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Abstract  
We live in times of multiple, interconnected environmental, social, and economic 
crises, where climate change, financial crashes, inequality, recession, unemployment, 
ecosystem degradation and loss of biodiversity compete to be the greatest challenge 
of our time; a situation which has been made emphatically clear by the recent 
financial collapse in 2008 and the subsequent global economic recession and political 
upheavals. The present thesis delves into this monstrous planetary spectacle using 
macroeconomics as an entry point for discussing different political aspects of the 
above-mentioned complex of crises.     
 
The main theme of the thesis is economic growth; an almost omnipresent economic 
policy object with significant gravity, able to determine and influence discussions and 
decisions about how to respond to the multiple environmental and social crises 
confronting societies today. As such, economic growth has become an almost 
unavoidable issue in economic sustainability research and policy; an entity which is 
difficult to avoid taking a stand on. Not surprisingly, this has made economic growth 
an object of strong antagonism between economic growth proponents and 
enthusiasts on one side, and growth opponents, sceptics, and agnostics on the other. 
The present thesis delves into this antagonism through several empirical entry 
points, the two most important of which are – economic policy proposals and 
macroeconomic models – for sustainability.  
 
One of the main purposes of the thesis is to open and re-politicise the issue of 
economic growth and sustainability by presenting a series of alternative analytical 
takes and interpretations of this issue. In this spirit, the thesis does not propose many 
concrete economic policy solutions, but provides an opportunity to engage in and 
perhaps rethink the politics of economic growth and sustainability.  
 
The thesis is organised around 3 research questions, which are addressed in a 
selection of articles. Question 1 regards policy proposals for solving the multiple 
environmental and economic crises of our age, and the narrative analysis of such 
proposals. Question 2 asks the ontological question of what economic growth is and 
how it has acquired its policy significance. Finally, Question 3 asks how 
macroeconomic modelling has been and still is involved in economic research and 
policy for sustainability in Denmark and internationally.  
 
Altogether, the thesis consists of six articles, of which four have been published, one 
has been accepted with revisions, while one is an unpublished working paper. Five of 
the articles are devoted to answering the three overall research questions, while the 
sixth article does not directly concern any of these questions; instead it supplements 
the issues of macroeconomics, economic growth and sustainability by delving into 
the topic of values and value pluralism.  
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Resumé 
Vi lever i en krisetid, hvor klimaforandringer, finansielle sammenbrud, ulighed, 
recession, arbejdsløshed, ødelæggelse af økosystemer, og tab af biodiversitet 
samtidigt er filtret ind i hinanden og konkurrerer om at være den mest uløselige  
samfundsmæssige udfordring. Denne afhandling adresserer dette planetariske 
kompleks af kriser og diskuterer forskellige makroøkonomiske aspekter af det. 
 
Hovedtemaet for afhandlingen er økonomisk vækst; et næsten allestedsnærværende 
politikobjekt med betydelig indflydelse på den politiske debat og beslutninger om, 
hvordan vi skal reagere på de mange miljømæssige og sociale kriser vore samfund 
konfronteres med i dag. Således er økonomisk vækst et næsten uundgåelig emne i 
diskussioner om økonomisk politik og bæredygtighed; et emne man simpelthen er 
nødt til at tage stilling til. Ikke mindst siden det finansielle sammenbrud i 2008 er 
økonomisk vækst således blevet genstand for genopblusset kontrovers om økonomisk 
vækst. Denne afhandling adresserer denne kontrovers fra flere forskellige empiriske 
vinkler, de to vigtigste af hvilke er politikforslag og makroøkonomiske modeller. 
 
Et af hovedformålene med afhandlingen er at åbne og re-politisere spørgsmålet om 
økonomisk vækst og bæredygtighed ved at præsentere en række alternative analyser 
og fortolkninger af dette tema. I overensstemmelse med denne tilgang advokerer 
afhandlingen ikke (i særlig udstrakt grad) for konkrete politiske løsninger, men 
forsøger snarere at skabe åbninger for nye forståelser af økonomisk vækst og 
bæredygtighed. 
 
Afhandlingen er organiseret omkring 3 forskningsspørgsmål som behandles i et 
udvalg af artikler. Spørgsmål 1 omhandler politiske forslag til løsning af de mange 
miljømæssige og økonomiske kriser i vores tid og den narrative analyse af sådanne 
forslag. Spørgsmål 2 stiller det ontologiske spørgsmål om, hvad økonomisk vækst er, 
og hvordan denne størrelse har fået så stor politisk betydning. Endelig stiller 
Spørgsmål 3 skarpt på, hvordan makroøkonomiske modeller er og har været 
involveret i økonomisk forskning og politik for bæredygtighed i Danmark og 
internationalt. 
 
Samlet består afhandlingen af seks artikler, hvoraf fire er blevet publiceret, en er 
accepteret med revisioner, mens en er et upubliceret arbejdspapir. Fem af artiklerne 
tager vare på besvarelsen af de tre overordnede forskningsspørgsmål, mens den sjette 
artikel ikke direkte vedrører disse spørgsmål; i stedet supplerer den diskussionerne af 
makroøkonomi, økonomisk vækst og bæredygtighed ved at behandle emnet 
værdipluralisme. 
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Introduction  
We are living in a time of planetary crises; climate change, ecosystem degradation 
and the eradication of species are taking place at this very moment, along with 
almost incomprehensible income and wealth inequality, social injustice and the unfair 
distribution of resources, while recent financial collapses and recessions are still 
affecting many national economies1. In response to this complex of crises, 
practitioners, activists, academics and even some politicians have taken an interest in 
sustainability and are proposing and investigating opportunities for a sustainable 
transition, a recurring theme of which is the economy.  
 
Explaining the status of the economy as a key sustainability issues is a complicated 
affair. However, one way to approach this may be to emphasise a widespread 
perception of a well-functioning economy as a prerequisite for sustained prosperity 
and wellbeing. Adding to this, the emergence of global, human-induced 
environmental threats to prosperity and wellbeing have provided a new context for 
understanding the economy and economic activities and highlighted the paradoxical 
status of the economy as both a provider of prosperity and wellbeing and a major 
obstacle to the sustenance of these. This paradoxical status of the economy is closely 
linked to the dilemma of growth, which refers to the double-sided issue of economic 
growth as both a generic recipe for economic welfare and environmental havoc 
(Jackson 2009). In this thesis, the dilemma of growth provides the backdrop for 
addressing the multi-facetted issue of economic growth and sustainability.  
 
Economic growth and sustainability  
Given the complexity of the matter, it is not surprising that a clear-cut definition of 
sustainability does not exist. However, common to most sustainability conceptions is 
the idea of extending some prosperous and beneficial state of collective affairs into 
the future so that unborn generations have equal preconditions for prosperity and 
wellbeing to current generations (Pollitt et al. 2010). This implies that severe climate 
change, the destruction of vital life-supporting ecosystems, and the mass eradication 
of species contradict sustainability, and that a sustainable transition involves actions 
and changes to avoid or overcome such threats to prosperity and wellbeing.  
 
In the sustainability literature, it is common to separate sustainability into three 
dimensions: environmental, social and economic, where sustainability ultimately depends 
on favourable conditions in all three dimensions (Pollitt et al. 2010). Even though 
this distinction is useful for multiple purposes, it is, however, not adopted in any 
strict sense in the present thesis. Rather, sustainability is seen as a more or less 
coherent ensemble of issues and solutions to problems such as climate change, 
inequality, loss of biodiversity, unemployment and ecosystem degradation, all of 
which are linked to economic activities in various ways. A key issue in this regard is 
the expansion of such activities – also labelled economic growth – the severe 
environmental consequences of which have been highlighted for decades and also 
                                            
1 Some might argue that the global economy is slowly recovering from the financial collapse of 2008; 
however, growth rates in the West have been declining for decades, unemployment in most Western 
countries is still high, and insufficiently regulated financial activities mean that the world is at 
constant risk of yet another financial collapse. 
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gradually documented (MEA 2005, Turner 2008, Krausmann et al. 2009, Rockström 
et al. 2009, Ewing et al. 2010, Wiedmann et al. 2015, Burton 2016).  
 
Economic growth and GDP 
By focusing on economic growth and sustainability, this thesis delves into 
contestations between various approaches to sustainability and sustainable 
transitions and investigates economic growth as a policy object of crucial importance 
to such transitions. In the following, I, therefore, briefly introduce some core issues 
in relation to economic growth and sustainability. To begin this, I wish to say a few 
words on the concept of gross domestic product (GDP); the current measure of 
economic growth.   
 
The GDP measure  
GDP is a measure of a country’s total marketed production for a year (or a quarter of 
a year), which is calculated in terms of the flow of money during this period (Mankiw 
1992). The flow of money is counted in two different ways: the total income from 
production and the total expenditure on purchases (Ibid.). These two aggregates are equal 
since “the expenditure of buyers on products is, by the rules of accounting, income to 
the sellers of these products” (Ibid.:17). Adding to this basic description, Mankiw 
explains how the flow of money can be divided into four overall components: 
consumption, investment, government purchases and net exports, where the sum of 
these components is considered equal to the total production of a country (Ibid.).  
 
Using this formulation of GDP to define economic growth implies that it is the 
increase of monetary flows due to the production of goods and services from one year 
(or quarter of a year) to the next. Not surprisingly, economic decline is the opposite, 
and a decrease in the production of goods and services over two or more consecutive 
quarters of a year is called a recession (Investopedia 2016).  
 
So far, I have merely presented basic accounting definitions of GDP, which are 
widely accepted and uncontested. However, controversy arises when economists 
argue that this measure of monetary flow is an appropriate measure of the wellbeing 
and prosperity of a nation as exemplified by the following: “Consumption is thus 
always rooted in production and income, and in so far as consumption is a good 
proxy for the economic wellbeing of people, annual GDP or income per person is a 
relevant measure of prosperity” (Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen 2010:29). The obvious 
consequence of this reasoning is that economic growth (as measured by GDP) is a 
vital source of prosperity and, therefore, also a key economic policy objective. This 
proposition is a central issue of contestation in this thesis and, in the following, I 
therefore briefly provide different perspectives on this issue, but first a short 
historical review.         
 
A history of GDP and economic growth 
Before I begin the review, I wish to stress that the history of GDP is part of the 
wider history of national accounting. In the following, however, I try to focus on 
GDP (to the extent that this is possible), while the wider concept of national accounts 
is further treated in the theory chapter of this thesis.  
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It has been asserted that the historical roots of the GDP measure stretches as far 
back as the seventeenth century, when the British Army commissioned a physician, 
named Petty, to draft a systematic survey of the wealth of Ireland for the purpose of 
taxation and the appropriation of wealth more generally (Fioramonti 2013). Petty’s 
attempt to measure the wealth of Ireland was followed in the eighteenth century by 
French and British economists who tried to devise theoretical conceptions of the 
wealth of nations (Cobb et al. 1995), while further steps towards more elaborate 
national accounts were taken during the late nineteenth century (Coyle 2014). 
However, the development of a coherent system of national accounts, including GDP, 
began during the first half of the twentieth century as part of the efforts to overcome 
the upheavals caused by the Great Depression and later the Second World War 
(Cobb et al. 1995, Fioramonti 2013).  
 
Haunted by the hardships of the Great Depression, the US government needed 
coherent economic statistics in order to get a comprehensive view of the current state 
of the economy, and to assess the effects of economic policy interventions (Cobb et al. 
1995). All sorts of economic data and statistics were available, but no aggregate 
measure existed (Coyle 2015). This led the US government to hire Kuznets to 
propose a measure of the current state of the economy, and Kuznets responded by 
drafting a measure which aggregated all marketed economic production into a single 
number (Fioramonti 2013).  
 
According to Coyle (2015), Kuznets intention was to draft a measure of economic 
welfare, which meant that he was concerned about identifying the elements of 
production that did actually contribute to welfare and those that ought to be 
excluded from the measurement since they did not. Along these lines, Kuznets also 
considered how the value of housework and home production could be included in his 
measure. Eventually, however, housework and home production were not included in 
the measure, while all marketed production was, regardless of whether it could be 
considered a contribution to economic welfare (Coyle 2015). One of the reasons for 
this decision was the difficulties of actually determining which elements of 
production should be excluded and how to impute reliable monetary values for 
housework and home production (Ibid.).  
 
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the policy focus changed from 
economic welfare to the question of how to afford and expand an industrial war 
machine (Coyle 2014). In the UK, Keynes became involved in answering this 
question, and his involvement spurred an increasing interest in measuring economic 
activity instead of economic welfare (Ibid.). This change resonated with the 
circumstances of war, but also with Keynes’s theoretical conceptions more generally, 
which the statistics of economic activity were eventually designed to fit. Among 
other things, this led to the inclusion of government spending (not least on the war) 
as a contribution to the measurement of overall economic performance. Before this, 
government spending was generally considered a drain on the economy.  
 
The efforts of Kuznets, Keynes, and several others, including Clark, a British 
economic statistician, to respond to the economic hardships of the Great Depression 
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and the Second World War gradually led to the drafting of a coherent system of 
national accounts including a measure of economic performance which was first 
dubbed ‘the gross national product’ (GNP) and later, in 1991, GDP. This massive 
accounting enterprise paved the way for a new territory of governmental politics – 
macroeconomic policy –  and was celebrated by the US Bureau of Economic Affairs in 
2000 as “[o]ne of the Great Inventions of the 20th Century” (Tily 2015).  
  
GDP as a measure of growth 
Even though GDP is today used as a measure of economic growth, this was not the 
case at the time of its development. Thus, during the Great Depression and the 
Second World War, the measure was a means of supporting policy decisions 
regarding the reduction of unemployment and the allocation of resources for war 
purposes, which meant that the measure was used as an indicator of the current level 
of economic activity, not the rate of change of this activity over time (Coyle 2014). 
This approach changed, however, during the fifties, and in the early sixties, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) introduced GNP 
as a measure of economic growth (Coyle 2015), not least as a part of the competition 
with the Soviet Union, who commanded its own measure of national income and 
economic growth (Fioramonti 2013). This institutionalisation marked a turning point 
in policy attention and initiated the rule of economic growth, where GNP shifted 
from being a policy tool to being a policy end in its own right (Coyle 2015).  
 
The gradual transformation of GNP to become an indicator of economic growth also 
included the incorporation of prosperity to the economic growth framework (Friman 
2002). Kuznets had tried and failed to promote his measure as an appropriate 
measure of economic welfare, yet the adoption of economic growth as a central focus 
to policy-making (Tily 2015), meant that Kuznets’s measure eventually gained a 
position as exactly such a measure. As emphasised by the earlier quote of Sørensen & 
Whitta-Jacobsen (2010), this status has strengthened the conception of consumption 
as a path to prosperity and has encouraged the promotion of economic growth by 
means of consumerist rhetoric and policies (Friman 2002, Fioramonti 2013).  
 
The power of GDP 
According to Fioramonti (2013), GDP has become the most powerful number in the 
world, a position rooted in the gradual institutionalisation of GDP as a measure of 
strength, success and failure of nation states and their governments, as a universal 
social cost metric, and as the arbiter over the affordability of public welfare 
expenditures (Ibid.). This institutionalisation took place over several decades and has 
now reached the point where economic growth is so ingrained in our collective 
perception of economic ‘realities’ that its power and influence seems to pass almost 
unnoticed.  
 
Along these lines, Fioramonti (2013) also explains how the measurement of wealth 
has been used as an instrument of exploitation and domination to serve the interests 
of wealthy elites (Ibid.). In the seventeenth century, the measurement helped clear a 
path for the British appropriation of wealth in Ireland, while today, it helps framing 
the exploitation of poor countries’ natural resources as a gain to their GDP (Ibid.). 
Finally, GDP also serves as a propaganda tool promoting the political status quo to 
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the benefit of the wealthy elite. An example of this is the narrative of trickle down 
economics, where economic growth is presented as a benefit to everybody in spite of 
the fact that most of this growth only benefits the top income bracket.     
 
New upheavals  
Even though the history of GDP is very much a story of an economic indicator 
conquering the world and achieving a hegemonic position, it is important to observe 
that this rise to supremacy was not without struggle or contestation (Fioramonti 
2013). To exemplify this, the Soviet Union, various organisations and several 
academics have commanded and promoted alternative measures of economic scale, 
performance and prosperity. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
‘victory’ of western capitalism, such alternatives have lived a relatively quiet life on 
the margin of mainstream economic discourse and policy-making.  
 
Yet, as the global community once again finds itself in times of upheaval, with recent 
financial crashes and economic crises causing great concern, and climate change and 
ecological havoc advancing, GDP as a measure of economic growth and prosperity 
has become the subject of renewed contestation. This means that the question of 
whether we are, in fact, ruled by the wrong measure, and whether we should start 
developing and being concerned about entirely different accounts is receiving 
increased attention. Some of the questions in this regard concern whether a measure 
of economic performance ought to account for the activities of the financial sector 
more thoroughly, and whether it is appropriate to exclude stocks of natural capital 
from a measure of aggregate wealth. Acting on such critical issues, in 2008, the 
French government commissioned a group of renowned economists, headed by 
Stiglitz, to reinvestigate the issue of measuring economic performance and social 
progress (Stiglitz et al. 2009). In the following, I briefly summarise some of the issue 
raised in this and other similar investigations.  
 
A new measure of economic welfare 
In their report to the French government, the authors emphasise that “what we 
measure shapes what we collectively strive to pursue – and what we pursue 
determines what we measure” (Stiglitz et al. 2009:9). This underlines reciprocity 
between measurement and collective aspiration, a circular reinforcement, which, in 
the case of economic policy, has resulted in GDP growth becoming a core aspiration 
in its own right. However, this circular reinforcement appears to have reached a 
point, where the gap between what GDP measures and what probably ought to be 
our main collective concerns has grown to such proportions that it can no longer be 
ignored.  
 
One way to understand Stiglitz and his co-authors’ response to this problem is to see 
it as a return to the problems facing Kuznets, when he was trying to design a 
measure of economic welfare during the hardships of the Great Depression. Thus, 
Stiglitz et al. reopen the question of whether a measure of total market production is, 
in fact, a good proxy for societal wellbeing, and their conclusion is negative. Having 
said this, it is important to stress that the authors still consider it relevant to measure 
economic activity, not least because it determines the level of employment, yet it 
must be done appropriately and for the right set of purposes.  
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This understanding resonates with other recent fairly mainstream critiques of GDP, 
which emphasise the inadequacy of GDP to account for much of the value-added in 
present day economies (Coyle 2014, The Economist 2016a,b). Exemplifying this, The 
Economist explains how GDP is often unable to capture the value of innovations and 
services in the digital economy, and more generally, it is stated that much of what 
people hold dear is not captured by our “main yardstick of value” (The Economist 
2016a). Putting this into an historical perspective, it is also stressed that the original 
purpose of GDP was to measure the productive capacity of the economy, while it is 
now used as a general compass for economic policy navigation in relation to taxation, 
unemployment and inflation (Ibid.). Finally, it is added that not only is GDP failing 
in terms of capturing the value-added of present day economies, using it as a measure 
of welfare is even more dubious (Ibid.).  
 
Along this line of reasoning, Stiglitz et al. divide their investigation into three overall 
topics: economic performance, wellbeing and sustainability. Addressing the first theme, 
the authors emphasise how modern economies have changed significantly since GDP 
was invented, which presents new difficulties in accounting for economic output. To 
exemplify this, the authors highlight the massive expansion of the service economy 
(including finance), where the value added is difficult to capture, and to which the 
keyword is often quality rather than quantity; a distinction which GDP is not able to 
capture. Adding to this, the authors also stress that there is a need to redesign the 
measurement of government spending so that welfare contributions of public 
services, such as education, healthcare and housing, are appropriately accounted for 
(Stiglitz et al. 2009).  
 
Turning to the question of wellbeing, the authors argue that there is a need to deploy 
multiple measures of wellbeing to complement the measurement of economic activity. 
As recognised by the authors, however, the list of welfare components not included in 
GDP is long: income and wealth distribution, health, education, political voice, social 
relationships, and equality of human conditions. In order to devise a reasonable 
welfare measure, all of these would have to somehow be taken into account. 
Furthermore, the authors distinguish between subjective and objective dimensions of 
wellbeing, dimensions which require very different methods of data collection and 
accounting. In conclusion, it could be argued that there are significant challenges to 
the project of designing a coherent set of measures for societal wellbeing.  
 
Finally, the issue of sustainability is addressed as a question of how current levels of 
wellbeing can be sustained. To this end, the authors acknowledge the state of our 
environment as a key issue. Addressing this issue, the authors suggest the 
deployment of a well-defined dashboard of physical indicators to monitor the state of 
the environment. The basic logic in this regard is that “[c]hoices between promoting 
GDP and protecting the environment may be false choices, once environmental 
degradation is appropriately included in our measurement of economic performance” 
(Stiglitz et al. 2009:7).  
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Radical contestations  
At this point, it should be noted that the Stiglitz report is only one of a long list of 
critical reviews of GDP, and in fact a rather mainstream example. Hence, I would 
now like to direct attention towards more radical growth contestations, for which I 
have chosen the publication of the Limits to Growth report in 1972 as a starting 
point.  
 
In the early 1970s, a group of young academics was commissioned by the Club of 
Rome to make an assessment of the future predicaments of mankind (Meadows et al. 
1972). This assessment was published in a report, which presented a series of 
scenarios for the future and concluded that economic growth was on a course of 
collapse, and would eventually meet its physical limits if nothing was done to change 
the course (Ibid.). The report immediately sparked heated debate, and the authors 
were met with harsh attacks from economists and politicians in several countries 
(Friman 2002, Cerasuolo 2012). What the authors hoped would be considered a 
reasonable warning and become a turning point in economic policy debate, was 
instead fiercely attacked and utterly rejected by mainstream economists and 
politicians (Cerasuolo 2012).  
 
In spite of its very limited success in terms of changing mainstream economic policy 
objectives, the Limits to Growth report still had a significant impact on various 
academic communities and grassroots organisations, which adopted the Limits to 
Growth agenda and continued to promote and elaborate on the messages forwarded 
in the report. In this manner, the report became an important critique of economic 
growth, which was later followed by several attacks on the GDP measure for being a 
more or less irrelevant measure that combined costs and benefits and excluded all 
sorts of welfare components, such as housework and the stocks of natural resources, 
which help sustain our existence (Røpke 1997, van den Bergh 2011).  
 
The critique of economic growth is closely connected to the development of the 
discipline of ecological economics, the founders of which expressed critical views on 
economic growth even before the Limits to Growth report. Thus, for decades, 
ecological economists have argued that the economy is a metabolic organism, the 
biophysical size of which cannot continue to grow indefinitely (Røpke 2004). In 
recognition of this biophysical limitation, some ecological economists argue that we 
should instead try to achieve a steady state economy with a stable or mildly 
fluctuating biophysical size, which does not exceed ecological limits (Daly 1991, 
CASSE 2016). 
 
Such conceptions of the biophysical nature of the economy and the consequential 
impossibility of perpetual economic growth have existed for decades as a marginal 
economic discourse. More recently, however, in the wake of the financial crash in 
2008 – which presented an opportunity to express a wide range of financial, economic 
and ecological crises as part of one unified crisis – the critique of economic growth 
has gained further support and gathered opposition under banners such as prosperity 
without growth (Jackson 2009), degrowth (Kallis et al. 2012), and beyond GDP (Seaford 
2013).  
 
   8 
Even though these labels stand for a very wide range of issues and proposals, it is, in 
my view, fair to claim that they all, in one way or another, concern what Jackson has 
coined the dilemma of growth. This dilemma articulates economic growth as a 
double-sided issue: on the one hand, economic growth provides societal stability, 
welfare and jobs, while on the other, it has detrimental environmental effects 
(Jackson 2009). This dilemma is central to the thesis and sets the scene of analysis by 
providing the core macroeconomic conundrum - how to overcome the dilemma of 
growth? - which presents entirely new challenges to economic thinking and has led to 
new modes of storytelling and macroeconomic modelling, which are further 
investigated in this thesis.        
 
Three positions   
In relation to the economic growth and sustainability controversies here described, 
three overall, overlapping (especially in the case of the latter two) economic growth 
positions ought to be mentioned: the protagonist, the antagonist and the agnostic 
position. The protagonist position can be further divided into two categories: the 
super optimists and the decouplers, where the former consider economic growth to be 
the solution to our environmental problems – as we get richer, we can afford to 
improve the environment – while the latter acknowledge that there is a need to 
determine how to decouple economic growth from environmental impact (OECD 
2011). 
 
Growth antagonists, on the other hand, are explicitly against the pursuit of further 
economic growth, and degrowth has become a well known label for this form of 
antagonism. However, degrowth is not merely an anti-growth movement, it also has 
positive content. Thus, Kallis explains that degrowth “is about imagining and 
enacting alternative visions to modern growth-based development” (Kallis 2015:0) 
and “an invitation to abandon economistic thinking and construct viable alternatives 
to capitalism (Kallis 2015:1). As such, degrowth is perhaps more than anything else a 
movement towards the re-politicisation of the economy and a move towards 
regaining democratic control over our economies by means of hard-fought 
institutional change (Kallis 2015:1). Adding to these considerations, however, Kallis 
also emphasises that degrowth involves the idea of “downscaling affluent economies 
and their material flows in a just and equitable manner” (Kallis 2015:1).  
 
Finally, growth agnostics, who use labels such as a-growth and post-growth, question 
the status of GDP growth as the matter of most concern in this era of environmental 
and social crises. Instead, we should rather care about material flows, ecological 
impact, employment, equality, and justice and stop the quest for growth, whether it is 
measured by GDP, green GDP or any other fancy progress indicator. This approach 
reduces economic growth and GDP to less important residuals of other more 
important policy objectives (van den Bergh 2011). A part of the a-growth agenda is 
the suggestion to simply stop measuring GDP, which would free resources to do 
other more useful accounting and help us to direct our attention towards the more 
pressing issues of our time (van den Bergh 2011). Along these lines, it is also 
reasonable to ask whether progress in fact ought to be a core concern of our time. 
Another approach could be to say: let’s stop worrying about further progress and 
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start to solve the calamitous problems we have caused on this planet during the last 
couple of centuries of progress.  
 
Research questions  
The individual articles of this thesis are all rooted in the controversies and issues 
presented in the preceding sections and, thus, economic growth and sustainability 
constitute a pivotal theme, which is addressed from several different angles 
throughout the thesis. In order to navigate the complex waters of this theme, my 
research was guided by three overall questions. In the following, I first present the 
questions and then explain how the individual articles respond to them.    
 
The questions 
 
1. How can a comprehensive view of policy proposals for solving the multiple 
environmental and economic crises of our age be provided, and what can a narrative 
analysis of these proposals tell us about their political strength?  
 
2. What is economic growth, and how did it become a policy objective with the ability to 
obstruct policy action in favour of a sustainable transition?  
 
3. What is the role of macroeconomic modelling in policy and research for sustainability? 
 
Question 1 is primarily addressed in Article 1, where a collection of policy reports is 
investigated, a comprehensive mapping of policy proposals is presented, and a 
narrative analysis of the proposals is performed. The question of the political 
strength of the proposals is approached from a narrative policy analysis angle, which 
means that the proposals are analysed as stories expressing varying degrees of 
persuasive strength (Urhammer & Røpke 2013). This line of investigation is to some 
extent continued in Article 2, in which the question of characters, such as heroes, 
villains, gods and demi-gods, in policy narratives is briefly elaborated (Urhammer 
2015a).      
 
Question 2 is primarily addressed in Article 3, where this onto-political question is 
addressed by describing economic growth as a constructed monster that circulates, in 
various forms and appearances, through well established channels, between different 
sites such as statistical offices, ministries and news media (Urhammer 2014). The 
article takes a Latourian perspective on economic growth and uses notions such as 
translation and circulation to describe how the monster stays alive and maintains its 
position as arbiter of economic policy (Ibid.). In relation to the latter part of question 
2, it is argued that the ability to obstruct policy actions in favour of a sustainable 
transition is rooted in the status of economic growth as the primary objective of 
economic policy and as a proxy for collective wellbeing, which entails that policies 
that can be framed as a threat to economic growth are implicitly also a threat to our 
common wealth and wellbeing (Ibid.).   
 
The ontological status of economic growth is also a topic in Article 2, where 
economic growth is presented as the supreme god in a neoclassical system of belief, 
and the ability to obstruct policy actions in favour of a sustainable transition is 
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that can be framed as a threat to economic growth are implicitly also a threat to our 
common wealth and wellbeing (Ibid.).   
 
The ontological status of economic growth is also a topic in Article 2, where 
economic growth is presented as the supreme god in a neoclassical system of belief, 
and the ability to obstruct policy actions in favour of a sustainable transition is 
explained by an alliance between a neoclassical system of belief and a wealthy elite 
interested in maintaining its favourable position (Urhammer 2015a).   
 
Question 3 is addressed in Article 4 and 5; where macroeconomic modelling for 
sustainability is a key issue (Urhammer forthcoming, in progress). In order to acquire 
a clearer notion of the term macroeconomic modelling for sustainability, the reader 
will hopefully benefit from consulting the section about macroeconomics in the 
theory chapter of this introduction and in Article 5, where a more elaborate 
discussion of modelling for sustainability is presented (Urhammer in progress). 
However, a brief explanation of the term is that macroeconomic modelling for 
sustainability concerns the incorporation of environmental variables and concerns in 
various computational macroeconomic modelling frameworks.  
 
Article 4 investigates the Danish history of a modelling discipline, which I have 
labelled macroeconomic energy modelling – a subset of the wider family of 
macroeconomic models for sustainability. As the story unfolds, it is explained how 
economic growth plays a key role in this development, and how the issue of energy 
was only the first in a series of sustainability concerns to get integrated in 
macroeconomic modelling (Urhammer forthcoming). As such, Article 4 provides an 
historical introduction to Article 5, which delves into a discussion of contemporary 
macroeconomic modelling for sustainability with the intention of contributing to 
ongoing discussions of ecological macroeconomics (Urhammer in progress).  
 
Finally, it ought to be mentioned that Article 6 (Pirgmaier & Urhammer 2015) is a 
supplementary article, which does not respond to any of the three overall research 
questions. Rather it provides a background analysis of values and value pluralism, 
which is also a part of the antagonism of economic growth and sustainability.  
 
As the reader of the thesis will probably observe, the research questions and their 
answers express some kind of an activist attitude, and they are in fact meant as 
contributions to an activist agenda in favour of a sustainable transition. In this 
regard, I do not consider the articles to be objective knowledge pieces, but rather 
interventions with the purpose of providing new perspectives on economic growth 
and sustainability as a key policy issue of our time. It is my hope that this will bring 
useful insights for further thinking and action in favour of a sustainable transition. 
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Thesis overview 
 
Main 
theme 
Economic Growth and Sustainability  
Research 
questions 
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3  
Articles Article 1 & 2 Article 2 & 3 Article 4 & 5 Article 6 
 
Table 1. Overview of research questions and articles 
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Theory   
In this chapter, I present an account of some theoretical aspects of the thesis. The 
chapter is divided into different topical sections: the first section consists of a few 
words about the interdisciplinary approach of the thesis. Following this comes an 
explanation of some different roles played by theory, which leads to a brief 
introduction to macroeconomics. This is followed by a section describing the theories 
used for analytical purposes, while the chapter ends with some words on the 
existence of an object named the economy.   
 
Interdisciplinarity  
This thesis relies on a multitude of theoretical perspectives, and interdisciplinary is 
probably the best adjective to describe it. What I mean by interdisciplinary in this 
regard is simply that it is more or less impossible to place the thesis in one specific 
disciplinary category since it draws upon and involves a wide range of disciplines. 
Thus, instead of choosing a specific discipline and its methods as the point of 
departure, the thesis puts an issue – economic growth and sustainability – in the 
centre of attention and addresses this issue from multiple theoretical angles.  
 
A relevant critique of this approach is that it is very difficult for the interdisciplinary 
researcher to acquire an in-depth understanding of all the disciplines and theories at 
play in the research, and I am afraid that this critique applies in my case. However, I 
also find that there are advantages to this cross-cutting approach, which lie in the 
establishment of a wide range of entrances to addressing a multifaceted issue.   
 
To grasp the interdisciplinary character of the thesis, one merely has to look at the 
two terms – economic growth and sustainability – and several disciplines are 
immediately called upon. To explain this, I initially wish to direct attention towards 
economics and natural science; economics in its capacity as the traditional discipline for 
dealing with economic growth, and natural science due to its role in investigating 
issues of sustainability such as climate change, ecosystem degradation and loss of 
biodiversity. Thus, the main theme of the thesis opens a door to an interdisciplinary 
territory; a territory which ecological economics has roamed for some decades now. 
Whether this thesis actually belongs to the field of ecological economics is not of 
great importance to me, but it is certainly fair to say that the thesis engages in issues 
which are core to ecological economics, especially to the sub-field of ecological 
economics labelled ecological macroeconomics.    
 
Different roles of theory 
Before I go on to describe some of the most important disciplines and theories at play 
in the thesis, I would like to suggest a distinction between three different roles of 
disciplines and theories in my thesis, which I have labelled: background, object of 
research and tool of analysis.  
 
The role of the background discipline is played by various natural science disciplines, 
which provide a backdrop of concerns to the thesis in the form of alarming accounts 
of climate change, ecosystem degradation and loss of biodiversity (MEA 2005, 
Rockström et al. 2009, IPCC 2014), to name but a few. Each of these issues could be 
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the subject of social science research, and one could investigate their social 
constitution. However, this is not the aim of this thesis. Instead, climate change, 
ecosystem degradation and loss of biodiversity are simply treated as very troubling 
circumstances, which need to be addressed collectively and without any further 
hesitation.  
 
Theory as object of research concerns the fact that certain academic disciplines and 
theories are important empirical sites of research to the thesis. Here I especially refer 
to macroeconomics and the accounting methods it depends on, the modelling 
practices it fosters, and the policy proposals which can be associated with it. Finally, 
theory as a tool of analysis includes discourse analysis, narratology and various 
science and technology studies (STS) perspectives, which have been deployed to 
answer the different research questions of the thesis. 
 
In the following, I try to account for the most important disciplines and theories that 
play the latter two roles in my thesis and also, very briefly, relate the theories to 
various questions treated in the articles.  
 
Theory as object of research  
Even though this thesis does not rely on macroeconomics as a theoretical tool of 
analysis, macroeconomics still plays an important role in the thesis as an object of 
empirical research. In the following, I therefore give a short introduction to 
macroeconomics and some of its different schools.   
 
Macroeconomics  
No clear-cut definition of macroeconomics exists, yet I think few would object to the 
view that macroeconomics concerns the economy of nation states defined in terms of 
economic aggregates – production, consumption, investments, inflation, unemployment, the 
balance of payments, public budgets – and the causal relations between such aggregates 
(Jespersen 2009, Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen 2010).  
 
Even though economists have theorised over such aggregates and relations before 
him, it is widely accepted that the British economist Keynes is the founder of modern 
macroeconomics, the literary beginning of which is marked by his seminal book The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, published in 1936 (Jespersen 2007). 
The General Theory was written as a response to the calamitous unemployment and 
the extreme economic, financial and political instability of the interwar period. These 
difficulties are reflected in Keynes’s theoretical endeavours to provide sound policy 
advice for addressing and curbing the economic instabilities and the unemployment 
problem of his time (de Vroey & Malgrange 2011). 
 
In this sense, Keynes’s work had a significant normative and policy-oriented 
character, which has been a salient identity of macroeconomics ever since. To better 
understand this identity, it is useful to observe that, in spite of many deep 
methodological disagreements, different schools of macroeconomics share the idea 
that economic policy can make a difference, in the sense that it is possible to influence 
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macroeconomic mechanisms and developments by means of economic policy 
(Jespersen 2007).  
 
Even though Keynes is widely recognised as the founder of modern macroeconomics, 
it must be stressed, however, that theorising on the wealth of nations and the 
economic affairs of countries predates Keynes by centuries. Both classical and 
neoclassical economists before Keynes addressed these issues, and Keynes was 
certainly aware of this theoretical heritage, to which he remained loyal during his 
early carrier until he finally rejected it by developing a radically different economic 
theory (Jespersen 2007). Thus, Keynes’s early work can be seen as part of the 
neoclassical tradition, while his General Theory marked a radical break with this 
school of thought, a break which still divides modern macroeconomics into two 
fundamentally different methodological traditions: the neoclassical and the Keynesian 
(Ibid.).  
 
Different schools of macroeconomics   
In spite of the fact that there are fundamental differences between neoclassical and 
Keynesian economics, it is difficult to obtain a comprehensive view of the distinction 
between the two. This difficulty is rooted in theoretical developments, subsequent to 
Keynes’s work, which include various attempts to integrate the two schools in 
various ways. Jespersen, however, offers a useful distinction by emphasising a 
fundamental divide between the two in terms of the neoclassical commitment to 
general equilibrium and Keynes’s devotion to the concept of fundamental uncertainty. 
Adding to this, Jespersen also describes the divide as one between idealism and 
realism. In the following, I try to account for some of the features that characterise 
two fundamentally different schools of macroeconomic thinking.  
 
Neoclassical macroeconomics  
Neoclassical macroeconomics is rooted in the work of the neoclassical economists of 
the nineteenth century, who developed a highly mathematical economic discipline 
inspired by Newton’s classical mechanics (Mirowski 1989). Neoclassical scholars 
conceptualised the economy as a deterministic ensemble of markets, for which the 
equilibrium between supply and demand on each individual market can be summed to 
a general equilibrium of all markets of the economy. In other words, this means that 
there always exists a vector of prices which clears all markets so that supply equals 
demand on all markets simultaneously (de Vroey & Malgrange 2011). The French 
economist, Walras, was the first to formalise this idea in a strict mathematical proof, 
while Arrow and Debreu further refined the mathematics of general equilibrium in 
the 1950s, thus strengthening the status of the general equilibrium axiom as the 
fundamental tenet of neoclassical macroeconomics (Jespersen 2007).  
 
As an aggregate theory of supply and demand on particular markets, neoclassical 
macroeconomics can be seen as generalisation of so-called microeconomic theory 
resting on the existence of a representative economic agent, who optimises utility 
(households) and profits (firms). In order to do so, the agent needs to be rational and 
have perfect foresight, meaning that he has a clear ordering of preferences and always 
knows the outcome of his choices (Hodgson 1988). Adding to this, Jespersen stresses 
that perfect foresight, in the macroeconomic sense of the word, implies that the 
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economic agent always knows the vector of prices which clears all markets in general 
equilibrium (Jespersen 2007).  
 
As a generalised theory of markets, neoclassical macroeconomics addresses 
fundamental problems, such as unemployment, inflation and the balance of payments, 
as questions of market equilibria that can be analysed independently due to the ceteris 
paribus – all other things being equal – assumption. In the case of unemployment, this 
means that solving the unemployment problem merely becomes a mater of finding 
the price (wage) which clears the labour market. According to this theory, 
involuntary unemployment only exists if wages are not flexible enough to clear the 
labour market.  
 
Due to its very stylised description of the economy as an ensemble of perfectly 
functioning markets, Jespersen has characterised neoclassical macroeconomics as a 
theory concerned with how the economy ought to function ideally. This has 
prompted him to call neoclassical macroeconomics a form of idealism expressed in 
terms of axiomatic assumptions such as rationality, perfect foresight and general 
equilibrium (Jespersen 2007). Adding to this, it ought to be mentioned that 
neoclassical economics has also been described as a positivist science, meaning that it 
confesses to the idea that it is possible to arrive at true statements about the world if 
reason and logic (mathematics) is applied to empirical evidence in the proper way 
(Hodgson 1988).  
 
Keynesian macroeconomics  
According to Jespersen, Keynes’s economic theory differs from neoclassical 
economics especially on two distinct points: the economy as a whole and fundamental 
uncertainty (Jespersen 2007). The idea of thinking about the economy as a whole was a 
rejection of the neoclassical conviction that the economy could be thought of in terms 
of separate markets, independently analysable according to the ceteris paribus 
assumption. Instead, Keynes’s theory attempted to unify all the various 
macroeconomic aggregates into one causally connected system. One of the 
advantages of this approach is the avoidance of the atomistic fallacy, which, very 
broadly speaking, is the fallacy of explaining the development of the whole economy 
by means of the aggregated market behaviour of a single stylised economic agent 
(Ibid.). Adding to this, Keynes introduced the idea of fundamental uncertainty, which 
was a rejection of the neoclassical general equilibrium axiom, which rests upon the 
idea of the perfect foresight of economic agents. Instead, Keynes emphasised that 
there are multiple things economic agents are unaware of and that the future is 
highly uncertain – full of stuff about which “we simply don’t know” (Jespersen 2007, 
citing Keynes) – which makes the general equilibrium axiom, dependent on the 
rational expectations and perfect foresight, useless. This new approach meant that 
especially the question of the distant future – the long term – became a question 
characterised by fundamental uncertainty instead of general equilibrium (Ibid.).   
 
The uncertainty approach to economics opened a door to thinking about the 
economies of nation states in an entirely different way, which also included 
significant attention to institutional arrangements, such as public welfare and 
regulation, put in place to handle the fundamental uncertainty of the future. Finally, 
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Keynes’s rejection of basic neoclassical tenets required attention to path dependencies 
connecting past, present and future by other means than perfect foresight and 
general equilibrium (Ibid.).  
 
In relation to unemployment, Keynes realised that the persistent unemployment, 
which characterised the interwar period, could not be explained within the 
neoclassical general equilibrium framework. Instead, he suggested that insufficient 
aggregate demand was the cause of unemployment, and that this deficiency had its 
roots in insufficient investments (King 2002). Keynes concluded along these lines 
that full employment was only a special case of his more general theory of 
employment, and that governments needed to stimulate aggregate demand by means 
of public investments in order to bring down the high levels of unemployment (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, Keynes recognised an urgent need for a deeper understanding of the 
financial sector and for a reform of monetary theory and policy, which had proven 
inadequate for explaining or harnessing the financial dynamics behind the Great 
Crash in 1929 (Ibid.).  
 
Unlike the neoclassical school, Jespersen argues, Keynesian economics is devoted not 
to how the economy should ideally function, but to how it actually functions. As such, 
Keynesian economics is devoted to realism and to studying the social ontology, 
characterised by fundamental uncertainty, which constitutes the mechanisms and 
development of the economy. This realist view also implies a distinction between 
theory and reality, where the job of the economist is to ensure the correspondence 
between the two (Jespersen 2007).    
 
Different paths  
Since the publication of Keynes’s General Theory in 1936, macroeconomics has 
branched out in several directions, which has led to a number of slightly confusing 
labels of macroeconomic schools. Sticking to Jespersen’s distinction (previously 
explained), it is possible, however, to separate these schools into two overall paths: 
the neoclassical and the Keynesian, where the neoclassical synthesis, the new classicals, 
and the new Keynesians belong to the former, while the post-Keynesians belong to the 
latter. In the following, I provide a very short account of these different schools of 
macroeconomics.  
 
The neoclassical path 
In the years following the publication of the General Theory, several attempts to 
further formalise Keynes’s theory mathematically, such as Hicks’s IS-LM model and 
Tinbergen’s macroeconometric models, emerged (de Vroey & Malgrange 2011). 
However, as Jespersen observes, characteristic of these attempts was a devotion to 
neoclassical principles, which meant that these models can be seen as attempts at 
incorporating Keynes’s theory of effective demand (as an explanations for the level of 
production and unemployment) in the general equilibrium framework. This 
theoretical integration can be seen as the first step in the direction of the so-called 
neoclassical synthesis, where a Keynesian analysis is only relevant in the short run, 
while the long run is characterised by general equilibrium (Jespersen 2007). In spite 
of this fundamental break with Keynes’s approach, the proponents of the Neoclassical 
Synthesis still believed in the impact of fiscal policy on the adjustment of the 
   18 
economy to the general equilibrium (Ibid.). The Neoclassical Synthesis came to 
dominate the three decades following the Second World War, and during the fifties it 
was further elaborated by Solow, who developed a highly influential economic 
growth model based on the framework (Ibid.). Thus, the neoclassical synthesis came 
to command two types of models: short term demand-driven macroeconometric 
models to explain business cycles, and long term economic growth models based on 
the general equilibrium assumption.  
 
In the late sixties, strong voices critical of the Keynesian view and the neoclassical 
synthesis gained attention. The most prominent of these belonged to Friedman, who 
criticised the Keynesian reliance on a negative relation between inflation and 
unemployment, a critique which was strengthened in the early seventies by the 
simultaneous rise of inflation and unemployment (stagflation) (de Vroey & 
Malgrange 2011). Reinforcing Friedman’s critique, Lucas used the stagflation 
phenomenon to initiate a fierce attack on the Keynesian framework and the 
neoclassical synthesis and, thus, took the lead in a movement which would eventually 
reinstall neoclassical economics as the mainstream of macroeconomic theory.  
 
Lucas’s uprising, dubbed new classical macroeconomics, contained several points of 
critique including the rejection of macroeconometric models and the lack of a micro-
foundation of the Keynesian approach. The critique included the view that 
statistically estimated behavioural relations were not stable over longer periods of 
time, which implied that macroeconomic models should instead be based on the 
deeper, stable microeconomic behavioural relations, the existence of which Lucas did 
not venture into verifying empirically (Jespersen 2007). Thus, Lucas’s critique led to 
an increased emphasis on the optimising behaviour of individual economic agents and 
the general equilibrium as the basis of macroeconomic analysis (de Vroey & 
Malgrange 2011).  
 
In response to the new classical turn, leading proponents of the neoclassical synthesis 
accepted the demand for a consistent micro-foundation of macroeconomics and 
developed a school dubbed new Keynesian economics, where rational expectations 
and general equilibrium played centre stage, yet with a strong focus on 
understanding various rigidities in the adjustment to the general equilibrium 
(Jespersen 2007).   
 
The post-Keynesian school 
In order to account for the school of post-Keynesian economics, it is necessary to 
return to the 1930s, when opposing interpretations of Keynes’s work led to different 
paths of development. As already described, one theoretical development consisted of 
integrating aspects of Keynes’s ideas into the neoclassical general equilibrium 
framework, although this approach was not appreciated by all of Keynes’s 
contemporaries and successors. This meant that several economists stayed loyal to 
Keynes’s emphasis on fundamental uncertainty and the rejection of the general 
equilibrium axiom. Yet, several years passed before a common Keynesian front 
against the neoclassical synthesis emerged during the sixties, and a network of self-
proclaimed post-Keynesians was establish in the seventies (King 2002).   
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When Keynes died, he left a wide range of questions unanswered, but the post-
Keynesians adopted his principles and interests and engaged in theorising along his 
conceptual path to answer some of these question and new ones which had emerged 
(Jespersen 2007). Thus, post-Keynesians responded to an increased interest in 
understanding economic growth and developed a theoretical alternative to Solow’s 
growth model based instead on Keynes’s ideas of effective demand. Furthermore, 
post-Keynesians have proposed an understanding of money, which replaces the 
monetarist idea of exogenous money supply with a theory of endogenous money, and 
post-Keynesians have also taken a strong interest in distributional aspects, which 
cannot be treated properly within the market-based framework of neoclassical 
economics (Ibid.).  
 
Since the 2008 financial crash, post-Keynesians have experienced an increased 
interest in their theoretical perspectives, not least due to the fact that members of the 
post-Keynesian economics community predicted the financial bust, more or less 
precisely, which mainstream economists and their models did not. These predictions 
were based on post-Keynesian approaches to financial accounting and monetary 
theory (Bezemer 2010).   
 
Ecological macroeconomics  
In its capacity as a discipline concerned with how to sustain the economic stability 
and prosperity of nation states, it can be argued that macroeconomics is in fact a 
sustainability discipline. However, the emergence of global, human-induced 
environmental problems and transboundary issues of inequality and resource 
appropriation have revealed the inadequacy of macroeconomics (regardless of 
theoretical inclination) to address wider environmental and social applications of 
sustainability.  
 
Addressing this inadequacy, ecological economists have proposed the biophysical 
reconceptualisation of economics, which is founded on the view that economies are 
metabolic organisms that extract and transform energy and materials and emit 
pollutants (Røpke 2004). Using this perspective, environmental havoc, such as 
climate change, the destruction of ecosystems and the depletion of natural resources, 
can be explained as the result of economic metabolism. An obvious consequence of 
this biophysical ontology is the rejection of perpetual economic growth (metabolic 
growth) as a remedy for sustained prosperity (Jackson 2009). 
  
This question also concerned the classical economists of the eighteenth century, some 
of whom argued that the amount of and access to land constitute physical limits to 
economic growth, a consideration which disappeared from economics, however, with 
the emergence of neoclassical economics in the nineteenth century (Friman 2002). 
Yet, during the late twentieth century, the question of limits re-emerged, not least 
due to the publication of the Limits to Growth report in 1972, and since the financial 
crash in 2008, this agenda has, once again, received increased attention (Røpke 2013).   
 
The conglomerate of economic, environmental and social crises that appeared in 
concert after the crash in 2008 spurred several ecological economists to further 
consider what macroeconomics ought to be in the context of growing global 
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environmental challenges and inequity. This has led to a collective effort to define 
ecological macroeconomics for the twenty first century. In the following, I sketch 
some headlines of this (very ambitious) theoretical endeavour.   
 
The biophysical ontology of ecological economics provides a backdrop for ecological 
macroeconomics by putting an emphasis on the scale of the economy and the 
distribution of resources. The limited planetary space for expansion leads to a 
concern for the material size of our economies, while the limited amount of natural 
resources makes it necessary to consider how these are distributed justly. One of the 
consequences of this focus is the call to abandon the objective of continued GDP 
growth, which makes the dilemma of growth a key challenge to ecological 
macroeconomics. The dilemma of growth refers to the problem that economic 
growth is our main recipe for economic stability and prosperity, while at the same 
time it is undermining the biophysical preconditions for stability and prosperity 
(Jackson, 2009). Recognising this dilemma, Jackson et al. state that “there is a need to 
develop a fully consistent ecological macroeconomics in which it is possible to 
maintain financial stability, ensure high levels of employment, improve the 
distribution of income and wealth and yet remain within the ecological constraints 
and resource limits of a finite planet” (Jackson et al. 2015: 6). This view highlights 
how ecological macroeconomics concerns the integration of the traditional 
macroeconomic heritage and the concerns of ecological economists.  
 
Evaluating the problems confronting ecological macroeconomics, Røpke highlights a 
series of challenges and requirements attached to this theoretical project, which 
includes the inability of the traditional macroeconomic focus on nation states to 
capture the global character of the problems facing economics today. This means that 
the term macro must be expanded to incorporate a planetary perspective on the 
pursuit of ‘the common good’ (Røpke 2013). Adding to this, Røpke also emphasises 
how macroeconomics is not suited to handling the problem of transformation, which 
is most likely to involve radical institutional change and international security issues 
in times of possible upheaval and instability (Ibid.).  
 
To address some of these challenges, Røpke suggests a list of requirements for 
ecological macroeconomics, which includes: the development of an elaborate 
consumption perspective to complement the mainstream production perspective, 
abandoning GDP as a key economic policy measure, accounting directly for natural 
material flows, handling radical institutional change, and incorporating the concept 
of socio-technical systems (Ibid.). Obviously, this is an immense task, and not 
surprisingly it involves the engagement of several different disciplines. Thus, 
ecological macroeconomics can be seen as a joint effort to integrate various schools of 
heterodox economics, especially post-Keynesian and ecological economics (Ibid.).  
 
There are probably many answers to why these two schools of economics have 
ventured into collaboration, yet it is perhaps not so surprising that two marginalised 
schools of economics have joined forces in order to gain influence, not least since 
these two schools seem to supplement each other very well. Thus, ecological 
economics brings an elaborate ecological perspective to the table, while post-
Keynesian economics offers a solid methodological apparatus for analysing money, 
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finance and economic crises, which have been insufficiently treated by mainstream 
macroeconomics.  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that efforts to incorporate the community of 
sustainable transition research into the ecological macroeconomics agenda is also 
taking place. This means that, among other things, the view on the economy as a set 
of sectors, connected by means of production and consumption can be supplemented 
by a perspective which interprets economic processes as an interplay between socio-
technical systems (Ibid.).  
 
Accounting 
According to Coyle, three main factors of macroeconomics motivated economic 
policies in the post-war period: theory, statistics, and modelling (Coyle 2014). In my 
view, these factors are still key to the interface between macroeconomics and policy-
making and to the existence of a policy object named ‘the economy’. In the preceding, 
I have given a brief account of macroeconomic theory, and in the following, I try to 
do the same for the other two factors.  
 
When talking about macroeconomic statistics, Coyle refers to national accounting, 
which concerns the account of aggregates such as gross domestic product, unemployment, 
inflation, interest rate, exchange rate, balance of payments, and the public budget (Jespersen 
2007). These are statistical measures of key macroeconomic variables, and as such, 
national accounting provides an indispensable statistical foundation for 
macroeconomics, which establishes a close connection between the two. To better 
understand this connection, it is useful to observe that modern macroeconomics and 
national accounting both emerged as parts of a conjoint effort to overcome the 
economic difficulties of first the Great Depression and later the Second World War. 
As such, national accounting was developed in order for politicians and economists to 
get a general view of the state of national economies, and macroeconomics depended 
on such accounts for theorising, policy assessment and the provision of advice (Tily 
2009, Coyle 2014).  
 
As mentioned in an earlier section, Keynes’s ambition was to view the economy as a 
whole, and national accounting provided the statistical foundation for doing so. 
However, as Coyle observes, economic statistics are not objective measures, they are 
interpretations that also change realities (Coyle 2015). Bearing this in mind, it is 
noteworthy that the development and design of national accounts was, in fact, 
influenced by the worldviews and theoretical requirements of Keynes’s 
macroeconomics (Tily 2009). This reveals how national accounting is not merely an 
objective measure of real entities, but also a measurement drafted to provide an 
empirical body for theoretical entities.  
 
Adding yet a dimension to the understanding of accounts, Miller & Rose argue that 
accounting is a constituent element in creating governable objects (Miller & Rose 
1990). In the case of national accounting, the economy is the object which has been 
rendered governable, at least to the extent that there now exists a widespread 
perception of the economy as something which can be governed by means of policy 
and state regulation. In this capacity, national accounting has become an instrument 
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for augmenting the influence of nation states, making national accounting a 
technology of power just as much as it is a source of information (Miller 1986). Along 
these lines, Miller sees national accounting as part of a wider political modernisation 
project, which has introduced political rationalities, such as economic growth and 
progress, as key governmental objectives (Miller 1986).  
 
To end this section, I wish to highlight that the emergence of pressing 
environmental problems has led to the need for and development of entirely different 
sets of accounts, which ecological economists, along with others, are trying to 
promote and incorporate in the framework of macroeconomics. Such accounts include 
environmental accounts that are drafted to inform us about the state of ecosystems, 
the stocks of natural resources, the amount of materials we use, and the general 
environmental impacts of economic activities. Using Miller & Rose’s perspectives, 
this means that the environment is also undergoing a process of statistic 
objectification, which strengthens the perception of environmental processes as 
governable by means of policy-making. When this perspective is incorporated into 
the macroeconomic perspective, it can be seen as an attempt to reinterpret and re-
objectify the economy in biophysical terms.  
 
Modelling  
Models and modelling play an important role in macroeconomics, where they are 
employed for several purposes including conceptualisation, theorising, and empirical 
application. By conceptualisation I mean a figurative description which articulates a 
basic ontological vision. Exemplifying this, Daly speaks of the pre-analytical vision of 
ecological economics, picturing the economy as a subset of the biosphere (Røpke 
2005), thus providing a new context for the mainstream vision of the economy as a 
circular flow of money, goods and services between households and firms (Mankiw 
1992).  
 
A macroeconomic model for theorising is an equation or a set of equations that can be 
solved analytically for the purpose of explaining causal relations between economic 
aggregates. Examples of theoretical models could be the Cobb-Douglas production 
function or the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. Finally, empirical 
application (computational models) involves larger sets of equations, often fitted to 
country-specific data, solved on computers for the purpose of providing policy advice, 
forecasts or assessments of policy proposals, and testing theoretical propositions (den 
Butter & Morgan 2000, Jackson & Victor 2015).  
 
The boundaries between these categories are ambiguous, and the different types of 
modelling overlap and interact. Thus, basic ontological visions of the economy set 
the scene for theoretical modelling, while theoretical models are incorporated into 
applied models, and applied models, in turn, can help strengthen or destabilise 
conceptual models. To exemplify this interaction, one could claim that the three basic 
ontological visions of the economy mentioned earlier – a deterministic ensemble of 
markets (neoclassical), a causally connected system of diverse aggregates 
(Keynesian), and a metabolic organism (ecological economic) – set different scenes for 
the theoretical models. The first allows for ceteris paribus general equilibrium models, 
the second rules out this type of modelling, while the latter demands the 
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incorporation of environmental accounts and causalities. This makes macroeconomic 
modelling a complex affair with multiple theoretical and political implications.  
 
One of these implications is the basic question: what are macroeconomic models? 
Having tried to figure this out for the entire time span of writing this thesis, I have to 
admit that my best answer is: well, it depends. Some macroeconomists share the 
realist (or critical realist) view that the economy exists as an objective reality, and 
that macroeconomic models are (or ought to be) epistemic tools which try to 
represent this reality and provide the best possible correspondence between theory 
and reality (Jespersen 2007). Somewhat in opposition to this view, neoclassical 
economists, such as Friedman, have emphasised that economic theories and models 
should not be judged by the truth of their assumptions, but by their ability to predict 
(Friedman 1953), which makes macroeconomic models crystal globes of soothsaying.   
 
Finally, proponents of the performativity approach (which is further explained in a 
following section) hold that the question of economic theory and modelling is not an 
epistemic question of true or false, but a question of successful or unsuccessful 
(Callon 2007). Thus, the important question is not whether the model makes true 
statements of the world, but whether it is able to make a difference or not. As such, 
macroeconomic models are political creatures highly sensitive to the wishes and 
worldviews of their operators and the demands of the operators’ employers.  
 
Theory as a tool of analysis 
Having now introduced the discipline of macroeconomics, I wish to turn to some of 
the theoretical perspectives that have been deployed for analytical purposes in the 
thesis.  
 
Discourse analysis 
Several of the articles in this thesis use documents of various kinds as empirical 
material. Even though it is not imperative, one approach to such material is to see it 
as discursive material, the interpretation of which can benefit from discourse analysis. 
Such an approach has been taken in Article 1, where macroeconomic policy proposals 
for solving the global system crisis are seen as belonging to either one or both of two 
opposing policy discourses labelled pro-growth and no-growth (Urhammer & Røpke 
2013). In doing so, the article uses discourse as an overall framework to set the scene 
of analysis.  
 
The range of discourse analysis approaches is vast and includes contributions from 
multiple scholars, and as a interdisciplinary researcher, I have only scratched the 
surface of the field. Hence, in the article, we rely, for a large part, on literature which 
summarises discourse analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999), thereby acquiring just 
enough insight to use it analytically. In Article 1, a brief introduction to discourse 
analysis is provided (Urhammer & Røpke 2013), and I see no reason to repeat it here. 
Instead, I try to account for some features of discourse analysis not presented in the 
article. In doing so, I focus on Foucault (1972), who is rightfully considered an 
influential scholar to the field of discourse analysis. Furthermore, the account is 
aimed at pointing out connections between Foucault’s discourse approach and other 
theoretical perspectives deployed in the thesis.  
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Going straight to the connections, I wish to emphasise Foucault’s strong attention to 
the role of discourse in the creation of knowledge objects (Foucault 1972). This 
attention is epitomised by the following question, which defines the purpose of 
discourse analysis “what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and 
nowhere else?” (Ibid.:31). Some of Foucault’s examples of such existences are madness 
and sexuality, which he argues have become knowledge objects due to discursive 
practices of psychiatric and medical expertise (Ibid.). Of special interest to my thesis 
in relation to expertise is Foucault’s treatment of the role of economics in 
governmental practices (Foucault 2008). Here, Foucault emphasises how economic 
expertise has constituted a certain truth regime, which determines what is true and 
false (and right and wrong to do) in relation to ‘the economy’ as an object of 
governmentality (Ibid.), where governmentality can be understood as a certain 
dispersed regulatory mentality towards social life (Miller & Rose 1990). 
 
The focus on objects and knowledge objects is a recurring theme in several of the 
theoretical perspectives of my thesis, especially the STS perspectives, which are 
presented in a following section. However, amongst STS scholars, I have observed an 
emphasis on the importance of materiality (tangible things), which at least indirectly 
questions Foucault’s strong focus on discourse as the constituter of knowledge 
objects. Yet, it is in fact possible to find in Foucault’s work, a recognition of the 
existence of something external to discourse, or, as Foucault puts it, the existence of 
‘prediscursive’ experiences freed from the tyranny of texts (Foucault 2008:47). In my 
view, this establishes a point of reconciliation between Foucauldian discourse analysis 
and STS, and suggests that the difference between the two is, at least to some extent, 
a question of empirical focus, where discourse analysis has a more narrow focus on 
symbols and written and spoken language, while STS is often characterised by 
ethnographic research that attempts to take a wider ensemble of empirical inputs into 
account.  
 
Continuing along the line of pointing out similarities between discourse analysis and 
STS perspectives, I would like to direct attention to Foucault’s emphasis on 
discourses as networks of relations between signs and statements, relations that 
determine the space of possible utterances of a given discourse. Perhaps a bit 
laboured, this is somewhat akin to STS approaches, such as actor-network theory 
(ANT), which also concerns networks of relations between things. However, in the 
case of ANT, relations extend far beyond signs and statements and involve the 
association of material things, statements and technologies in networks connecting 
multiple human and non-human actors (Callon 1986a, Callon 1986b, Latour 2005). 
Finally, Foucault repeatedly stresses that discourse is practice and observes how 
objects emerge from discursive practices. This attention to practices (yet more widely 
considered) also characterises various STS approaches to the construction of objects 
(Latour 1993, Mol 1999).  
 
To end this section, I would like to say a few words to relate the Foucauldian view on 
discourse to Article 1 (which also draws upon several other approaches to discourse 
analysis) of this thesis (Urhammer & Røpke 2013). The most important heritage from 
Foucault in the article is probably the view that knowledge objects are discursively 
constituted (Ibid.). From this point of departure, the article delves into an analysis of 
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a controversy regarding economic growth and sustainability as it materialises in a 
collection of policy reports. In doing so, the article uncovers a certain form of 
antagonism, where two more or less opposing discourses struggle to settle and 
stabilise the meaning of economic growth in relation to sustainability (Ibid.).  
 
Narratology 
In Article 1, the antagonism between the discourses is described as a war of stories, 
which means that the policy proposals presented in the article are analysed as 
narratives (Urhammer & Røpke 2013). Hence, the discipline of narratology plays an 
important role in the article. As was also the case for discourse analysis, narratology 
is briefly introduced in the article, yet, to supplement this description, I here try to 
provide some additional insights.  
 
Narratology is concerned with the analysis of narratives – stories and storytelling – 
and the priniciples of narratology are fairly simple: “[o]nce characters and a plot are 
in place, a story has been constructed” (Czarniawska 2010:64). Rooted in this 
understanding, narratology comprises a set of theories of plots (sequences of events) 
and characters, where the former can be seen as a structural dimension and the latter 
as a dimension of agency. In this sense, narratology somehow echoes a modern 
distinction within many social sciences between structure and individuals, yet in a 
very unorthodox manner, where structure and agency are impossible to separate, and 
where the conception of character stretches far beyond human agency. Along these 
lines, Czarniawska stresses how narratology “[…] does not search for laws, but for 
patterns and regularities, which do not reveal a deep structure – either of the world 
or of the mind […]” (Ibid.:60). Thus, narratology is not about finding fundamental 
laws of the social or the psyche, and as such, it resembles understandings forwarded 
in the STS literature, especially by Latour, who has in fact been profoundly inspired 
by Greimas, one of the founding fathers of narratology (Latour 2013). One important 
influence of Greimas on Latour was the attention to non-human agency (Ibid.), which 
is evident in folktale, where all sorts of non-human characters, such as magic rings, 
dragons and gnomes, play important roles and are able to drive sequences of events 
(plots).    
 
An aspect of narratology of special interest to the present thesis is the view that 
narratives are the main bearers of knowledge in contemporary societies (Lyotard 
cited in Czarniawska 2010:59). According to this understanding, attention is directed 
towards a non-modernist perspective on knowledge practices as forms of collective 
storytelling, where humans and non-humans interact and produce sequences of cause 
and effect, reasoning, explanation and interpretation (Ibid.). This understanding 
connects to the production of historical knowledge (also of great interest to 
Foucault), which in a narratology perspective is not the discovery of an objective, 
universal history, but the emplotment of events into something which becomes 
history (Ibid.). This view formed my approach in Article 4, which is an historical 
article about macroeconomic energy modelling in Denmark (Urhammer 
forthcoming). Here, I emphasise that it is ’my’ story not objective history, though I 
certainly hope and believe that my informants agree with me on the most basic 
patterns and regularities.   
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STS perspectives   
STS and especially the studies carried out by Latour have played an important role in 
my understanding of the issues investigated in this thesis. Yet, Latour’s perspectives 
do not play a very explicit role in the thesis, except in Article 3, which is fully 
committed to a Latourian worldview (Urhammer 2014). Unfortunately, when writing 
the article, time and length were too limited to allow a fair account of Latour’s many 
literary contributions. Hence, to make up for some of the most critical omissions in 
this regard, in this section, I attempt to explain some aspects of Latour’s and other 
kindred STS scholars’ work, which is of special interest to the thesis.   
 
Empirical philosophy  
In Article 3, I use the term empirical philosophy as a general term to describe Latour’s 
mode of inquiry (Urhammer 2014). This, however, is perhaps too much of a 
simplification since Latour has been involved in the development of a variety of 
theoretical movements carrying several different labels. The theory which Latour is 
probably most often associated with is ANT, which was developed by scholars such 
as Callon, Law and Latour (Muniesa 2015). However, recognising that Latour has a 
somewhat ambivalent attitude towards the term ANT, both recalling it and still 
embracing aspects of it (Latour 1999), I searched for another term to describe his 
perspectives, and found empirical philosophy, which Latour has used himself to 
describe his approach more recently (Latour 2013b). To me, empirical philosophy is a 
very suitable term for Latour’s approach since it emphasises that he is in fact a 
philosopher (by training) who is deeply interested in philosophical questions and 
engaged in a crusade against a line of philosophical thought that dates all the way 
back to Plato. This line of philosophical thought, Latour argues, has led to a 
modernist mode of interpretation, which dominates common perceptions of the world 
today (Latour 1993).  
 
Thus, one could say that Latour’s crusade concerns the rejection of modernity and a 
modernist mode of interpretation, which, according to Latour, has resulted in 
speculative separations and dichotomies such as nature and culture, subject and object, 
and reality and representation. To accentuate the prevalence of such separations in 
present day conceptions of our common world, Latour has proposed that our age is 
ruled by the modern constitution, the perceptions and interpretations of which 
dominate institutions such as science and politics (Latour 1993, Latour 2004, Blok & 
Jensen 2011).  
 
In his attempt to overthrow the modern constitution, Latour points out that “we 
have never been modern” and that modernist interpretive categories are constantly 
obliterated by human-non-human relations, which reveal that our common world – 
the world that humans and non-humans share and construct together – is hybrid and 
constituted by associations across modernist boundaries (Latour 1993, Blok & Jensen 
2011). This understanding has prompted Latour to propose the replacement of the 
modern constitution by a non-modern or a-modern constitution, the key operation of 
which is ecologization – a mode of operation which involves the obliteration of 
modernist categories and the recognition and inclusion of non-humans as legitimate 
and constituent members of our common world (Latour 2013b). As such, Latour sees 
the new constitution as an on-going composition of a common world, an activity 
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which he has dubbed cosmopolitics (more about this later). The cosmopolitical 
programme reveals Latour’s strong emphasis on non-human agency, which is 
inspired by Greimas, and means that materials, animals, plants and technology are 
considered legitimate members of our collective, where collective is Latour’s term to 
replace the modernist term society (Latour 2013a,b).      
 
Methodologically, Latour’s mobilisation against the modern constitution consists of a 
call for philosophy to leave its speculative grounds and engage in empirical inquiry, 
which means that he imagines empirical philosophy to be a crossing of the 
anthropological approach and the philosophical tradition, where the devotion to 
inquiry and fieldwork is taken from the former and mixed with the interest in 
metaphysics and ontology of the latter. Equipped with this mix of traditions and 
disciplines, Latour imagines how the non-modern ethnographer is able to engage 
with multiple modes of existence and participate in the composition of a common 
world (Latour 2013b).  
 
In the turn towards inquiry and fieldwork, Latour’s take on philosophy resembles 
other STS scholars’ approaches. Exemplifying this, Mol explains how she is engaged 
in a philosophical mode of investigation which is not “interested in the preconditions 
for acquiring true knowledge” or in “how to find the truth?” (Mol 2002:5, original 
emphasis). Rather, Mol’s philosophical mode is characterised by an interest in 
knowledge practices and how objects are handled in practice (Mol 2002). This 
invokes a conception of politics, not unlike Latour’s, as a matter of objects and 
ontology (more about this later).   
 
A sociology of translations  
When writing about ANT, Callon and Latour have sometimes referred to it as a 
sociology of translations (Callon 1986b) or sociology of associations (Latour 2005:173). 
The latter term is not used very often, even though it emphasises the basic tenet of 
Latour’s philosophy – the relation – which implies that existence is a matter of 
relations, and that nothing exists in itself, since every thing exists through relations 
with other things. This is Latour’s basic take on metaphysics, which rejects ideas of a 
universal substance or a priori categories2; the coming into being, existence and 
disappearance of things is always a matter of relations with other things: being-as-
other instead of being-as-being (Latour 2013b). Here, it is appropriate to mention that 
Latour is certainly not the first to base his philosophy on relations, and he has not 
tried to hide the fact that he is inspired by the works of ‘mentors’ such as Serres and 
Dewey, who have also taken relations or associations as a philosophical point of 
departure (Serres 1995, Dewey 2012). This means that Latour can be considered part 
of and a contributor to a wider philosophical tradition based on relations or 
associations.  
 
Now turning to the other term for ANT – sociology of translations – which can also 
be considered part of the relations-tradition, yet now with an emphasis on acts of 
translation. Latour describes translation as displacement, movement, and 
                                            
2The typical and unavoidable philosophical question in this regard is, of course, whether ‘The 
relation’ is an a priori category or not.  
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transformation of the current state of an entity (Latour 2005), and Callon adds that 
“[t]ranslation builds actor-worlds from entities. It attaches characteristics to them 
and establishes more or less stable relationships between them” (Callon 1986b:25-26). 
In this sense, translation can also be seen as a means for world making, where actors 
are deliberately associated to achieve a specific reality that serves the interest of the 
world maker (Callon 1986b). In relation to this view, however, it is important to 
observe that world making is difficult and unpredictable since actors might resist, 
have entirely different agendas or try to construct the world in a different manner. 
This means that translation involves resistance and alliances between actors and that 
no translation is possible without work (Latour 2005). As such, the sociology of 
translation is a sociology which can be applied widely to explain multiple aspects of 
societal life and add new interpretive dimensions to the concept of power.  
 
The theory of translation has been used by Callon and Latour to show how objects of 
science (scientific facts) come into being as chains of translations (networks), which 
are stabilised by the work and agency of multiple human and non-human actors 
(Latour 2005). Adding to this, Latour points to the importance of circulation as a 
means for objects to maintain existence and for facts to remain ‘true’ (Latour 1992). 
Thus, the circulation of objects or facts by means of different vehicles is vital to the 
stabilisation and existence of knowledge objects and scientific facts (Blok & Jensen 
2011).  
 
In Article 3, the terms translation and circulation are used, to articulate economic 
growth as a chain of translations (a monster), which stays alive as a constant signal 
circulating in a stabilised circuit (ecology of circulation) (Urhammer 2014). However, 
due to the fact that the special issue in which the article was published was about 
language and economics, I succumbed to the temptation to bend the notion of 
translation towards the common understanding of translation as an act of translating 
words between languages (Ibid.). Prior to publication, I was not very satisfied with 
this bending until I became aware that translation, as used by Latour and Callon, is 
in fact inspired by Serres’ theory of information and transformation of signals, in 
which translation is seen as a mediation which transmits and distorts a signal (Blok & 
Jensen 2011). This is, at least in my view, not so far from the process of translation of 
words between languages, and in this sense, the translation of words can be seen as a 
certain mode of translation, which is part of the far larger repertoire of translations.  
 
Conceptions of politics 
As the title of this thesis indicates, there is something political3 about economic 
growth, something which most readers will probably not deny, at least in the sense 
that economic growth certainly is a salient trope in mainstream policy discourse. 
However, I hope that the articles in this thesis will convince the reader that there is 
more to the issue. Hence, in order to accommodate this persuasion, I make a 
theoretical account of the different conceptions of politics at play in the thesis.  
 
                                            
3 In the following, political is an adjective meaning “something which has to do with politics” or “is 
of politics”. 
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Politics has occupied the minds of scholars for ages, and an entire academic discipline 
– political science – is devoted to studying this topic. In the political science tradition, 
various forms of government, especially government as practiced by states and state 
institutions, have been the main focus of attention (Boyer 1990). More recently, 
however, attempts at expanding the conception of politics and what can rightfully be 
labelled political have emerged not least within the field of STS.  
 
One major achievement of STS is a convincing description of the social workings of 
science and technology, which has led to a strong rejection of the modern perception 
of science and politics as two separate domains, with science dealing with facts, while 
politics takes care of values (Latour 1993). In contrast, STS has shown that politics 
occurs in all sorts of places, science is an important site of politics, and that facts and 
values do not belong to each separate domain (Jasanoff 1990, Latour 1993, Mol 
1999). In a recent article, Brown reviews the STS literature (and beyond) on science 
and politics and presents a series of interesting conceptions of politics (Brown 2015). 
In the following, I briefly account for some of these conceptions which are of special 
relevance to my thesis.  
 
To set the scene, Brown (2015) initially identifies two very general conceptions of 
politics: a spatial- and an activity-conception. The spatial-conception articulates politics 
as belonging to and taking place in a specific domain or sphere – ‘the political 
domain’ or ‘the sphere of politics’ (Ibid.). Even though this conception is abstract and 
metaphorical, it is often associated with the state and its institutions (Ibid.), an 
association which Rose & Miller have made an effort to challenge, yet still somehow 
maintaining a spatial-conception of politics. This is exemplified by the following 
sentence: “The domain of politics is thus simultaneously distinguished from other 
spheres of rule, and inextricably bound into them” (Rose & Miller 2010:279). In a 
similar vain, Article 1 of the present thesis expresses a spatial-conception of politics 
and articulates distinguishable domains of politics and science (Urhammer & Røpke 
2013).  
 
In contrast, the activity-conception describes politics not as a feature of a specific 
domain, but as a certain type of activity, which involves deliberation, negotiation, 
persuasion and contestation between all sorts of actors (Brown 2015). Obviously, this 
conception does not rule out entities such as the state and its institutions as the sites 
of politics, but it rejects the existence of one single, stable domain of politics and the 
idea of the state and its institutions as the site of politics par excellence. Instead, the 
activity-conception allows for practically any place to become (and stop being for that 
matter) a site of politics, depending on what actors do at these places at specific times 
under specific circumstances. In its many different forms, the activity-conception is, 
in my view, the conception of politics which is favoured by most STS scholars.  
 
As indicated, science plays an important role in STS conceptions of politics, which 
rebel against so-called ‘scientism’, which expresses science as objective, value free and 
essentially non-political4 (Brown 2015). This rebellion has been carried out by 
showing that the production of scientific facts is full of deliberation, negotiation, 
                                            
4 Neoclassical economics is, by the way, a good example of scientism.  
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persuasion and compromise between human and non-human actors, and that facts 
and values are closely intertwined (Latour & Woolgar 1979, Latour 1993, Jasanoff 
1990). Within the boundaries of this more or less general agreement, STS scholars 
have, however, developed different conceptions of science and politics, where some 
have remained closer to more traditional conceptions of science and politics and 
focused on science-politics interactions in terms of science advice and science policy 
(Brown 2015, Jasanoff 1990). In this approach, traditional agencies of politics, such as 
politicians, civil servants and state organisations, remain in focus, while the practices 
of science and scientific advice are added (Jasanoff 1990). Furthermore, socio-
technical controversies and imaginaries are important sites of research in this 
approach, where such sites are investigated with special attention to so-called co-
production involving the interaction between discourses, technology, institutions and 
various epistemic practices (Jasanoff 2004, Blok 2005).  
 
Continuing his search for conceptions of politics, Brown identifies a conception, 
which he has dubbed world making (Brown 2015). This conception is comprised of 
concepts, such as ontological politics (Mol 1999), object oriented politics (Marres 2007), 
and cosmopolitics (Stengers 2005, Latour 2007), and is closely related to the 
understanding of the construction of knowledge objects, presented in the previous 
section, although now with an emphasis on the politics of such objects.  
 
In Mol’s approach, ontological politics involves “[…] the way in which ‘the real’ is 
implicated in the ‘political’ and vice versa” (Mol 1999:74, original emphasis), where 
‘the real’ is performed by different ontologies and ‘the political’ entails the struggle 
(and sometimes reconciliation) between ontologies (Mol 1999). In this conception, 
‘the real’ sets the possibility conditions for collective action, while the contestation of 
realities makes it possible to influence and change such conditions by means of 
ontology. In relation to my thesis, ontological politics concerns how various 
macroeconomic schools, narratives and models struggle to define macroeconomic 
realities and, thus, determine the possibility space for collective action in relation to 
these realities. In Article 4, this form of politics is illustrated by the establishment of 
a macroeconomic reality – economic growth – performed by practices of modelling 
and forecasting in state organisations and research institutes. The main argument in 
the article is that this reality is influential in determining the possibility space for the 
future development of the Danish energy system (Urhammer forthcoming).      
 
The object (or issue) oriented take on politics is concerned with how contested 
objects, such as roads and epidemics, become sites of politics, and how such objects or 
issues spark public involvement (Marres 2007, Brown 2015). In her formulation of 
this understanding, Marres is inspired by Dewey, who argued that publics come into 
being as a result of social mobilisation due to the consequences of conjoint action5. 
Marres adds to this perspective by focussing on the articulation of such consequences 
as issues, and on how this articulation becomes political since different articulations 
struggle to define issues  (Marres 2007). In accordance with Dewey, the issue 
                                            
5 For a more thorough account of this view, see the theory section of Article 4 (Urhammer 
forthcoming).   
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oriented conception of politics is closely connected to perceptions of democracy and 
can, thus, be seen as one of many paths laid out in an on-going pursuit of democracy.  
 
Somewhat linked to this pursuit, Latour promotes cosmopolitics - the collective 
composition of a common world – as a replacement of the ruling modernist concept 
of politics (Latour 2004, Latour 2007, Brown 2015). How exactly the composition of 
a common world can be seen as a form of politics is not easy to understand and even 
harder to explain. However, it might be helpful to see it as an on-going ontological 
enterprise involving efforts to determine what our common world is and how to deal 
with the hybrid entities inhabiting it. To Latour, this is a political project, which 
requires a non-modern constitution – the parliament of things – a new set of 
institutions to replace the modern constitution, in which humans and non-humans 
can come together and somehow settle who and how many we are, and how we can 
live together (Latour 2004, Blok & Jensen 2011).   
 
Trying to relate Latour’s vision of a new constitution to the topics of my thesis, it 
could be argued that Latour’s grand tale of cosmopolitics and the parliament of 
things resembles the grand sustainability tales discussed in Article 1, where some 
form of utopia (green growth or a steady-state economy for instance) is reached by 
means of sustainable transition (Urhammer & Røpke 2013). Parallel to this, Latour’s 
grand tale concerns the utopia of a new a-modern constitution, which is reached by 
means of ecologization (Latour 2013b). Furthermore, Latour’s attention to the 
composition of a common world is also closely connected to discussions of political 
ecological and environmental conflict (Blok & Jensen 2011), which can be interpreted 
as concerning those entities and life forms that are excluded from taking part in the 
composition of a common world. Here, I especially think of non-human life, 
indigenous peoples and marginalised social groups more generally as excluded from 
constitutional politics. In a cosmopolitical utopia, these groups would somehow have 
to be included and allowed to participate in decisions about the world they inhabit.  
 
Adding a final aspect to the world making conception of politics, I wish to stress that 
controversies and acts of politicisation which challenge established practices, 
institutions, and objects and transform them into sites of controversy, must also be 
considered core to politics (Brown 2015, Latour 2005). Exemplifying this, Latour has 
emphasised that controversies are important sites for understanding sociality and 
politics, and he is participating in the on-going development of an elaborate 
methodological framework for mapping controversies (MACOSPOL 2016). Even 
though I have not used these methods of controversy mapping, the controversy 
perspective still plays an important role in my thesis, where antagonism and 
contestation between opposing approaches to economic growth and sustainability are 
analysed from different empirical angles.  
 
Theoretical controversies  
Continuing along the lines of controversy, I wish to highlight the fact that my thesis 
is, in fact, characterised by multiple theoretical and methodological controversies and 
tensions including fundamental disagreement regarding economic growth, general 
equilibrium, and the ontological status of the economy, to mention but a few. I myself 
am not external to these controversies and participate in them in multiple ways. 
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Thus, in relation to economic growth, I would call myself a moderate agnostic, who 
certainly thinks we should devote less collective energy to the worshipping of the 
economic growth god, while still acknowledging that the measurement of economic 
activity actually makes sense for various macroeconomic policy purposes. When it 
comes to general equilibrium and neoclassical economics in general, I am very far 
from being a fan and much more in favour of Keynes’s concept of fundamental 
uncertainty. Yet, in the case of the ontological status of the economy, I am in 
opposition to most post-Keynesians and ecological economists, many of whom tend, 
more or less explicitly, to take a realist or critical realist perspective on the economy 
and the world we live in more generally. Exemplifying this, the teachers of a 
methodology course in ecological economics, which I attended for ethnographic 
purposes, at the University of Leeds, emphasised several times that a model is a 
representation of reality, thus making a conceptual distinction between reality and 
model. In opposition to this approach, I am more in favour of the STS tradition, in 
which it is common to consider the strange thing called reality to be partly 
constituted by theory and method (Law 2004).  
 
To end this chapter and continuing along the lines of the preceding statements, I 
would like to devote a few words to discussing how various theoretical perspectives, 
some of which have been introduced in the preceding, can be used to understand the 
thing called the economy.  
 
The economy  
In spite of several differences, discourse analysis, narratology and various STS 
perspectives all share an interest in the construction of knowledge objects and 
describe such objects as emerging from various practices. In Foucault’s view, this 
emergence is rooted in discursive practices (Foucault 1972), to narratology, 
knowledge objects emerge from stories and storytelling (Czarniawska 2010), while to 
branches of STS, such objects are described as emerging from practices of associating 
multiple human and non-human entities in sequences of translations (Callon 1986, 
Latour 2005).  
 
Various versions of the ‘knowledge object’-perspective have also been deployed to 
describe ‘the economy’, for instance by Schabas, who states that “ ‘[t]he economy’ 
emerged as an object of reference for economists circa 1820 and endures to the 
present as an epistemic object” (Schabas 2008). Thus, in Schabas’s view, there is a 
‘before the economy’, when economists did not use this expression (and if they did, it 
meant something entirely different from today), while the classical economists 
discursively created ‘the economy’ as part of their endeavours to carve out a specific 
epistemic domain of economics, separated from nature and fully explicable in terms of 
human behaviour and market mechanics (Schabas 2005). Adding to this, Schabas 
explains that the economy gradually became part of everyday speech in a similar vain 
as the concept of temperature (Schabas 2008). Taking a ‘knowledge object”-
perspective on the economy, thus, allows for the description of the economy as an 
epistemic object, which has emerged from discursive practices of neoclassical 
economists and later spread to become part of everyday language.  
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This description, however, calls for a few considerations regarding the metaphysical 
applications of such a perspective. Hence, firstly, it should be mentioned that this 
perspective is in opposition to a realist view, which tends to consider the economy as 
an objective reality, existing independently of human description. Instead, Schabas’s 
view can be seen as social constructivist, meaning that she explains the economy as a 
linguistic construct which is created by economists. As an alternative to the realist 
and social constructivist positions, however, it is also possible to take a constructivist 
perspective, which offers a third view on the emergence of knowledge objects.  
 
The constructivist perspective has been proposed by Latour in order to bypass the 
dichotomous deadlock between realism and social constructivism and consists of 
seeing the emergence of scientific facts and objects as a process which obliterates the 
boundaries between what is real and what is socially constructed. In this view, 
knowledge objects come into being as a result of description meeting indeterminate 
material conditions (often in various laboratory settings), a process which, in some 
cases, gradually allows for stabilisation and the coming into being of well-defined 
facts or objects (Latour 1992).  
 
Steps in the direction of understanding the economy in a somewhat constructivist 
manner have been taken by scholars such as Callon and Mackenzie, who promote a 
performativity approach to economics (MacKenzie 2006, Callon 2007). The basic 
proposition of this approach is that markets are constructed in interactions between 
statements and calculative devices of economics, and various socio-material settings 
(Callon 2007). This is a rejection of a positivist view, typical of neoclassical 
economics, of markets being objective realities governed by universal economic laws, 
which can be understood by means of rigorous mathematical description. Instead, the 
performativity approach sees economic theory as a participant in the creation of 
market realities (MacKenzie 2006, Callon 2007).  
 
The use of the term performativity is inspired by Austin’s theory of speech acts, 
where a performative is a sentence which, instead of describing or asserting something 
as being true or false, is part of an action. Hence, a performative is not true or false, it 
is successful or unsuccessful (Austin 1962). A famous example of a performative is the 
‘yes’ uttered at a wedding, which concludes the performance of a marriage. In 
Austin’s theory, the context in which the performative is uttered is vital to its 
success: in order for the ‘yes’ to be performative, the institutional setting of a 
marriage needs to be in place (Ibid.).    
 
The STS version of performativity elaborates on the relationship between statements 
and their worlds. Thus, according to Callon, words and worlds should not be viewed 
separately, but in complete entanglement, where the statement and the object are 
constituent elements of each other (Callon 2007). As a consequence, material 
conditions determine the possibility conditions of statements, while statements are 
able to change material conditions. From this view, Callon derives the idea of 
economic theory as a participant in the creation of markets. Extending this view to 
my thesis, one could say that I have tried, in Article 4, to illustrate how 
macroeconomic statements provided by models were part of determining what could 
be thought and done in relation to the Danish energy system, a determination which 
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also influenced decisions regarding transformations of this system (Urhammer 
forthcoming).  
 
An important aspect of the performativity approach to economics is the significance 
of calculation and calculative devices, where calculation is considered a practice of 
“[i]solating objects from their context, grouping them in the same frame, 
establishing original relations between them, classifying them and summing them up 
[…]” (Callon & Muniesa 2005:1232). In addition, economic calculation involves the 
formatting of values by means of a monetary metric in order to establish institutions 
of economic transactions (markets) and calculation.  
 
One of the main lessons from this understanding is that economic calculations are 
interventions in socio-material conditions, which change such conditions. 
Exemplifying this, Callon & Muniesa describe markets as calculative devices, where a 
multiplicity of material and social conditions are transformed into the monetary 
exchange of goods and services (Callon & Muniesa 2005). In a somewhat similar 
vain, Miller & Rose (1990) emphasise how accounting (one of the aspects of 
calculation) can be used to transform multiple socio-material conditions into objects 
of governance.  
 
Even though Callon and Muniesa do not engage in analyses of macroeconomics and 
‘the economy as a whole’, their view also applies to macroeconomics and 
macroeconomic models that can be considered good examples of economic calculation 
and calculative devices, participating in the construction and governance of an object 
named the economy. During the course of writing the thesis, I struggled with my 
ambition to present a more elaborate constructivist take on the economy. This 
project, however, did not come to a conclusion and has not been included in the 
thesis. Yet, I would like to note that such a project, at least in my view, consists of 
determining how elements such as – national accounting, theorising, modelling, 
storytelling, translation, and circulation – connect to each other and establish the 
economy as an object which is almost omnipresent in state institutions and processes 
of policy-making.  
 
To relate such a constructivist perspective on the economy to the previously 
described conceptions of politics, one could say that there is, in a sense, something 
highly non-political about the economy, meaning that its existence and qualities are 
hardly ever contested in mainstream policy discourse. Along these lines, Latour 
describes the Economy (with a capital E indicating objectivity and singularity) as a 
frozen continent meticulously constructed by a modernist “economization project 
whose aim it is to put an end to politics and construct an infrastructure about which 
is said “hands off” ” (Latour 2016). What Latour expresses here is how the calculative 
practices of economics have constructed an object step by step, a thing called the 
Economy, the existence and characteristics of which are almost as irrefutable as hard 
facts produced in science laboratories (Latour 2013b). The consequence of this 
appearance is a de-politisation of collective concerns of great importance: what ought 
to be open to political struggles and moral considerations has become a matter of 
economic ‘facts’ better left to the economists. In this thesis, I attempt to reopen and 
re-politicise the economy, in particular the almost uncontested objective of economic 
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growth, in order to participate in struggles to find solutions to the massive economic 
and ecological difficulties of our time.   
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Materials and methods   
Given that the themes of my thesis – economic growth, sustainability, 
macroeconomics, modelling – are transboundary and cut across analytical categories 
such as the global, national and local, it is not easy to confine the analysis to one 
specific locality or a well-defined set of data. This means that neither a traditional 
ethnographic study of occurrences at a specific site, nor an analysis based purely on 
documents seemed appropriate to serve my purposes. Instead, I have tried to combine 
various data sources and methods of analysis to create a patchwork, where a variety 
of data and methodological approaches have been deployed in combination. Having 
said this, it should be stressed that the thesis exhibits an empirical inclination 
towards economic issues of Western countries and in some cases more specifically 
Denmark and Danish historical developments. Furthermore, I ought to mention that 
the main empirical basis of the thesis is in fact documents and audio recorded 
interviews, so most of the articles mainly rely on this type of material.  
 
In the following, I first provide a few general reflections on documents, interviews, 
search methods and coding. Thereafter, I present the empirical material of the thesis, 
while I conclude the chapter with some considerations regarding multi-sited 
ethnography and my role as a researcher with an urge to make a difference.  
 
Documents and interviews  
According to Lynggaard, documents are language fixed in text and time, where text 
is commonly perceived as written, but also includes photography, graphs, and other 
visual objects (Lynggaard 2010). The documents analysed in my thesis were mainly 
journal articles, books, and policy reports. One of the intriguing features of this type 
of material, however, is that it is carefully drafted with a purpose of persuasion. Thus, 
Latour emphasises how scientific articles are pieces of rhetoric, conveying an 
impression of objective discovery, where the entire ethnographic ‘backstage’, 
characterised by negotiation, compromise and doubt, of the article is omitted (Latour 
1987). This observation applies, in Latour’s case, to scientific texts produced by 
science labs. However, McCloskey has argued in a similar vain in relation to 
economics and elaborately explained how economics is also a discipline of rhetoric 
(McCloskey 1998).  
 
Acknowledging this feature, I have chosen two different methodological approaches. 
The first was to embrace the rhetorical dimension of journal articles and policy 
reports and analyse such documents as instances of storytelling and persuasion to get 
a sense of the persuasive strength of different macroeconomic policy proposals. 
Secondly, I have tried to find ways to ‘get behind the scene’ and learn about the 
machinery of drafting macroeconomic journal articles and policy reports, especially 
to determine the role of modelling in this enterprise. However, doing this thoroughly 
would require elaborate ethnographic fieldwork at specific locations, such as 
ministries or economic councils, which was never the intention of my project. So 
instead, I have sought to find what could be labelled a middle course between pure 
document analysis and ethnographic fieldwork, which ended up being interviews. 
Thus, interviews with economists and model builders at universities and state 
organisations, such as the Ministries of finance and the Danish Economic Council, 
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became my opportunity to take a peek inside the macroeconomic ‘laboratories’ of 
various universities and the Danish state apparatus.   
 
According to Kvale, an interview is a conversation with the purpose of acquiring an 
insight into the life-world of an interviewee (Kvale 1996). I find this description 
appropriate, but would perhaps rather say that an interview is a conversation with 
one or multiple purposes. In my case, the purposes counted: getting to know 
practices of macroeconomic modelling, acquiring a better understanding of 
macroeconomics, piecing together historical sequences, retrieving information which 
could not be found in articles and reports, and acquiring a comprehensive view of 
macroeconomic modelling for sustainability. My approach to achieving these 
purposes was the well-known formula of a semi-structured interview, where the 
interviewer has a check-list of prepared questions, yet is open to and interested in the 
exploration of unprepared questions and themes (Berg 2007).  
 
Given the multiple different purposes of my interviews, my informants also came to 
play different roles. Thus, during one interview, an interviewee could switch between 
being an expert conveying expert knowledge of her specific field, an artisan telling 
anecdotes about modelling practices, and a historian providing information on long 
past events. Audio recordings of the interviews later allowed me to turn the 
interviews into written text and divide statements into various categories reflecting 
the different roles that my informants came to play during the interviews.  
 
Searching   
In relation to the creation and gathering of data, questions of search strategies 
obviously emerge, and in present day academic practices, academic writers are 
especially expected to account for how text is identified and collected. In my thesis, 
articles and other documents were located by methods such as: using search engines 
and combinations of search terms on the Internet, paying attention to references and 
going through bibliographies, and recommendations given to me by peers and 
interviewees. Other than that, I have not followed any strict strategy of data 
gathering, but I have rather tried to acquire sets of data, which seemed adequate for 
my research purposes and which were within my reach given the constraints of time 
and personal resources.  
 
Coding  
An academic researcher is generally expected to be able to account for the process of 
engaging with data and the production of analyses. Yet, I must admit that this 
process is, at least in my view, too subtle for me to claim full awareness of since it 
involves many elements that I have not consciously controlled. For instance, I would 
sometimes go to bed confused about how to approach my material and then wake up 
the next morning with a useful and very tangible idea of how to proceed. Thus, 
sleeping was in fact a vital part of my research method, even though I have no idea 
what went on during my sleep. Having said this, there were luckily also 
methodological techniques which were within my conscious control, and coding was 
one of them.    
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Emphasising that coding is a rather multifaceted and complex affair, Coffey & 
Atkinson (1996) note that categorisation and systematisation is, in fact, a good point 
of departure for the coding of given data material. This may sound quite obvious, and 
it probably is, but I have to acknowledge that the systematisation and categorisation 
of documents in various thematic folders on my computer was in fact one of the most 
important parts of my coding process, and it helped me get an overview of my 
material and develop conceptual ideas. As people interested in philosophy will 
probably certify, categorisation is certainly not an innocent business and my category 
choices where highly idiosyncratic in a way which shaped the final results and 
sometimes led to undesirable constraints and dead ends.  
 
As another aspect of coding, Coffey & Atkinson (1996) highlight how the 
identification and marking of chunks of text can separate data into various thematic 
categories. This activity is sometimes referred to as segmentation, which can be 
followed be recontextualisation, where chunks of text are reinserted in new textual 
contexts and perhaps surrounded by similar thematic chunks from other interviews 
or by statements written by the researcher (Ibid.). Such processes of marking, 
segmentation and recontextualisation were also applied during the drafting of my 
thesis, where documents (including transcribed interviews) were marked in various 
ways, and where chunks of text were copied and inserted into new textual contexts. 
In some cases, such coding concerned the identification of discursive categories and 
narrative structures (Urhammer & Røpke 2014), while in other cases, coding 
consisted of recognising and linking historical patterns and events across interviews 
and documents (Urhammer forthcoming).  
 
More generally, Coffey & Atkinson (1996) highlight how coding establishes a link 
between data and theoretical concepts, where the categorisation and systematisation 
of data are merely elements in a wider multifaceted interpretive process. As such, 
coding is a heterogeneous discipline, which is not confined to activities of organising 
material in various thematic categories or highlighting sentences using different 
colours, however useful such activities may be. Thus, Coffey & Atkinson (1996) 
emphasise that coding is just as much a process of reflection as it is a question of a 
precise procedure, which means that coding requires interaction with data, goes 
beyond data, and adds new layers of interpretation to the research process.  
 
In my case, this view spurred me on to achieve some kind of awareness of coding as a 
hybrid and rather creative process and embrace the role of active interpreter and 
creator of new interpretive layers to the data material. Along these lines, I have also 
tried to be aware of how my personal theoretical inclinations influenced the 
understanding of the data material, but also how the available data material 
constrained the theoretical ambitions. Exemplifying this, discourse and narrative 
analysis suited my choice of using documents as empirical material, while my 
theoretical interest in STS provided me with a partly unsatisfied urge to go further 
than text and discover practices and material conditions. In the case of document 
analysis, the afore-mentioned element of rhetoric and persuasion, which characterises 
the documents I have engaged with, prompted me to embrace this rhetorical 
dimension and analyse certain documents as if they were collections of narratives and 
storytelling. In this case, the coding of the material consisted of adding an 
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interpretive layer by configuring the text material into a selection of well-defined 
narratives.  
 
Data material  
During the course of writing this thesis, a wide range of data was gathered and 
processed in various ways. All together, the collected data material for the entire 
thesis includes approximately: 33 hours of audio recorded interviews of 21 
professionals, 11 hours of audio recorded seminars, 45 reports, 88 journal articles, 8 
books, 18 websites and a few field observations (for a comprehensive overview of the 
data material see appendix 1). Even though each individual article draws upon a 
specific set of data, it is appropriate to talk about a collective set of data for the entire 
thesis, not least since some articles share data and rely on data material from other 
articles as background material. In the following, I describe the data material and 
how it was processed for the purposes of the individual articles. Finally, I discuss the 
concept of multi-sited ethnography, which has, at least to some extent, inspired my 
research.  
 
Interviews and seminars 
In the span of writing the thesis, I carried out a series of interviews and audio 
recorded a number of seminars of special empirical interest. Some of the interviews 
could be labelled expert interviews, which provided insights into macroeconomic 
modelling, while other interviews rather served as explorative conversations about a 
wide range of issues related to macroeconomics and modelling. However, all the 
interviews could reasonably be labelled semi-structured.   
 
In Article 4, 15 Danish model builders (expert practitioners), economists and civil 
servants, many of whom were part of the Danish macroeconomic modelling 
community, were interviewed about macroeconomic modelling and energy in 
Denmark (Urhammer forthcoming). All the interviews were transcribed and coded in 
order to identify: important events, a common chronology and significant models and 
modelling features. While working on the article, I also recorded a Danish seminar 
about multi-sector models and energy. This recording became a useful source of 
information about the most recent of the three models described in the article.   
 
In Article 5, some of the above-mentioned interviews along with similar interviews of 
model builders, who I arranged to meet during my stay in Leeds (more about this 
later), served as material for approaching the interface between macroeconomic 
modelling and policy-making (Urhammer in progress).    
 
Reports  
The reports and documentations used in this thesis were published by organisational 
actors, such as the OECD, the Danish Energy Agency, the New Economics 
Foundation and the Worldwatch Institute, and spanned a wide range of issues from 
green growth policy programmes to energy plans and documents on macroeconomic 
models.  
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In Article 1, 19 reports were analysed for the purpose of investigating economic 
policy proposals for solving the so-called system crisis (Urhammer & Røpke 2013). 
The reports were located using the Google search-engine and search words, such as 
‘green growth’, ‘green economy’ and ‘degrowth’, by exploring organisational 
websites, and by going through lists of references. During the process of reading the 
reports, a gradual categorisation of the reports into two overall discursive categories 
took place using folders on my laptop. Parallel to this, excel spread sheets were used 
to group policy proposal into two overall policy categories and a number of sub-
categories. Parallel to this work, an analytical layer was gradually developed by 
articulating two grand stories and a series of archetypical narratives for each 
discursive category.   
 
In Article 4, 16 reports were analysed for the purpose of telling the story of 
macroeconomic energy modelling in Denmark (Urhammer forthcoming). The 
collection of reports comprised a series of energy policy plans and documents of 
different Danish macroeconomic energy models. In many cases, interviewees made 
me aware of the existence of specific reports. The energy plans were used as a 
supplement to interviews and provided a means for tracing the subtle connection 
between modelling activities and policy-proposals. In the pursuit of this connection, 
the energy plans were coded in order to identify coinciding themes between 
interviews and reports. Furthermore, the plans were part of establishing the overall 
chronology of the story. The technical model documents primarily served as a 
supplement to the interviews and provided a valuable source for understanding and 
describing the technicalities of the models.  
 
Finally, Article 5 used 7 reports about different macroeconomic approaches to 
environmental modelling as a supplement to a selection of journal articles 
(Urhammer in progress). Article 3 used 1 report about beyond growth indicators to 
better understand the circulation of economic growth (Urhammer 2014), while nine 
reports from various Danish State organisations, mainly about modelling and 
national accounts, served as the background for understanding the core themes of the 
thesis.  
 
Journal articles  
Journal articles also served as empirical material for a number of the articles. This 
was especially the case for Articles 1, 5 and 6 (Urammer & Røpke 2013, Urhammer in 
progress, Pirgmaier & Urhammer 2015). In Article 1, 10 journal articles were used to 
supplement the organisational reports (Urhammer & Røpke 2013). Even though 
academic articles are most often organised differently than reports, the categorisation 
of the articles and their policy proposal followed the same procedure as for the 
reports.  
 
In Article 5, 38 journal articles were surveyed (Urhammer in progress). The articles 
were located using Science Direct, Scopus and Google Scholar and search words, 
such as ‘macroeconomic’, ‘modelling’ and ‘sustainability’, by going through lists of 
references, and finally, by asking peers and model builders for useful references. The 
articles were categorised using laptop folders into several methodological categories, 
some of which were again subdivided into sub-themes. Parallel to this, excel spread 
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sheets were used to help organise the content of the articles in sheets divided into 
categories such as research questions, theory and worldview and tools and technicalities.  
 
In Article 6, 35 journal articles were reviewed in order to account for a series of 
axiological positions and to analyse the use of the term ‘value pluralism’ in a series of 
articles published in the journal Ecological Economics (Pirgmaier & Urhammer 
2015). The search process, categorisation and analysis resembled the one performed 
in Article 5 (Urhammer in progress). Finally, the articles analysed in Article 5 also 
served as a background for writing about neoclassical economics as a system of belief 
in Article 2 (Urhammer 2015a).    
 
Books 
Also various books have served as data material in this thesis. This is the case for 
Article 4, 5, and 6. Yet, the most important use of a book as empirical material is in 
Article 2, which depends heavily on Sørensen & Steinsland’s book about the Norse 
poem Völuspa (Sørensen & Steinsland 2001). 
 
Websites  
Even though the data material of this thesis does not contain many websites, Article 
3 draws on statements and information from 17 websites (Urhammer 2014). The 
websites were located using Google-searches combining words such as ‘the economy’ 
and ‘economic growth’ with words such as “healthy”, “sick”, and “strong”, in order to 
find linguistic instances of the objectification and personification of these entities. 
The searches were not carried out to gather exhaustive data material, but to acquire 
telling examples to support conceptual propositions. Furthermore, Article 4 used one 
website in order to help get an overview of the history of Danish energy policy from 
the point of view of the Danish Energy Agency (Urhammer forthcoming).   
 
Field observations  
Parts of this thesis are inspired by disciplines committed to ethnographic fieldwork, 
and even though fieldwork did not play a prominent role in writing the thesis, it is 
still fair to claim that field observations did serve as a supplement to the rest of the 
data material. As such, the fieldwork of the thesis did not follow an elaborate plan, 
instead it simply happened along the way, or, as I write in Article 3, “in the stream of 
my life” (Urhammer 2014:311). In the following, I will try to describe some of the 
fieldwork carried out in the course of writing the thesis.  
 
In the first year of the project, I spent six month at the School of Earth and 
Environment at the University of Leeds. Here I became part of a community of 
ecological economists and participated in meetings, events and followed a graduate 
course in quantitative ecological economics methods. The University of Leeds turned 
out to be a very relevant ethnographic site since it housed a strong group of 
ecological economists and a group of Post-Keynesian economists. While I was there, 
these two groups participated in planning the biannual conference of the European 
Society for Ecological Economics, and I got the chance to be present at sites of cross 
fertilisation between these two communities, where the ecological community 
encouraged the incorporation of ecological aspects to the post-Keynesian framework, 
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while the post-Keynesians inspired the ecological framework not least with its 
rigorous understanding of the financial dimension of economics.  
 
At the end of my stay in Leeds, I got the chance to participate in an international 
exergy economics seminar, which gathered the world’s leading researchers within 
this field. The seminar was workshop-based and focussed strongly on opportunities 
for collaboration and how to push the research programme of exergy economics 
forward. I participated as a note-taker and thus had the chance to be an almost 
anonymous observer. Some of the recurring themes at the seminar were: the creation 
of and access to data and databases, the struggle against and opportunities for 
collaboration with mainstream economists, and the opportunities for enrolling other 
research programmes, such as life-cycle assessment and complexity theory, in the 
exergy agenda.    
 
Back in Denmark, I got to know central members of the Danish macroeconomic 
modelling community and learned about the Danish history of macroeconomic 
energy modelling through a series of interviews, which brought me to sites such as 
The Danish Ministry of Finance, Statistics Denmark and the Niels Bohr Institute for 
Theoretical Physics. In Denmark, I also participated in several seminars about 
macroeconomic modelling, through which I acquired further knowledge about 
mainstream modelling methods and how they are practiced in governmental 
organisations.  
 
When it comes to using fieldwork as a direct source of information, Article 3 does so 
most elaborately (Urhammer 2014). In this article, I draw upon conversations and 
meetings which took place during my stay in Leeds. The most fruitful of these were 
two conversations with former civil servants of the UK Treasury and the Mexican 
Ministry of Finance, and a meeting with a programme manager from the New 
Economics Foundation in London. The civil servants provided me with insights into 
the epistemic practices of ministries of finance, with knowledge about the tight 
entanglement of macroeconomic modelling and processes of policy-making, and put 
me on the track of the circulation of numbers and graphs between statistical offices 
and ministries of finance, while the programme manager shared his experiences of 
economic growth as a strong cultural idiom in many of the UK ministries he had 
visited.  
 
Concluding the fieldwork, it was mainly a source of background information helping 
me interpret and find connections between the topics of my thesis, although it also 
served as a more direct source of information which helped me to develop the 
conceptual framework for Article 3 (Urhammer 2014).  
 
Some elements of a multi-sited ethnography 
In Article 3, I claim to have performed a multi-sited ethnographic study (Urhammer 
2014). This claim, however, is not explicitly justified in the article. Hence, I would 
like to devote a few words to elaborate a bit on this methodological topic as it has 
been articulated by Marcus (1998). According to Marcus, multi-sited ethnography 
emerged during the 1980s from inter/anti-disciplinary research, which challenged 
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the distinction between local life-world perspectives and world-system perspectives 
as two separable levels of investigation, the former studied by ethnographers, the 
latter by macro-theorists (Ibid.).  
 
In opposition to this distinction, multi-sited ethnography approaches world-systems 
as objects that emerge from connected life-worlds through the circulation of macro-
theoretical concepts and narratives between specific sites and localities. In this view, 
world systems are objects which must be studied from site to site through multiple 
contexts, and hence, the objects of multi-sited research can neither “be accounted for 
ethnographically by remaining focused on a single site of intensive investigation” nor 
by pretending a view “from above or ‘nowhere’ ” (Ibid.:80 and 97). Along these lines, 
multi-sited ethnography tries to avoid assumptions about the existence of systems 
prior to analysis. Instead it “[…] allows the sense of system to emerge 
ethnographically and speculatively by following paths of circulation” (Ibid.:92).  
 
Even though my work is very far from a carefully crafted multi-sited ethnographic 
study as Marcus envisioned it, my approach to economic growth and 
macroeconomics somehow still resonates with some of Marcus’s ideas. Especially, I 
have been encouraged by Marcus and several STS scholars to follow things through 
different sites and data material. Which things to follow obviously depends on the 
research question, yet, Marcus emphasises, among other things, controversies, stories 
and metaphors as suitable objects of a multi-sited ethnography (Ibid.). Thus, in the 
absence of a reliable holistic model of macro-processes, following the parties to a 
specific controversy can open useful terrain, and when dealing with discourses and 
modes of thought, following plots, symbols and metaphors can lead the way to new 
discoveries (Ibid.).  
 
In line with these recommendations, I have tried to follow controversies regarding 
economic growth through various sorts of data material along a blurry line of 
separation between different epistemic approaches to macroeconomics and economic 
growth. This has led to a description of economic growth as a multidimensional 
object with many appearances: in Article 2, it is a god in a mythological system of 
belief (Urhammer 2015a), in Article 4, it is a key factor in crafting energy policy 
imaginaries (Urhammer forthcoming), in Article 3, it is a constructed, circulating 
monster (Urhammer 2014), and throughout the thesis, it acts as a separator between 
discourses, publics, models, and policy proposals.  
 
The ethnographer activist 
To end this methodological account, I wish to mention one more aspect of Marcus’s 
multi-sited approach which has served as an inspiration to my work: the ethnographer 
activist – a translator and storyteller, who participates in processes of circulation, 
articulation and renegotiation of world-system objects (Marcus 1998). At least to 
some extent, I see myself as an ethnographer activist who has tried to make my 
project a contribution to a struggle to change our current mode of economic thinking 
and policy-making. This intention has, among other things, prompted me to install 
an element of flexibility in my project, which has allowed me to react to calls from 
various academic journals in order to communicate transformative perspectives to 
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audiences expected to be more or less unfamiliar with such views (Urhammer 2014, 
2015).  
 
Finally, it could be argued that the themes of the thesis were also more or less 
determined by my activist agenda, which is reflected in the fact that the main 
emphasis of the thesis was originally supposed to be macroeconomic modelling for 
sustainability. However, the aforementioned activist flexibility and the constant 
discovery of economic growth as a monster political obstruction to economic policy 
transformation made me reconsider the focus and allow economic growth to 
somehow take centre stage. As such, the process of writing the thesis can be 
described as that of an ethnographer activist gradually discovering, and not trying to 
avoid, the gravity of economic growth, not least due to recognition of the enormous 
influence of economic growth on macroeconomics and modelling in relation to issues 
of sustainability.  
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Presentation of articles  
In this chapter, I present the articles of the thesis. Since the articles are different and 
have been written under different circumstances, I do not present them in the same 
way. Instead, I highlight a few relevant features and link the articles to the research 
questions they intend to answer. Hence, before I proceed to the presentation of the 
articles, I first present the research questions again.  
 
Question 1 
 
How can a comprehensive view of policy proposals for solving the multiple environmental 
and economic crises of our age be provided, and what can a narrative analysis of these 
proposals tell us about their political strength?  
 
Question 2 
 
What is economic growth, and how did it become a policy object with the ability to obstruct 
policy action in favour of sustainable transition?  
 
Question 3 
 
What is the role of macroeconomic modelling in policy and research for sustainability? 
 
Article 16 (Urhammer & Røpke 2013) 
Article 1 addresses Question 1 of the thesis and sets the scene for the rest of the 
articles by introducing the system crisis perspective and by mapping a wide range of 
policy proposals for solving the system crisis (Ibid.). In doing so, the article 
establishes economic growth as a controversial issue, which serves as a pivotal point 
of contestation throughout the thesis.   
 
The article presents a combined discourse and narratology approach to analysing a 
selection of policy reports and academic articles, by means of which it contributes to 
two different literary discussions. Firstly, it adds nuances to the study of 
contestations between growth protagonists and antagonists by pointing out that 
growth protagonist and antagonist discourses share a selection of policy narratives. 
Secondly, it adds a dimension to the concept of narrative policy analysis by 
suggesting a strong connection between narrative dynamics and structure. In Roe’s 
approach to narrative policy analysis, attention is directed towards the structure of 
narratives in the sense that the shape of the plot is considered to be the determining 
factor to the persuasive strength of a story (Roe 1994). In Article 1, it is argued that 
the internal dynamics of a narrative – the cast of characters and what this cast does 
to create the structure – also plays a role in determining the persuasive strength of a 
narrative (Urhammer & Røpke 2014). If a story has too many villains and no heroes, 
for instance, it is likely to lead to chaos and a less engaging plot.  
 
                                            
6 It ought to be mentioned that this article elaborates on work initiated in my master thesis 
(Urhammer 2012).   
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As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, the thesis has an activist attitude, 
which is also detectable in Article 1, the purpose of which, among other things, is to 
direct attention towards narratives and storytelling as important factors in policy-
making for a sustainable transition. The normative hope thus expressed in the article 
is that stronger attention to policy stories told, shared and circulated among a wide 
range of actors will strengthen the movement towards a sustainable transition (Ibid.).   
 
Article 2 (Urhammer 2015a,b) 
Article 2 was written on request from the Danish literature journal ‘Kritik’ for a 
special issue on crises (Urhammer 2015b). In my capacity of (wannabe) ethnographer 
activist, I saw the writing and publication of this article as a chance to communicate 
the issues of my thesis to a wider audience. As there was no restriction on the form of 
the article, I took this as an opportunity to play with genre, which resulted in the 
article being a mix of futuristic fiction and academic article. 
 
In Article 2, Questions 1 and 2 of the thesis are addressed with an emphasis on 
question 2, which means that the article presents economic growth, along with other 
entities of economic theory, as a god in a system of belief. In addition to this, the 
article also elaborates on the discussion of heroes and villains in economic policy 
narratives, which was initiated in Article 1. This is achieved by introducing gods and 
demi-gods to the discussion. With this extension, Article 1 and 2 collectively 
command a vocabulary to rearticulate aspects of economic policy in terms of gods, 
demi-gods, heroes, and villains (Urhammer & Røpke 2013, Urhammer 2015a).  
 
The purpose of the article is strongly normative and consists of an attempt to 
challenge the objectivity ethos of neoclassical economics and to illustrate how policy 
objects, such as economic growth and competition, possess traits and features similar 
to those of mythological gods and, therefore, perhaps should rather be considered as 
such. In this regard, the article can be seen as a proposal to embrace economics and 
economic policy rather as a matter of mythology than a matter of economic ‘facts’. 
 
Continuing along the normative path, the article also tries to establish a connection 
between neoclassical mythology and the interests of ‘the elite’. The main argument in 
this regard is that the theoretical tenets of neoclassical economics almost too 
conveniently fit the interests of the rich and corporations so that the neoclassical 
gods, such as growth and competition, can be used to confront policies, such as 
corporate taxation and environmental regulation, with reference to how such 
interventions will threaten the gods of the neoclassical system of belief (Urhammer 
2015a).  
 
Finally, I would like to mention how Article 2 connects to discussions of the 
opposing worldviews of neoclassical and ecological economics. Thus, to describe the 
former, I have chosen to speak of the deterministic, linear, neoclassical cosmology, 
while the Norse poem Völuspa represents the crisis awareness and attention to 
downfall, which is characteristic of ecological economics. Along these lines, the 
Völuspa also represents the attention to complexity, chaos and uncertainty which 
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characterises the systems thinking of climate science and other environmental 
sciences.  
 
Article 3 (Urhammer 2014) 
Article 3 is the main article for addressing Question 2 of the thesis, which means that 
the article investigates the ontological status of economic growth. Amongst 
economists, this status is mainly a question of representation, where economic 
growth is described as an objective phenomena measured by GDP. In Article 3, this 
perception is challenged, and a perspective, which considers data collection and 
processing and the translation and circulation of numbers and graphs to be 
constitutional elements of economic growth as a policy object, is presented. 
 
As was also the case for Article 2 (Urhammer 2015a), Article 3 came into being as 
part of my activist agenda, which means that the article can be seen as an 
intervention with the purpose of disseminating unconventional perspectives on 
economic growth and sustainability. More concretely, the article was a response to a 
call for a special issue on language and economics, and I saw this call as an 
opportunity to draw attention to the major environmental crises of our age and their 
relation to economic growth both as a biophysical phenomenon and a policy object. 
Since I had to react fairly quickly to the call, I had no time to establish a solid 
empirical base for the article, which means that it became a conceptual paper, 
sketching a certain perspective rather than thoroughly investigating clearly defined 
empirical material. Along these lines, my sense of relevant literature was also limited 
at the time of writing. This is most likely still the case, but I have at least tried briefly 
to make up for this shortcoming in the theory chapter and the introduction to this 
thesis.  
 
In its capacity of conceptual paper, several themes and propositions of the article are 
merely touched upon and deserve further elaboration. In this regard, one theme 
especially calls for further explanation (perhaps even retreat), and that is the question 
of how a new inclusive language of decision-making can offer a path for Latourian 
ecologisation?7 (Urhammer 2014). The reason for considering a retreat in this regard 
is the fact that I have to admit that my plea for a new inclusive language is mostly 
wishful thinking, which I do not have any clear idea of how to operationalise. Having 
admitted this, I could try to excuse myself by saying that Latour’s notion of 
ecologisation is equally vague (which I am inclined to think it is), yet it seems more 
interesting to direct attention towards work which does in fact try to investigate the 
role of language in processes for which ecologisation might be an appropriate label. 
In this regard, I would like to mention de la Cadena, who has studied indigenous 
interventions in state politics of Latin American countries, and who describes such 
interventions as sites for connecting different language situations (de la Cadena 
2010). Along these lines, de la Cadena’s and other scholarly work, might serve as an 
entrance to engage with the problem of how to develop a new inclusive language for 
the purpose of ecologisation. 
                                            
7 For a slightly more detailed description of ecologisation see the section labelled  ”empirical 
philosophy” in the theory chapter.  
   50 
 
Article 4 (Urhammer forthcoming) 
In Article 4, the focus is switched to addressing Question 3 of the thesis, which 
means that macroeconomic modelling takes centre stage. One of the purposes of 
Question 3 is to provide useful insights for current discussions of macroeconomic 
modelling, sustainability and economic policy. The article attempts to do so by 
describing specific historical modelling developments in Denmark, and by situating 
these developments in a context of politics and policy-making (Ibid.). In relation to 
the latter, the intention of the article is to get ‘behind the scenes’ of Danish energy 
policy-making and to provide insights into models and modelling practices involved 
in this type of policy.  
 
While writing the article, I struggled with the ambition to empirically cover links 
between model building, policy plans, and actual policy decisions, which turned out, 
however, to be overly ambitious. Instead, I ended up focussing on model building and 
merely indicating how such practices connect to policy plans and decision-making. 
My approach in this regard was to argue that macroeconomic models can be seen as 
effective instruments for articulating the economic realities of energy policy not least 
due to their capacity to draft energy policy imaginaries – visions of energy system 
futures (Ibid.).  
 
A key, yet only mildly surprising, discovery of the article is the fundamental role of 
economic growth and economic growth projections in Danish macroeconomic energy 
modelling, a role which consists of constraining the imaginary policy space by 
requiring the energy system to be able to deliver the energy demands of a growing 
economy (Ibid.). Along these lines, economic growth projections can be seen as a 
constant pulse of information, which emanates from the ministry of finance and is 
incorporated in modelling projects and reports covering issues of the energy system 
and the wider economy in Denmark.  
 
The version of Article 4 appearing in the thesis is a revised version which has 
recently been resubmitted to Ecological Economics. The article has, thus, undergone 
the first round of peer review and is currently awaiting the editor’s decision.      
 
Article 5 (Urhammer in progress) 
Article 5, which is in fact not an article but a working paper, continues along the 
lines of Article 4 and addresses Question 3 of the thesis. The work on this article was 
initiated in the first months of writing the thesis. Article 5 is thus the article which I 
have spent most time trying to write, and yet I have not been able to conclude the 
work in the form of a journal article. My original intention was to provide a very 
wide survey of macroeconomic modelling for sustainability, which turned out to be 
far too ambitious due to the huge variety of methodological approaches and vast 
amount of literature on the issue. Hence, along the way, the aim of the article became 
instead to identify a range of key topics for macroeconomic modelling for 
sustainability and to see how the treatment of these issues could provide insights into 
the development of ecological macroeconomics, especially in relation to modelling 
and policy-making.   
   51 
 
As mentioned, the article is a working paper, which means that it is not organised as 
a traditional journal article, instead it is a collection of thematic chapters treating 
various aspects of macroeconomic modelling for sustainability in an ecological 
economic policy perspective.  
 
Article 6 (Pirgmaier & Urhammer 2015) 
Even though Article 6 is thematically different from the rest of the articles – it 
neither concerns economic growth nor macroeconomics – it is still closely related to 
the overall themes of the thesis. Thus, it discusses values, value pluralism and value 
incommensurability, which, at least in my view, are key separations between 
neoclassical economics and ecological economics, where the former can be labelled 
value monist, while at least a segment of the ecological economics community adhere 
to value pluralism.  
 
Putting this in relation to economic growth, GDP can be seen as a value monist 
measure, which can only account for value if it is articulated in terms of a single 
monetary value metric. In opposition to this, the aforementioned ecological 
economists and other like-minded scholars, hold that it does not make sense to count 
all value by the same metric and aggregate it into one single number. Instead, we 
should acknowledge the fact that some values are incommensurable in that they 
cannot be accounted for by the same metric. In the case of certain values, it might 
even be utterly absurd to try and account for them at all. In this sense, values and 
value pluralism also relate to the discussion of macroeconomic modelling, which – 
especially in the case of neoclassical methods – is totally dependent on the 
assumption that one value metric suffices. Yet, if this assumption does not hold, how 
should we then do macroeconomic modelling, and is this type of modelling 
meaningful at all?     
 
Summary 
To end this chapter, I briefly summarise the conclusions of the  articles in relation to 
the three overall research questions of the thesis.   
 
Conclusion 1 
The main conclusion in relation to Question 1 is that a comprehensive view of policy 
proposals for solving the multiple environmental and economic crises of our age can 
be provided by means of a mapping of narratives consisting of an overall distinction 
between two discourses (pro-growth and no-growth), six so-called macro narratives, 
and a series of economic means (Urhammer & Røpke 2013:65). Regarding the 
political strength of policy narratives, it is concluded that Roe’s (1994) emphasis on 
the plot structure as an indicator of political strength can be supplemented by 
highlighting the importance of actants who enable certain structures. Thus, Article 1 
puts emphasis on the cast of characters and the presence of heroes and villains. The 
strong cast of heroes in the pro-growth narratives facilitates a well-structured green 
growth policy plot, while the lack of heroes and the excess of villains in the no-
growth narratives complicates the telling of a coherent and engaging story 
(Urhammer & Røpke 2113). Finally, Article 2 adds to the conclusion by introducing 
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the gods of economics to the cast of characters (Urhammer 2015a). If a policy 
narrative incorporates the authority of institutionalised gods, such as growth, market 
and competition, it inherits some of the strength of these gods.    
 
Conclusion 2  
Conclusion 2 responds to Question 2 by proposing that economic growth is a 
circulating monster composed of multiple translations, including the formatting of 
scattered data into a single number, the visual presentation of this number in graphs, 
and stories about this number (Urhammer 2014). The strength of the monster is 
explained by “an entanglement of institutions, state instruments and discourse that 
facilitates easy circulation and makes economic growth a nearly omnipresent concern 
in certain collectives” (Ibid.:315). The ability of the monster to obstruct policy action 
in favour of a sustainable transition is explained by the status of economic growth as 
a concern which trumps environmental concerns. Article 2 ‘concludes’ that economic 
growth is a god in a system of belief; a god which possesses the power to reject 
policies that appear to be a threat to its existence (Urhammer 2015a).  
 
Conclusion 3  
The final conclusion concerns the role of macroeconomic modelling in economic 
policy and research for sustainability. The answering of this question is divided 
between two articles. Article 4 concludes that macroeconomic modelling was 
included in Danish energy policy as an instrument of inquiry into emergent energy 
issues of core concern to the Danish government. Furthermore, it is argued that 
these modelling practices became a means of incorporating an overall concern for 
economic growth into energy policy imaginaries (Urhammer forthcoming).  
 
In Article 5, the preliminary conclusion is that macroeconomic modelling in 
economic policy and research for sustainability has multiple roles. Sometimes it is a 
means of establishing consistency in relation to theory or accounting principles; 
sometimes it is a means of serving the interests of an incumbent government, and 
sometimes it can be used to debunk various theoretical propositions (Urhammer in 
progress). Thus, given this multiplicity, a further conclusion is that the usefulness of 
macroeconomic models depends on how they are designed and used to fit their 
purposes. This means that model builders, who wish to use models as weapons in 
battles for a sustainable transition, might benefit from reconsidering whether the 
models they build do, in fact, serve the purpose of the policy changes they are aiming 
for.     
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General conclusion 
In this thesis, I approach the issue of economic growth and sustainability from a 
range of different empirical angles and theoretical perspectives, the overall purpose 
being to re-politicise the issue of economic growth and sustainability by illustrating a 
variety of political dimensions of this issue. This quest for re-politicisation is spurred 
by deep frustration over what appears to me to be the widespread and seldom 
disputed (at least in mainstream media and politics) ‘truth’ of economic growth as the 
most important economic policy objective and a universal societal good, the pursuit 
of which trumps concerns for issues such as climate change, inequality, ecosystem 
degradation and loss of biodiversity. 
 
In order to re-politicise the issue of economic growth and sustainability, I have 
particularly embraced three recurring and entangled modes of politics: controversy, 
world making and policy-making. Controversy is core to the thesis, which treats 
economic growth antagonism in relation to sustainability by delving into a series of 
pro-growth and post-growth battles and disputes. Thus, Question1 of the thesis sets 
the scene for investigating the economic growth/sustainability controversy as a 
battle of storytelling, where macroeconomic policy proposals for sustainability are 
presented as narratives exhibiting various degrees of persuasive strength (Urhammer 
& Røpke 2013), while Question 3 provides an opportunity to approach the same 
controversy from a different angle; namely macroeconomic models and modelling 
(Urhammer forthcoming, in progress). Together, these two research questions make 
it possible to investigate this controversy by focussing on two different weapons of 
battle: stories and models. Furthermore, in Article 4, the controversy perspective is 
approached using Dewey’s notion of a public, which facilitates the investigation of the 
controversy in terms of confrontations between two opposing publics; the 
traditionalists and the environmentalists (Urhammer forthcoming).  
 
As has been elaborately illustrated by mappers of controversies, controversies are 
complicated and messy (Venturini 2010), and I must admit that some of the richness, 
complexity and messiness of the controversy in focus has been lost in my 
configuration of it by means of a fairly rigid distinction between economic growth 
protagonism and antagonism. Yet, I have made an effort to show some of the nuances 
of the controversy, not least by emphasising that protagonists and antagonists do, in 
fact, share stories and modelling methodologies, and that different publics, organised 
around this issue, intermingle and are not that easily separated (Urhammer & Røpke 
2013, Urhammer forthcoming, in progress).   
 
Politics as world making consists of articulating the formatting and configuration of 
material circumstances as a form of politics. From this perspective, all three research 
questions of the thesis are invitations to think of theory, accounting, modelling and 
storytelling as world making. In this sense, Question 1 allows for a conception of 
narratives as creators of macroeconomic realities (Urhammer & Røpke 2013). 
Question 2 opens a space for describing economic growth as a constructed world, a 
monster, and a god (Urhammer 2014, 2015), and Question 3 sets the scene for 
presenting macroeconomic models as participators in the making of economic and 
environmental realities not least by being constituent elements in the construction of 
imaginaries of the future (Urhammer forthcoming, in progress).       
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Finally, the question of policy and policy-making is salient throughout the thesis. 
This salience is rooted in the understanding that a sustainable transition of the scale 
which is required to address the massive environmental and social crises of our time 
is probably only achievable if governments around the world support it whole-
heartedly instead of obstructing it in the name of growth, which often seems to be the 
case today. In Article 1, the issue of policy is addressed by focussing on policy 
proposals and the analysis of the persuasive strength of such proposals (Urhammer & 
Røpke 2013). Article 2 addresses policy by presenting macroeconomic entities such 
as economic growth, the market and competition as gods in a religious belief system, 
which is heavily involved in economic policy (Urhammer 2015a). The policy 
perspective in Article 3 concerns how economic growth has infiltrated public policy-
making institutions and shaped them in such a way that they have become dependent 
on this monster (Urhammer 2014). Finally, Article 4 and 5 delve into descriptions of 
how macroeconomic models and modelling is involved in processes of policy-making. 
This is done by showing how models are able to set the scene for policy processes by 
producing policy assessments and imaginaries of the future and by providing the 
language and epistemic tools for engaging in questions of economy and sustainability 
(Urhammer forthcoming, in progress).  
 
Due to the predominant focus on macroeconomics, this thesis does not venture into 
analyses of the interphase between macroeconomic calculation and special interests in 
policy-making. Sometimes I get the impression that economic growth is very much a 
policy trope serving the interest of elites, corporations and industry. For instance, if a 
policy proposal in favour of a sustainable transition threatens the interests of 
corporations and industries, one effective way to undermine it is to let some 
macroeconomic model calculate how many billions the policy will cost society in 
terms of GDP. This indicates to me that there is a connection between 
macroeconomic calculations and special interests, which I have not had the chance to 
investigate in any depth. Along these lines, it is important to emphasise that this 
question obviously also includes the special interests of environmental NGOs and 
communities in favour of post-growth transitions, which means that a stronger 
awareness from this side of how to use macroeconomic calculations to serve their 
interests might be helpful to the quest for a post-growth transition. The interphase 
between and entanglement of macroeconomic calculation and special interests is, 
thus, in my view, an issue of great importance to communities working for radical 
policy change, and I therefore encourage anybody with an interest in this question to 
explore it further.   
 
Other than this encouragement, I must admit that this thesis does not present many 
concrete recommendations. Nonetheless, having investigated policy proposals such 
as green growth and neoclassical impact assessment models, I tend to think that they 
are expressions of some sort of collective madness; a worshipping of a brute god in a 
weird mechanical world, and the sooner we leave this religious practice the better. 
Hence, my main recommendation consists in repeating the plea for economic growth 
agnosticism, which others have proposed before me (van den Bergh 2011). Thus, I 
insist that economic growth is simply not the most important policy issue of our 
time. Instead of being so concerned with the ups and downs of GDP, we should 
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direct far more collective energy towards climate change, the wild west of finance, 
ecosystem degradation, loss of biodiversity, inequality and social injustices. One way 
to begin this, probably and unfortunately, long goodbye could be to invest fewer 
resources in the measurement of GDP, and not succumb to the temptation to invent 
new silly economic welfare measures to replace it. Rather, we should devote more 
collective energy to accounting for and taking care of tangible things such as the 
materials and energy we use, the waste and pollution we produce, and the habitats we 
destroy.       
 
To end this general introduction, I would like to state that in the acknowledgment of 
the importance of policies for sustainable transition, this thesis tries to reopen the 
understanding of economic growth and sustainability and present alternative policy 
stories, models and perspectives, which can hopefully serve as a contribution to the 
re-politicisation of the frozen economic growth continent.    
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Since the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, a series of publications onmacroeconomic responses to the compound crises of
the economyand the environment have emerged. Under labels such as green new deal, green growth and the great
transition, attempts at offering coherent responses to the crises have been made. These responses have in
common that they all present a large number of policy proposals for ways in which to solve the current crises
and achieve a sustainable economy. This article provides a mapping of a selection of such responses and an
analysis of their content. The analysis combines discourse theory and narrative analysis and investigates
discourses by studying the narratives they produce. The study thus contributes to the long line of analyses on
discourses on sustainable economy: empirically, by investigating and analysing a number of macroeconomic
proposals for solving the system crisis, and theoretically, by elaborating on the concept of narrative dynamics
in relation to persuasive strength in political decision-making.
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1. Introduction
The world is facing a multitude of environmental, economic and
social crises which are threatening the wellbeing of present and future
generations. Climate change, ecosystem degradation and pollution are
destroying the environment (MEA, 2005; Rockström et al., 2009).
Financial meltdowns, recessions and debt are affecting the economy,
and unemployment, inequality and social unrest are threatening the
stability of many societies, also in Western countries, which are the
focus of this paper (Asici and Bünül, 2012; Lipietz, 2013). The political
responses to these crises differ. Many actors tend to give priority to
the economic crisis and focus on getting the economy back on the
growth track before they are prepared to direct more attention towards
environmental issues (Geels, 2013; Tienhaara, 2010). Others are aware
that a return to business as usual is not an option, because economic,
social and environmental problems are interconnected and call for
coherent solutions which address the problems simultaneously
(Jackson, 2009; NEF, 2010b; OECD, 2011c; UNEP, 2011b). The
strategies for addressing the problems in a coherent way differ
widely with regard to their radicality. Some stay close to the
traditional economic framework and aim at returning to the growth
path, only in a modiﬁed form of green growth (OECD, 2011c; UNEP,
2011a), whereas others consider the different crises as aspects of a
deeper system crisis that calls for more radical solutions and will
involve a halt to economic growth in the afﬂuent countries (Jackson,
2009; NEF, 2010b).
This divide points to the existence of two different discourses
which provide different stories of how to solve the system crises.
The main purpose of this article is to analyse and compare the
persuasive power of these different stories. The study is based on
the application of discourse and narrative analysis (Czarniawska,
2010b; Dryzek, 1997; Fairclough, 1992; Greimas, 1966; Hajer,
1995, 1996; Roe, 1994) and provides a mapping of a broad selection
of macroeconomic proposals, adding to a couple of survey papers in
this ﬁeld (Asici and Bünül, 2012; Bina and La Camera, 2011) by
applying a different approach for systemisation.
Economic growth is at the core of these proposals. It is a nodal
term which holds the key to understanding the system crisis and
the opposing views on how to solve it. Central to this understanding
is the dilemma of growth (Jackson, 2009), which refers to the problem
that economic growth is at the same time the main provider of
wealth and social stability and the instigator of environmental
disaster (Jackson, 2009). There seems to be two main approaches
to confronting this dilemma. The ﬁrst is to decouple economic
growth from environmental impact by the use of technologies
which secure high resource and energy efﬁciency (OECD, 2011c;
UNEP, 2011a), and the second is to establish an economy based on
a stable throughput of materials and energy within global carrying
capacity (Daly, 2008; Jackson, 2009; O'Neill et al., 2010). The ﬁrst
approach suggests what we see as a reconﬁguration of the current
global economy, while the latter implies a total transformation of
the global economic system. The feasibility of decoupling is strongly
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challenged by the proponents of the latter approach (Jackson, 2009),
and we suggest that these two opposing conceptions have led to the
emergence of two different discourses as regards the dilemma of
growth; here, we characterise these as a pro-growth and a no-growth
discourse, respectively.
The latter approach ﬁts in with the basic ideas of ecological
economics, but until recently, ecological economists have contributed
relatively little to macroeconomic research and policy development.
The ﬁeld has a long tradition of research focusing on how to
operationalise the concept of scale of the economy in relation to the
biosphere, and discussions on the environmental impact of economic
growth, relative and absolute decoupling, and Herman Daly's steady
state propositions also have a long history (Røpke, 2005). But it was
not until the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008 that more detailed
discussions onmacroeconomic issues and policies appeared high on the
agenda, and the strong criticism of mainstream positions on growth
was supplemented by an increased focus on constructive policy
proposals. Recent years have thus seen a growing number of
contributions to the development of an ecological macroeconomics
(Daly, 2008; Harris, 2009, 2013; Jackson, 2009; Kallis et al., 2012;
Lawn, 2010; Røpke, 2013; Schor, 2010; Victor, 2008; Victor and
Rosenbluth, 2007), but the theoretical foundations and policy proposals
of an ecological macroeconomics still need to be elaborated in more
detail.
In addition to this elaboration effort, there is a need to consider
how the perspective of ecological macroeconomics can impact
policy-making in a wider and more effective way. An important
precondition for political impact is that the perspective offers a
strong narrative with considerable persuasive power (Roe, 1994).
Analyses and debates on political impact, narratives and discourses
all play a rather modest role in ecological economics, so we have
found inspiration in a number of contributions both from within
and outside of the boundaries of ecological economics. Fred Luks
was the ﬁrst to suggest that ecological economists should include
the discourse on rhetoric into the self-awareness of ecological
economics, because rhetoric is important for the political impact of
this ﬁeld (Luks, 1998). For instance, he emphasises the importance
of metaphors in communication with a wider audience. Closer to
the topic of the present paper are two more recent contributions.
Berg and Hukkinen (2011) provide a narrative policy analysis of
the sustainable consumption and production debate taking place in
Finland and make the interesting observation that growth critique
may strengthen the dominant growth stories because the critique
adds to the complexity and uncertainty in the policy ﬁeld. The
second paper was written by Lehtonen, who has conducted a critical
discourse analysis of internal discourses in OECD, highlighting the
organisation as a site for discursive battles (Lehtonen, 2009).
Outside of the boundaries of ecological economics, authors such
as Hajer (1995, 1996) and Dryzek (1997) have made interesting
contributions to the ﬁeld of policy analysis regarding the issues of the
environment and economy, Hajer by developing a rigorous discursive
framework for analysing subjects such as acid rain and ecological
modernisation (Hajer, 1995, 1996) and Dryzek by delivering a broad
analysis of four different environmental discourses (Dryzek, 1997). By
drawing on this literature, we connect the tradition of discursive policy
analysis of environment and economy to similar contributions within
ecological economics.
Previous studies on the environment and economyusing a discourse
approach have focused on environmental discourses (Dryzek, 1997), on
single subjects such as acid rain (Hajer, 1995), concepts such as
ecological modernisation1 (Hajer, 1996), and studies on a national
(Berg and Hukkinen, 2011), organisational (Lehtonen, 2009) or
local level (Åkerman and Peltola, 2012). In this study we expand
the domain of analysis by investigating a series of macroeconomic
responses addressing economic, social and environmental problems.
In Section 2, we describe our empirical material and provide an
introduction to the theoretical understandings applied in the article.
Section 3 presents and structures the content of the research
material and identiﬁes nuances and incoherences in the discourses.
This is followed by a narrative analysis of the content in Section 4.
Section 5 elaborates on the ﬁnding of shared narratives, while the
conclusion in Section 6 puts the study into perspective.
2. Materials and Methods
The basic ontology of this study is that issues are discursively
constituted, implying that the investigation of issues beneﬁts from
focussing on the discursive practices through which they materialise.
These practices include storytelling, which connects amyriad of entities
from different social domains (Hajer, 1995). The methodology of this
article is thus to investigate the issue of the system crisis and its possible
solutions by delving into the rich world of narratives in a series of
publications containing macroeconomic solutions to this crisis. By
using visual mapping, we sketch some outlines of the order of discourse
which constitutes the issue of the system crisis and its possible
solutions. Furthermore, an analysis of the narratives through which
this order of discourse materialises provides an idea of how the
dynamics of narratives adds to the concept of narrative persuasive
strength.
When focusing on the scientiﬁc impact on policymaking, we ﬁnd
it relevant to analyse narratives from a realm between the scientiﬁc
and the political domains. Thus, the primary focus of this study is
ofﬁcial reports from organisations that are neither political parties
nor universities but still closely connected to both the scientiﬁc and
the political domains. Another reason for focussing on such reports
is that this type of communication is well suited for the narrative
analysis of our study, since it tends to gather a large number of
concrete policy proposals in a more clear-cut fashion than is often
the case in scientiﬁc articles.
We have analysed reports from the following organisations:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: OECD
(OECD, 2009, 2011b,c,d,e), United Nations Environment Programme:
UNEP (UNEP, 2009a,b, 2011a,b,c), United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs: UN DESA (UN DESA, 2009), New
Economics Foundation: NEF (NEF, 2008, 2009, 2010a,b, 2011),
Sustainable Development Commission: SDC (Jackson, 2009), Centre
for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy: CASSE (O'Neill
et al., 2010) and The Worldwatch Institute: WI (Assadourian, 2012).
Altogether, we have analysed 19 reports spanning the period between
2008 and 2013. Eleven of these reports we label pro-growth and
8 of them no-growth. Since the more radical positions are less
institutionalised than themainstream strategies,we have supplemented
this selection with a number of scientiﬁc articles covering these
perspectives (Bonaiuti, 2012; Kallis, 2011; Kallis et al., 2012;
Kerschner, 2010; Lorek and Fuchs, 2013; Martinez-Alier, 2009;
Martinez-Alier et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2010; Smith, 2010a,b).
We are aware that the datamaterial of this study does not fully cover
the issue at hand and that there is a bias in favour of Anglo-American
perspectives. This bias presents a challenge as regards the inclusion of
alternative and less institutionalised perspectives such as degrowth,
sometimes published in languages other than English. We have tried
to overcome this challenge by supplementing the data material with a
number of scientiﬁc articles that present these perspectives and draw
on a wider base of non Anglo-American literature. With this addition,
we ﬁnd our data material sufﬁcient to provide a basis for our
methodological approach and conclusions.
The theoretical starting point of this article is that our writing and
way of talking about issues form the perception of and lead the actions
1 Ecological modernisation is a concept rather similar to the concept of green growth
studied in this article. Green growth can be understood as a further development of
ecological modernisation.
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we take regarding these issues. This is clearly not a new idea, and
many scholars within social sciences have contributed to it. Common
to these contributions is the notion of discourse which has been
developed by, among others, Foucault (1972, 1973), Fairclough
(1992, 1995) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Within the ﬁeld of
policy analysis, the so called interpretive turn has led to an
understanding of policy processes according to which the idea of
discourse is inﬂuential (Yanow, 2000), and regarding the issues of
environment and economy, discourse approaches have been applied
by authors such as Hajer (1995) and Dryzek (1997). All of these
authors add to the notion of discourse, and place emphasis on
different aspects of it, but the general idea is that discourses are
particular ways of speaking about and assigning meaning to certain
parts of reality, and that discursive activities are considered to be
key forces that shape social structures and processes (Jørgensen
and Phillips, 1999). Thus, discourses matter in politics (Dryzek,
1997), and therefore it is worthwhile to investigate the discourses
constituting the issue of the system crisis and its possible solutions.
Complex issues often attract a large variety of interpretations and
suggestions (Dryzek, 1997), and the issue of the system crisis and its
possible solutions is no exception. Thus, this issue can be perceived
as constituted by different discourses struggling to assign certain
meanings to it. Such a complex conﬁguration of competing discourses
covering the same social domain can be conceptualised as an order of
discourse (Fairclough, 1992). This article attempts to give a rough
sketch of the order of discourse constituting the issue of the system
crisis and its possible solutions by investigating a relatively large set of
written narratives.
A narrative can be understood as the linguistic ordering of
events and phenomena in structures establishing more or less
coherent accounts of these events and phenomena (Czarniawska,
2010a,b; Roe, 1994). Such accounts are often referred to as stories.
Even though some authors distinguish between narratives and
stories (Czarniawska, 2010b; Roe, 1994; Yanow, 2000), we do not
apply a sharp distinction between these two. Instead, we ﬁnd it
worthwhile to distinguish between the notion of discourse and
narrative. In this regard, we consider narratives to be phenomena
embedded in discourses. Discourses are wide ensembles of ideas,
concepts and categorisations (Hajer, 1995), while narratives are
the result of discursive practices which organise elements of these
ensembles into comprehensible plots. Thus, narratives can be
understood as a certain type of materialisation of discourses.
Narrative analysis has been applied within policy analysis, for
example by Emery Roe, who focuses on the plot structure of
narratives in relation to political decision-making. Roe discovers
how certain narratives enable politicians to act on issues, while
others do not. The explanation for this is to be found in the plots of
the narratives (Roe, 1994). The plot is the essential structure of the
narrative — a sense-making way of organising narrative content
(Czarniawska, 2010a,b). Narratives with a simple tripartite structure
of beginning, middle and end are suitable for political action, while
for example the scattered plots of critique do not offer a clear
direction for political decisions (Roe, 1994). We ﬁnd this view
important, but suggest that there are also other dimensions of
narrative strength in relation to policymaking, such as the
institutional setting in which the narratives are told and the internal
dynamics of narratives. This relates to Hajer, who emphasises two
important aspects of discourses: the institutional context in which
they are embedded and the content of the discourses (Hajer, 1995).
Even though we agree with Hajer on the importance of both of
these aspects, this study mainly focuses on the content of narratives
and not so much on the institutional setting in which they are told.
The analysis of narratives often has a strong focus on the structure
of narratives. But the analysis can also focus on the dynamics
embedded in and shaping these structures. Todorov, for example,
describes the development of a simple tripartite plot as caused by
forces and actions (Todorov, 1971).2 In this view, the dynamics of
narratives lies in the presence of actants. This perception can be
further elaborated by the use of the actant model developed by
Greimas, in which generic pairs of actants create the basic dynamics
(Greimas, 1966; Petersen, 1998). Some of these actants are: the
subject and the object, and the sender and the receiver. The subject
is the active part reaching for or doing something to the object,
while the sender communicates or brings something to the receiver
(Petersen, 1998). Often, the actants can be termed heroes, villains or
victims (Petersen, 1998). We believe that this dynamic understanding
of narratives can add something to the perception of narrative
persuasive strength.
3. Macroeconomic Narratives
In this study, we refer to responses to the system crisis such as
green growth, green new deal and the great transition as macro
narratives. This word has a double meaning: ﬁrst, it refers to these
responses as macroeconomic, and second, as aggregates of smaller
narratives. These smaller narratives are policy proposals — means
for achieving certain goals. In order to visualise the macro narratives,
we have constructed a mapping which connects a series of means to a
series of these narratives by the use of black, white and grey colouring,
illustrating their composition of different smaller narratives.
For the sake of clarity, we have carried out a crude separation of
macro narratives into two wide discursive categories: pro-growth
and no-growth. The pro-growth macro narratives promote continued
economic growth in a green version, while the macro narratives of
no-growth consider this impossible and therefore recommend the
development of different versions of a no-growth economy. In our
study, the pro-growth narrators are OECD, UNEP and UN DESA, while
the no-growth narrators are NEF, CASSE, SDC, WI and a number of
scholars from the ﬁeld of ecological economics.
The pro-growth narrators are international and highly institu-
tionalised organisations, and their main audience is governments
and government ofﬁcials from around the world. Thus, they are
empowered by the advantage of directly addressing an international
audience involved in policymaking at several levels. The no-growth
narrators are smaller and far less institutionalised in comparison with
those of pro-growth, and it seems fair to assume that their audience is
further away from actual policymaking.3 Although few of the no-
growth narrators are empowered by the same privilege of speaking
directly to political decision makers from around the world, they exert
an indirect inﬂuence, for instance through publicmedia and educational
institutions.
Each of these narrators tells a speciﬁcmacro narrative. OECD tells the
story of green growth (GG), UNEP calls their story green economy (GE),
NEF unfolds the great transition4 (GT), SDC speaks of prosperity without
growth (PWG), CASSE provides a story about steady state economy
(SSE) and ﬁnally, WI and a series of scholars are telling the story of
degrowth (DG). In our mapping, macro narratives are often syntheses
of more than one publication. This means, for example, that the green-
growth column contains proposals from all the selected publications
from OECD, and the great-transition column does the same regarding
the selected publications from NEF. Finally, it is important to observe
that the degrowth column is qualitatively different from the other
columns, since the information it carries is provided by a mix of both
reports and scientiﬁc articles. In most cases, the reports include lists of
2 “An ‘ideal’ narrative begins with a stable situation, which is disturbed by some power or
force. There results a state of disequilibrium; by the action of a force directed in the opposite
direction, the equilibrium is re-established; the second equilibrium is similar to the ﬁrst, but
the two are never identical” (as cited in Czarniawska, 2010b).
3 As an exception, it should be mentioned that SDC was actually set up politically to
update politicians on subjects regarding sustainability.
4 NEF uses this title for a speciﬁc report, while we have used it to designate a wider
selection of NEF reports.
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concrete proposals supported by the authors, while this is rarely the
case for the scientiﬁc papers. The authors of the latter tend to be more
nuanced and to demonstrate a more dialectic approach, which may
sometimes make it less obvious whether or not the author supports a
certain proposal. Thus, the degrowth column could be claimed to be
associated with a higher level of uncertainty.
Before the narratives are presented, the next two sub-sections are
dedicated to a few background observations.
3.1. Green New Deal
The narrative of green new deal (GND) is a special case, since it is
used by both pro-growth and no-growth narrators. Regardless of the
narrator, green new deal is a story about immediate crisis
management, which signals a strong sense of urgency and suggests
large-scale initiatives such as government stimuli in the form of
large investments in sustainable infrastructure, leading to the
creation of new jobs. When told by pro-growth narrators, green
new deal (UN DESA, 2009; UNEP, 2009a) is a more narrow and
earlier version of the wider narrative of green economy, while the
NEF version (NEF, 2008) holds a unique position in between pro-
growth and no-growth. On the one hand, it resembles the pro-
growth versions of green new deal, but unlike all of the pro-growth
versions, it takes a strong critical stance against the ﬁnancial sector
and makes radical suggestions regarding stronger regulation of
this. On the other hand, it shares the general understanding of the
crisis with the no-growth narrators, but unlike no-growth narrative
promoters, it remains silent about economic growth. In Tables 1
and 2, UNEP's and UN DESA's versions of green new deal have been
merged with the remaining reports on green economy, while NEF's
version of green new deal has been merged with the remaining
NEF-reports in the macro narrative ‘the great transition’.
3.2. Green Growth and Green Economy
Even though green growth and green economyare very similar, they
are also signiﬁcantly disparate. One example concerns their different
emphasis on economic growth. This difference is apparent already in
their respective titles and deﬁnitions, where the word growth appears
both in the title and in the deﬁnition of green growth,5 while this is
not the case for green economy.6
A closer look at their respective deﬁnitions reveals that green growth
emphasises the necessity of the conservation of natural goods and
services for our wellbeing, while GE also takes future generations into
account. Considering that OECD is an organisation of wealthy nations,
this emphasis on our wellbeing adds a special ﬂavour and indicates an
approach less loyal to the entire global community than the approach
of UNEP, according to which the interests of future generations require
the involvement of signiﬁcant time horizons, all countries and more
environmental caution in decision-making.
It is also possible to track the two organisations' heritage in
their respective deﬁnitions of concepts. OECD remains faithful to
its main objective of development, which has so far been reached
through growth, while UNEP seems to be inspired by the UN
system's own deﬁnition of sustainable development, which
contains the element of present wellbeing without compromising
that of future generations.
3.3. Diverging Problem Analyses
The following presentation and comparison of the different
macro narratives focuses mainly on macroeconomic means, but
obviously these means are related to the narrators' understanding
of the crises — the key problems they identify, and the goals they
Table 1
Governing supply and demand.
Macro narratives 
Macroeconomic means GG GE GT PWG SSE DG
Price-based instruments:
Ecological tax reform
Carbon tax
Cap and trade 
Border tax adjustments
Picking the winner:
Technology policies 
Stopping perverse subsidies
Green subsidies 
Governing demand:
Green stimulus
Education and re-education 
Mainstreaming 
Increasing the demand for resource-extensive 
services 
Redirecting financial flows
(green investments):
Pension fund investments in green 
infrastructure
Eco-tax revenues invested in green transition
Financial transactions tax financing green 
transition
Advertisement tax revenue invested ingreen 
transition
Table 1: Governing supply and demand.
Legend
Agitates for
Discusses or mentions 
Does not speak about
Table 2
Change of socio-economic structures.
Macro narratives
Macroeconomic means GG GE GT PWG SSE DG
Means for localisation:
Local currencies 
Strengthening the informal economy
Enhancing local production and services 
New redistribution and labour marketpolicies: 
Maximum and minimum income
Citizen's income
Worksharing
Employer of last resort
Harnessing the financial sector:
Division between investment and retail banking 
Forced demergers of financial actors too big
to fail
Tax on financial transactions
Ban of obscure instruments
Capital control
Limit on bonuses
Fight tax havens
State-monopoly on money creation
Regulation of and creation of new businesses:
Limit to size (and right-size profits)
Cooperative ownership
New business models
Regulation of international trade 
New measures for economic progress 
Table 2: Change of socio-economic structures
Legend
Agitates for
Discusses or mentions 
Does not speak about
5 “Green growth means fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that
natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our
well-being relies” (OECD, 2011d).
6 “For UNEP, a ‘green economy’ can be deﬁned as a system of economic activities related to
the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services that result in improved
human well-being over the long term, while not exposing future generations to signiﬁcant
environmental risks or ecological scarcities” (UNEP, 2009b).
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are urging politicians to achieve. Therefore, in this section we brieﬂy
introduce the similarities and differences between pro-growth and
no-growth approaches with regard to their problem analyses, and,
in the following section, with regard to goals.
In general, the pro-growth reports devote much less effort to
basic problem analyses than do the no-growth reports, and in some
cases, the problem analyses have to be deduced from the implicit
rationales behind the macroeconomic proposals. Three key problem
areas are considered here: the connections between the economy
and the environment, between the economy and social stability,
and between the ﬁnancial sector and the real economy.
The pro- and no-growth accounts agree on the need to face
serious environmental problems, but the framing of the problems
differs. While the pro-growth analysis conceives of the problems in
terms of externalities and allocation, the no-growth analysis focuses
on the scale issue, planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009) and
the need for sharing limited resources. In the pro-growth account,
environmental problems are not considered to be a hindrance for
economic growth, because the internalisation of externalities can
correct the misallocation of capital and make it ﬂow in desirable
directions (UNEP, 2011b), while in the no-growth account, the limits
imply that the rich countries should stop growing their economies in
order to leave more biophysical capacity for the poor countries to
grow and develop (O'Neill et al., 2010).
Regarding social stability, the two accounts agree that economic
growth is the main recipe for maintaining this stability in the current
economic system, since growth provides jobs and income. But the
approaches draw opposite conclusions on how the economy should
deliver social stability in the future. While the pro-growth account
focuses on the challenge of how to decouple growth from
environmental impact, the key issue for the no-growth account is
to determine how an economy without growth can provide social
stability in the form of jobs and prosperity.
In the problem analyses of the no-growth account, the relationship
between the ﬁnancial sector and real economy plays an important
role. Two related problems are considered. First, the deregulation
of the ﬁnancial sector led to the dissociation of the ﬁnancial sector
from the real economy and to a debt-fuelled race for proﬁt in
which the size of the sector and its actors reached a level which
threatened the stability of the entire economic system (NEF, 2009;
Skarstein, 2011). Second, this development constituted part of the
background for increasing inequality in wealth and income in
many afﬂuent countries (Jackson, 2009). Stagnant incomes for the
middle class tend to reduce overall demand, but in countries such
as the US and the UK, this effect was postponed by a steep increase
in credit, not least in the real estate market (Skarstein, 2011).
When the bubble burst, the impact on the real economy thus proved
to be signiﬁcant. In this analysis, it becomes a key challenge to re-
regulate the ﬁnancial sector radically and transform it into a servant
of the real economy (NEF, 2008).
While the issues of ﬁnancial deregulation and increasing inequality
ﬁgure prominently in the problem analyses of the no-growth accounts,
they play a negligible role in the pro-growth accounts. An obvious
explanation is that organisations like OECD and UNEP are publishing
vast amounts of reports on a large variety of subjects and treating topics
such as ﬁnancial regulation and inequality in other publications (e.g.
OECD, 2011a). However, it is an important observation that these issues
are not considered central to green macroeconomics, and that the
strategies developed to reconcile environmental and economic goals
do not take them into account.
3.4. Macroeconomic Goals
All the narrators share some overall macroeconomic goals that
should be combined with environmental improvements: employment,
social stability, prosperity and wellbeing, but they disagree on the
relationship between these goals and growth. From a pro-growth
perspective, employment, social stability, prosperity and wellbeing are
more or less synonymouswith economic growth, andmust be obtained
by growth. Thus it is not necessary for pro-growth narrators to provide
a deeper analysis of these terms, since they are already embodied in
the word growth. In this view, the entire economic problem seems to
have been solved once economic growth has been decoupled from
environmental pressure. No-growth narrators oppose this view and
search for new ways of achieving social stability and new deﬁnitions
of prosperity and wellbeing independent of economic growth
(Jackson, 2009). In this view, wellbeing is far less dependent on
material consumption, and is instead based on good social relations,
strong local communities and meaningful societal participation.
3.5. Macroeconomic Means
It is common to the macro narratives of this study that they
present a series of means for achieving their goals. For further
categorisation and organisation of these means, they have been
divided into two broad categories: means for governing supply and
demand (Table 1) and means for changing socio-economic structures
(Table 2). The ﬁrst category contains means for directing production,
consumption and innovation towards a green transformation by the
rules of the current economic system, while the second contains
means for the reconstruction of the system. This conceptual division
reﬂects the basic division between the pro-growth and the no-
growth discourses, in which pro-growth is proposing system
modiﬁcation, while no-growth is advocating a system change. This
difference is visible in their different preferences of means. However,
the narrators of the two discourses actually agree on quite a few
means, particularly as regards those in the category of governing
supply and demand, which include means such as: price based
instruments, picking the winner, governing demand and redirecting
ﬁnancial ﬂows.
Price-based instruments are intended to signal whatwewantmore of
andwhatwewant less of,while leaving it to themarket to decidewhich
technologies and actors will be successful. Ecological tax reform is a
version of this narrative particularly favoured by many. In this story,
the workers and green innovative ﬁrms are the heroes, while polluting
and resource intensive ﬁrms are the villains. To favour the heroes and
restrict the villains, taxes on income must be lowered, while taxes on
resource consumption and pollution should be raised.
Picking the winner refers to more direct government inﬂuence on
sector developments such as subsidies to green industries. It is the
story of the government as a subject intervening in the market game
in favour of the environment. The heroes in this narrative are new
sustainable industries, while the villains are the sunset industries, e.g.
the fossil fuel industry. Both pro-growth and no-growth proponents
are in favour of picking the winner, and it is noteworthy that the pro-
growth interest in this strategy reveals a more diverse approach than
a pure neoliberal strategy strictly focusing on market-based and
technology-neutral instruments.
Governing demand is mainly based on instruments for greening
the public sector demand. It comprises public investments in:
green infrastructure, ecosystem restoration, green education and
re-education and the mainstreaming of green considerations in all
sectors and public institutions, e.g. by means of green public
procurement. This is a tale of the government as a provider of
sustainable transformation and jobs through strategic investments
and new institutional conﬁgurations. The pro-growth preference of
such measures again demonstrates that pro-growth is not a pure
neo-liberal agenda, since the idea of governing demand is clearly
inspired by a Keynesian approach to macroeconomics.
Redirecting ﬁnancial ﬂows means increasing the ﬂow of ﬁnancial
capital into green investments. There is agreement between pro-
growth and no-growth regarding this redirection. However, from a
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pro-growth perspective, this is an exercise of redirecting ﬁnancial
ﬂows within the channels of the existing system, while the no-
growth approach is to redirect through radical changes in the
ﬁnancial institutions.
The category change of socio-economic structures includes measures
such as: means for localisation, new redistribution and labour market
policies, harnessing the ﬁnancial sector, regulation of businesses and the
creation of new business models, the regulation of international trade and
new measures for economic progress.
The basic rationale behind the means for localisation is that
humankind is inherently living unsustainably, and that globalisation
exacerbates this tendency drastically. There are various reasons for
this, but essential to this mechanism is that globalisation enables
countries to live far beyond their own biophysical carrying capacity,
because they are able to draw on the output of ecosystems across the
planet (Rees, 2006). Furthermore, globalisation also makes it
difﬁcult to establish closed circulation of nutrients. Localisation is
therefore a story about the ways in which local communities can
seize control over their economies, disconnect from the globalised
economy and create modes of living within the local carrying
capacity (Schor, 2010). If this endeavour were accomplished in all
the local communities of the world, this would imply global
sustainability (Rees, 2006). This narrative deﬁnitely belongs to the
no-growth narrators. Except for a few pro-growth remarks on the
subject (UNEP, 2011a), the idea of localisation is only promoted in
the no-growth narratives, with different emphasis on different
means (see Table 2).
New redistribution and labour market policies contain:maximum and
minimum income, citizen's income, worksharing and employer of last
resort.7 Central to this narrative is society as a subject troubled by
inequality, unemployment and social unrest, and nature as the victim
of devastation from the economic activities of society. By sharing
income andwork between citizens, society can address important social
problems and at the same time decrease further environmental
pressure by removing some of the strongest incentives for further
growth. It is imperative that restraint with regard to consumption for
large social groups is not transformed into increased proﬁts and
afﬂuence for the few, which presupposes radical changes of the power
balance. These ideas are only expressed by the no-growth narrators.
However, differences still exist within no-growth regarding the
emphasis on and preferences for these means (see Table 2).
Harnessing the ﬁnancial sector is a story in which the ﬁnancial sector
is a furious bull thatmust be bridled. Each of themeans in this story (see
Table 2) is a shackle forged to control the beast, so as to make it a
servant, not a master of the economy. Again, this is a story not told by
the pro-growth narrators. In the no-growth camp, it is a popular story
in many versions. The most elaborate version of this story is told by
NEF, which has so far devoted two full reports to the subject (NEF,
2009, 2011).
The regulation of businesses and the creation of new business models
contain: a limit to size, cooperative ownership and newbusinessmodels.
This category has protagonists from both discourses, but pro-growth
focuses only on new business models, not on business regulation. The
pro-growth suggestions for new business models count ideas like
product-service systems and public-private partnerships, while the no-
growth proponents also suggest various forms of cooperative ownership
and more locally and ethically grounded business concepts. The
regulation of business in this category is mainly focused on actors in
the ﬁnancial sector (NEF, 2010a, 2011).
The regulation of international trade addresses the problems of
globalisation and is therefore closely connected to the localisation
narrative. Globalisation has provided the rich countries with enhanced
opportunities to export their environmental impacts and exploit
resources such as minerals, ﬁsh and cheap non-union labour.
Deregulation has made it possible to move all categories of capital
across borders throughout the world, and has nourished tax havens
and multinational exploitation of local resources. Globalised
international trade is thus seen to be in favour of the rich countries,
the multinationals and the capital owners, while it exploits the
poor countries, undermines the positions of workers in both rich
and poor countries, and threaten the interests of local communities.
The regulation of international trade is meant to address these
problems. Even though these issues are central no-growth concerns,
it is interesting to observe how few actual proposals regarding this
are to be found in the reports. The most concrete ideas for this can
be found in the story of harnessing the ﬁnancial sector (see Table 2).
Redeﬁning the measure of progress is a story about challenging the
autocratic rule of GDP over the meaning of prosperity. In this narrative,
new indicators, designed to count in the environment and social
circumstances, challenge the position of GDP.
4. Narrative Analysis
A basic understanding in narrative policy analysis is that “[s]tories
commonly used in describing and analysing policy issues are a force in
themselves, and must be considered explicitly in assessing policy options”
(Roe, 1994). The structure of stories is the main dimension in this
consideration, and here the tripartite plot consisting of beginning,
middle and end is a sign of narrative persuasive strength (Roe, 1994).
Berg and Hukkinen (2011) refer to this ﬁnding in their study of the
Finnish debate on sustainable consumption and production, in that
they consider the unstructured plot of growth-critique to be weak and
only instrumental in strengthening the incumbent story of growth.
Drawing on the perception introduced earlier that the structures of
plots possess and are shaped by internal dynamics, the idea of narrative
persuasive strength can be reformulated in terms of these dynamics: a
story possesses strength not only because it has a certain structure,
but also because it is characterised by certain dynamics. In the following,
we will try to elaborate this idea.
4.1. The Grand Story
It might be argued that humanity is currently a party to the making
of a grand story, the full plot ofwhich is yet unclear. For decades, the rich
kingdom of the west was prosperous and relatively stable. The growth
economy was the provider of this wealth and stability. Now serious
environmental disaster, social unrest and economic crises have joined
forces and become a monster crisis threatening to push the kingdom
and the rest of civilisation out of equilibrium towards the unknown. If
we look at this dynamics, it is possible to imagine how this will lead to
a story of beginning, middle and end. However, since we seem to be
somewhere in the transition between the beginning and the middle
stages, it is unclear what forces will dominate and create the dynamics
that will shape the rest of the story. One possible continuation is that
the monster crisis takes over and creates chaos and takes civilisation
to a new equilibrium of poverty and distress. Another is that rescuing
heroes march in to change the dynamics and establish a happy ending
in the form of a sustainable society. And ﬁnally there is the possibility
of something in between. In the following, wewill analyse two different
approaches to telling this grand story.
4.2. Pro-growth
Based on the pro-growth reports, it is possible to construct the
following archetypical pro-growth plot consisting of beginning, middle
and end:
business as usual→ system modiﬁcation→green growth economy
7 Employer of last resort means that the government provides public employment for
the unemployed at a minimumwage (Lawn, 2010).
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This story revolves around the growth metaphor, which in the
pro-growth discourse is synonymous with employment, social
stability, prosperity and wellbeing. This narrative possesses strength
because it provides politicians with a clear direction (Roe, 1994) and
does not question growth as the basic driver of the economy (Berg
and Hukkinen, 2011). It begins by describing the environmental
failures of the current economic conﬁguration called business as
usual. These failures make the economy a subject that has to pursue
the object of green. By modifying its operations, it reaches its goal of
becoming green without fundamentally changing its own identity as
the sender of wealth to society. This means that not only does this
narrative have a simple structure; it also possesses a simple and
understandable dynamics maintaining growth as the sender and
society as the receiver of prosperity and wellbeing after a process
of modiﬁcation in which the economy reaches out for and achieves
its new green identity.
The modiﬁcation stage of the plot is composed of a number of
narratives which can be synthesised into three interconnected stories:
government intervention, technological revolution and market salvation.
In the ﬁrst story, the government is the sender of new instructions to
the economy. By regulating, investing in and reforming economic
institutions such as the tax system, new economic frameworks and
dynamics are provided to secure the desirable allocation of capital.
The second story has technology as its subject. When the government
sets the right framework, technological innovation will blossom, and
new efﬁcient technologies will replace the old polluting technologies.
Finally, the last story is the story of how the market subject serves
green modiﬁcation by providing the optimal allocation of capital. As
soon as the market has received the framework for getting the prices
right, the market will work ceaselessly in favour of greening the
economy.
If a story is to have a happy ending, the presence of heroes is
useful. The hero creates hope and overcomes the insurmountable
by defeating the villains and helping the victims. Thus, the cast of
heroes, villains and victims creates important dynamics. In the pro-
growth story, there are many heroes and few villains, which makes it
a story bound for a happy ending.8 The main heroes of pro-growth
are: the market, the government, the investor, the technology, the
innovator, and the entrepreneur. In the interaction on market terms,
these characters create the modiﬁcation of the economy and actualise
the new green growth economy. These heroes are identical with those
which drive business as usual, and they represent the dynamics of
business as usual, but by inspiring and constraining these heroes to
act green, they are capable of turning the entire economy green. The
victims that will be saved are ecosystems, resources, poor countries
and poor people, while old polluting industries are the most obvious
villains in these growth-celebrating narratives.
Within narrative analysis, the idea of leaving something untold
plays an important role. In order to tell a good story a whole world
of elements must be left out. This reduction of elements is called
synecdoche (Czarniawska, 2010a,b). The most interesting synecdoche
of thepro-growthnarrative is perhaps the total omission of theﬁnancial
system, which indicates a lack of interest in the connection between the
current crisis and the ﬁnancial system. This synecdoche shows the pro-
growth propensity to status quo and tomodiﬁcation rather than radical
solutions to the present crisis.
4.3. No-growth
Themain problem for the grand story of no-growth is that it contains
toomuch critique and proposes utopia. Roe emphasises how criticism is
a weak narrative in politics because it has no simple structure but
organises as scattered arguments (Roe, 1994). As suggested earlier,
this understanding can be reformulated by also looking at the dynamics
embedded in this unorganised structure. Critique can be viewed as
emphasising negative forces that are pushing things in the wrong
direction, without providing counter forces to push things in a more
favourable direction. If we take critique of globalisation as an example,
the dynamics of this narrative is driven by the furious beast of
globalisation draining the earth and its people — multinational villains
rule in an unrestricted race to the bottom, victimising the local
communities and leaving no space for heroes. We suggest that it is
possible to rediscover the persuasive weakness of the unstructured
plot of critique (Roe, 1994) in the dynamics of this narrative. The
narrative remains powerless since it is not able to provide sufﬁcient
counter dynamics to the dynamics it criticises, it provides too many
victims and villains and not enough heroes. This can be exempliﬁed by
the relatively small amount of ideas for how to regulate and contain
international trade (see Section 3.5). There is no global agency that
can act as a hero in this story. Local communities are the most possible
heroes, but they are at the same time victims of the villains of the
globalised economy.
However, when we study the details of no-growth more closely,
serious attempts at establishing counter dynamics appear. To exemplify
this, we have selected three signiﬁcant no-growth stories, which could
be entitled: harnessing the beast, sharing and localisation. Harnessing
the beast comes in different varieties. In one variety, the beast is the
economy, a wild creature destroying the planet. By imposing serious
restrictions on its metabolism, it is possible to harness this beast and
teach it to live in harmony with its surroundings. Another variety has
the ﬁnancial sector as the beast, and in a third variety, economic
globalisation plays this role. In all its versions, this story emphasises
the need for constraining the malfunctioning global economic system.
The story of sharing suggests moderation to the competitive
mode of the growth economy. If those who have more share some
of their abundance with those who have less, the incentives for
growing the economy can be reduced: the growth economy ﬁghts
poverty by growing, the no-growth economy ﬁghts poverty by
sharing. The concept of sharing is especially focused on income and
work. By sharing these, we obtain a more equal distribution of
wealth, reduce the drive for further growth and render no-growth
more acceptable. In this narrative, altruistic individuals and societies
are heroes establishing a counter-dynamics to that of the furious
globalised growth economy.
In some respects, localisation is a version of harnessing the beast,
because one way to harness globalisation is to create local economies
out of its reach. Thus, localisation is about creating relativelymore closed
local economies which enhance local production and consumption.
Means for supporting such a development are local currencies and
cooperative ownership. By localising, it is easier for local communities
to consume and produce in accordance with environmental values and
to reduce the impact of transportation and packaging. In this context,
local communities are heroes establishing valuable counter-dynamics.
To end this section, we venture to sketch the grand no-growth plot
as a simple tripartite structure.
system crisis→ system transformation→no-growth economy
The big challenge for the narrators of this story is to account for the
feasibility of the two last stages of the plot. Hopefully, the three stories
mentioned above provide some inspiration for this task.
5. Shared Stories
If we are to ﬁnd possible routes to actual changes of policymeasures
in favour of a sustainable transition of the economy, one approach could
be to look for stories shared across the discursive boundary of pro-
growth and no-growth.
8 It is important to stress that we only mean ‘happy ending’ within the narrative
analysis. Whether the pro-growth approach will lead to a happy ending in factual terms
is an entirely different story.
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Our mapping of narratives (see Section 3.5 and Tables 1 and 2)
reveals that the two discourses pro-growth and no-growth agree
upon telling a number of stories. The most signiﬁcant are: ecological
tax-reform, green investments and redeﬁning the measure of progress.
The advantage of these narratives is that they are shared by narrators
across the discursive boundary, and that they have already been on
the political agenda in many countries. Massive investments in
green infrastructure were strongly emphasised in many green new
deal proposals, and in the years following closely after the ﬁnancial
crisis, many countries actually added a green ﬂavour to their
stimulus packages (Geels, 2013; Tienhaara, 2010). The story of an
ecological tax reform is widely told across the order of discourse
and has also been drawing political attention (Beuermann and
Santarius, 2006). The story of new measures for economic progress
is not a pure no-growth story, actually OECD and UNEP stress that
GDP “provides a distorted lens for economic performance” (UNEP,
2011b:4) and that “GDP generally overlooks the contribution of natural
assets to well-being” (OECD, 2011d:21). Thus, the willingness to
discuss and change the way in which wemeasure progress is already
present on both sides of the discursive boundary.
The existence of these shared stories suggests what Hajer has
termed a discourse-coalition (Hajer, 1995). A discourse-coalition is
constituted by a set of stories,9 a group of narrators uttering these
and the practices through which these stories materialise (Hajer,
1995). It is important to note that “[Discourse] coalitions are not
necessarily based on shared interests, let alone shared goals, but much
more on shared concepts and terms” (Hajer, 1996: 247). Thus, from
an ecological economics perspective this discourse-coalition might
provide a strategic opportunity for disseminating macroeconomic
narratives in favour of a sustainable transition of the economy,
without undermining the critical view on pro-growth. However,
there are some serious challenges to this idea, and perhaps it
presents some interesting questions for further research.
The shared stories are there, but how to use them? Luks
suggested a distinction between internal and external rhetoric of
ecological economics (Luks, 1998). Is it possible to elaborate this
idea by the use of these shared stories? Are there events where
these stories should be emphasised and other stories should remain
untold? Is it dangerous to emphasise this coalition with pro-growth
at the expense of the deep criticism of the pro-growth approach?
Will the participation in this coalition turn ecological economists
into useful idiots?
6. Conclusion
The macro narratives under scrutiny in this study ﬂourished in the
years following immediately after the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008. First, the
different versions of green new deal appeared with the intentions of
ensuring a quick recovery by using win–win logic. Later followed
broader narratives such as green growth and the great transition,
treating a large number of problems and presenting a major catalogue
of means. Common to all these narratives is the tendency to see the
ﬁnancial meltdown in 2008 as a golden opportunity for solving a wide
range of economic, environmental and social problems. However,
these narratives now seem to have lost momentum, probably due to a
strong focus on business as usual, economic recovery and austerity
policies, especially in Europe (Geels, 2013). But it is worth noting that
even if the rich world were to recover from the current economic and
ﬁnancial crises, the system crisis persists, and so does the need for
coherent answers to it. Thus, we claim that the stories constituting the
discourse coalition between pro-growth and no-growth are persistent,
highly relevant and likely to gain new momentum under the same or
new labels, simply because they are kept alive by the urgent and
undeniable need for sustainable transition of the global economy. We
therefore suggest that the discourse coalition based on these narratives
possesses useful discursive power in the on-going battle of sustainable
transformation of the economy.
Even though it might lead to some useful insight to draw a sharp
boundary between pro-growth and no-growth and describe them as
two distinct opposites (Bina and La Camera, 2011), we believe that
important insight can be gained by perceiving them as overlapping
and interacting in the practice of storytelling. It seems clear that neither
pro-growth nor no-growth has the power to govern the economy.
Mainstream economics is the main ruler, and thus both pro-growth
and no-growth can be considered alternative discourses trying to
change the reproduction of meaning exercised in business as usual.
For this purpose, strong new narratives are required. Roe emphasised
that a simple plot is an important factor in narrative persuasive strength
(Roe, 1994). We expand this notion to also concern the internal
dynamics of narratives. It might thus be useful for alternative economic
perspectives not only to establish simple structured plots, but also to
think about how actants such a heroes, villains and victims create
certain dynamics within the narratives.
Many forces govern the economy, but one of the most important of
these is policy making — political decisions inﬂuence the rules of the
game, and these decisions are under the inﬂuence of discourses and
guided by certain narratives. By the deliberate use of narratives, the
balance in the discursive power struggle of changing the rules of the
game might be altered, leading to actual policy changes in favour of a
transition to a more sustainable economy.
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Drinking the strength of life  
from men doomed to die, 
spitting the crimson blood 
on all the lands of gods; 
black becomes the sun 
in summers to follow, 
weather spells disaster – 
Need you know more? 
  
With this stanza, I begin my story of the divine belief in Economics at the beginning of the 
21st century, when this faith was practised and reached the height of its glory. The stanza 
originates from the Norse poem Völuspá,2 meaning prophecy of the Völva, which tells the tale 
of ancient gods, who at the beginning of the 21st century had long since perished. The verses 
were originally written in the Norse language approximately eighteen hundred years ago, 
while the present translation is from the beginning of the 21st century and thus about eight 
hundred years old. Despite the large gap in time between the first writing of these verses and 
the translation, it is still as if the stanza prophetically heralds the coming of events, which 
began in the days when the translation was made.  
 
The Völva speaking in the poem is a mysterious entity with the ability to speak prophetically 
about distant pasts and futures. In this manner, one might understand the Völva as an entity 
located outside of time, telling us of things to come and things long since passed.3 In her 
prophecy, the Völva predicts the end of the Norse gods in the violent calamities of Ragnarök, 
but the prophecy can also be considered as mirroring the crises, which increased throughout 
the 21st century. For this purpose, in particular the final lines in the stanza above, show 
prophetic clarity. The disastrous climate changes that truly came into effect in the second half 
of the 21st century are mirrored here, and we are sarcastically reminded that extensive 
knowledge did not serve as sufficient motivation to take the actions necessary to avert 
subsequent disasters.  
 
Thus many centuries later, it is not easy to give an in-depth explanation as to why countries 
and governments did so little to avert these self-inflicted disasters, whose nature was known 
with some certainty and whose arrival was doubted by few. However, there can be no doubt 
that the divine belief in Economics with its strong anchoring in central authorities and close 
alliance with society's elite was of great importance to maintaining the status quo, thus 
preventing the necessary transitions. Based on this relationship, I find it relevant to direct my 
                                                     
1 Published in Danish in the Journal, Kritik, Volume 48, Issue 214, August 2015 
2 Sørensen & Steinsland. “Vølvens Spådom”. Høst og Søn 2001. Translated to English, for the purpose 
of this article, by Daniel Olesen.  
3 This interpretation comes from Sørensen & Steinsland 2001.  
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searchlight at the divine belief in Economics in the 21st century to highlight certain 
characteristics of this faith. Hopefully, such an investigation can improve our understanding of 
the tragic downfall of a civilisation.   
 
It has now been about seven hundred years since the gods of Economics were supplanted by 
other systems of belief and cosmologies. Just as the Norse faith was combatting and 
gradually supplanted by the cosmology of the Christian faith around year 1000, the second 
half of the 21st century was also an era of old and new cosmologies battling for the right to 
preach the common faith. Belief in the gods of Economics was until this age very strong and 
held the foremost position in the national administrations and political thinking. State 
administrations were flooded by economists, a form of priests, skalds and sages, considered 
to possess unique powers related to interpreting the past, understanding the present, and 
foretelling the future. The policies of the nations were shaped according to their directions. 
Unfortunately, these directions were characterised by whims lacking a deeper understanding 
of the real issues of the age.  
 
Due to extensive wars and calamitous natural phenomena, which increased in occurrence in 
the second half of the 21st century and presumably is the reason for the loss of many 
important sources in understanding divine belief in Economics, the following is a mosaic with 
many gaps; the number of missing pieces is most likely much greater than the number of 
sources I do possess. Despite the loss of many sources related to the divine belief in 
Economics, there is still a quite significant amount of material informing us of this system of 
beliefs. Based on this material, the divine belief in Economics appears to be a highly 
advanced, diverse complex of myths, and it is thus beyond the scope of the present work to 
describe the entirety of this complex. Instead, I will attempt to make selective incisions and 
highlight certain aspects that appear to be of particular importance in relation to 
understanding the gods of Economics and the times during which they were worshipped.  
 
First, it should be noted that what we today refer to collectively as economic mythology in fact 
covers a number of different denominations, of which the most important are: classical, 
Marxist, institutional, Keynesian, neoclassical, and ecological Economics. Central to my 
investigations is the neoclassical denomination,4 which around the year 2000 held the 
greatest dominance; in part thanks to a political doctrine known as neoliberalism, derived from 
this denomination.  
 
Whether every denomination mentioned here can truly be called a religious denomination is 
doubtful, however, since the status of religion is highly dependent on being anchored in 
institutions as well as proclamation practices. The reason why the neoclassical denomination 
had the status of religion must be found in an extensive proclamation practice, anchored in 
academic environments, partisan circles, central authorities, media, and general speech 
combined with a strong affinity for worshipping the divine. Thanks to this, economic sages 
were able to conjure up strong, religious “truths” despite the extremely underdeveloped 
epistemological apparatus of neoclassical Economics.  
 
Regardless of the clear epistemological weaknesses contained in the economic mythology, 
this denomination was widespread throughout the world and was practised alongside the 
great monotheistic world religions. In some ways, it can be maintained that divine belief in 
Economics was the most widespread of the world religions around the year 2000. It was 
                                                     
4 In the following, divine belief in Economics is synonymous with neoclassical divine belief. 
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widely practised by nearly every public administration across the world, regardless of other 
religions also practised in the various countries.   
 
However, the worldview presented by the natural sciences also held a strong position around 
the year 2000, and this epistemology had conquered many spheres of influence formerly 
belonging to religion. Economic mythology deftly took advantage of this by choosing a form of 
proclamation that was in the guise of the natural sciences. Economic mythology was thus 
based on an extensive, mathematical foundation. This gave the mythology strong powers of 
persuasion equal to those of the natural sciences, and its computational models often held 
status as Völvas with the same powers of prediction as the natural sciences5. In the twilight 
years of the mythology, however, it became more and more obvious that its acolytes made 
use of dubious, mathematical descriptions lacking durable theorems.6 
 
 
Historical observations  
 
Desiring brevity, I have in this presentation chosen to keep my scope limited to the region that 
still to this day encompasses the Nordic countries. I will therefore initially outline latent 
tensions between environmental realities and economic myths characterising the societies of 
this region eight hundred years ago.   
 
Around the year 2000, the Nordic region was still highly affluent and well organised. 
Compared to many other regions, the Nordic countries were also characterised by relatively 
high levels of equality, trust and welfare, although all of the above was in decline, in part due 
to financial crises and the neoliberal doctrine. Related to this, it is worth mentioning that the 
Nordic region was among those that resisted neoliberalism the longest, along with the 
increasing inequality, distrust, and instability caused in part by the divine belief in Economics. 
This resistance was due to a particular Nordic tradition of distributing the wealth of society, 
though it eventually fell to the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state.  
 
Coinciding with how the divine belief in Economics strengthened its position of power, there 
was a rise in the number of increasingly alarming reports on the environmental state of the 
planet, originating from the natural sciences. Climate changes were deservedly the most often 
mentioned threat, but it was merely one out of a growing number of crises. Similarly, the swift 
expansion of humanity, increasing streams of refugees, the systematic eradication of other 
species, and ever-reducing amounts of clean water were all well documented issues. It was 
characteristic of many of these crises that one way or another, they were the by-product of 
the economic activities of human societies. The ways in which people produced, traded, 
consumed, transported, and built across the globe were thus on a swift collision course with 
the environmental boundaries of the planet. It is therefore not controversial to claim that with 
the knowledge possessed then as well as now, there were strong arguments in favour of 
radically transforming the economic activities of these societies to respect the environmental 
boundaries of the planet.7 
                                                     
5 It is interesting to note that these models often had names with religious undertones, such as ADAM 
(Judaism), HEIMDALL (Norse mythology), and HERMES (Greek mythology). 
6  Among the first to make this point was the Finnish econometrist Juselius, who assisted in uncovering 
fundamental issues in the neoclassic models. For examples, see “Using Econometrics for Assessing 
Economic Models”, Economics 2009.  
7 The idea of planetary boundaries was probably first proposed by Rockström et al. in "A safe operating 
space for humanity", Nature 2009.  
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There is a number of reasons why this did not happen to a sufficient degree, of which the 
influence of the divine belief in Economics is merely one. However, it is useful to highlight how 
this religion helped reinforce certain positions of power resistant to change; how its occult 
faith in Growth demanded a resistance against radical, environmental efforts and democratic 
control of multinational corporations, who in turn possessed the necessary resources to buy 
influence in parliamentarian democracy.  
 
Unfortunately, it was not evident to the general public at the time that the multinational 
corporations were able to drain the nations of social, environmental, and economic resources 
at such an extensive scale. The populations were greatly manipulated by neoliberal sermons 
that the multinational corporations were in service to Growth, creating jobs, and that all had to 
bring sacrifices to the altars of Growth and Market; the dispossessed needed to be further 
dispossessed, minimum wage needed further lowering, everyone had to work longer hours, 
democracies had to relinquish their autonomy, and the environment had to be sacrificed. This 
way, religious belief was used as a tool for political propaganda.8  
 
It is a lesson well known from studying the downfall of civilisations that priesthoods and 
affluent elites often join forces to protect the status quo of society9. There are several 
historical examples of this, which mirror trends that one could observe in the Nordic welfare 
societies around the year 2000, displaying an elite that completely ignored and 
underestimated the warning signs heralding the end of society. Additionally, the hypothesis 
concerning the close, temporal proximity between the heyday and the fall of a civilisation 
should also be mentioned; in many ways, this hypothesis is confirmed by the history of the 
Nordic welfare societies post year 2000.   
 
 
Proclamation and divine belief 
 
What we today acknowledge to be irrefutable fact was still unclear and controversial at the 
start of the 21st century, while matters that today are shrouded in doubt and mystery were 
then considered unquestionably true. By the former, I mean the multitude of environmental 
and social crises, which at the time had yet to manifest themselves fully; by the latter, I mean 
the mythical characters of the divine belief in Economics. However difficult it may be for us, 
we must try to understand that the society of that age truly believed in Market and Growth as 
eternal gods. In connection to this, it is worth mentioning that gods have a habit of losing their 
power over time. Around the year 2000, the Norse gods had long since passed into legend 
and become harmless. The same fate has fallen upon the gods of economic mythology, and 
we can only speculate, which of the gods of our era will be considered a mere fancy in a 
thousand years.  
 
If you wish to try to understand how the gods of Economics became real, imagine yourself as 
a Viking and envision the journey across the sea during a thunderstorm with lightning and 
thunder tearing the sky apart. It is not difficult to imagine that for the Viking, having so often 
made sacrifices to Thor and heard tales of him, the god of thunder suddenly becomes real. 
Similarly, imagine the stockbroker a thousand years later being seized by the belief in Market 
                                                     
8 A phenomenon also known from the societies of the Viking Age according to Sørensen & Steinsland. 
9  For examples, see Diamond, “Collapse. How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed”. Viking Penguin 
2005. 
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when key numbers suddenly rocketed towards the sky or plummeted towards the ground, 
showering the few in wealth and the many in misery.  
 
Looking at documents from that age, we find that in particular the economic priesthood, 
partisan factions, and certain news media preached the divine belief in Economics and 
constantly referred to the blessings of Growth and the all-knowing providence of Market. 
These preachings had a great effect on the language and perception of reality as related to 
everyday life. Thus, you could often hear politicians speak of how Growth would soon return 
and bring its blessings to all, or that it was best to leave responsibility for the Economy in the 
hands of Market.  
 
Around the year 2000, the divine belief in Economics was still conquering new lands. This 
was done by the skalds, politicians, and multinational corporations, who expanded their 
sphere of influence by constantly letting the gods Market and Price subjugate new territories. 
In this manner, rivers, forests, mountains, animals, plants, and people were given a price 
denoting their market value, through which they could be subject to the market mechanism, 
the ever-valid 'natural law' of Economics.   
 
 
Mirror images 
 
The purpose of this investigation is to examine the beginning of this millennium, now in its 
twilight years, in order to interpret the economic belief and missionary practices prevalent at 
the time. In aid of this, I have chosen an older system of faith, the Norse one, practised in the 
Nordic region during the Viking Age. Neither Norse nor economic beliefs are today living 
organisms of faith, but remnants of their many phenomenological appearances can be found 
in various works of writing. My primary source for the Norse mythology is the poem Völuspá, 
which we have preserved in various translations10. Due to its charismatic gods and strong 
themes of downfall, this mythology is a bountiful parallel to the divine belief in Economics as 
well as the era in which this belief was practised.  
 
It is generally acknowledged that the Völuspá is based on oral traditions and it was not put 
into writing (in different versions) until around the year 1000. We should therefore view the 
surviving, written versions of the Völuspá as crystallisations of oral storytelling traditions, 
believed to have been kept alive by the skalds of that age. The written versions originate from 
an era where the Norse culture was receding and the Christian world religion was advancing. 
There have thus been many speculations as to how much the written versions of the poem 
are affected by and adapted to a Christian worldview. The intent of this investigation is not to 
contribute further to these speculations, however. Instead, focus is directed at how the poem, 
as we have it in its written form, can be used as an analytical mirror held up against the 
cosmological understanding belonging to economic mythology as we know it. 
 
                                                     
10 For transparency's sake, it should be noted that the following description of Völuspá is widely based 
on the translation and interpretation made by Sørensen & Steinsland, published in 2001. 
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Völuspá 
 
The Völuspá is a grandiose cosmology, stretching from the earliest distant times of genesis 
until the last days of the gods during Ragnarök.11 The storyteller is the Völva, able to gaze 
deeper into both past and present than even the all-father Odin, the ancient one. Using a 
classic device from narratology,12 the prophecy can be divided into three phases13: chaos, 
order, and downfall. However, it is important to note that the phases overlap and that a phase 
of decline before the downfall and clear indications of resurrection following the downfall can 
be added to the model for the sake of further precision.  
 
The Völva tells us that the world is born out of the void, Ginnungagap, a potential of chaotic, 
primordial forces. Different creatures emerge from Ginnungagap. Ymir the Jötunn is the first, 
and then follow the gods Odin and his brothers, who create order in chaos and shape the 
world known as Midgard. The gods also name all things and summon time by counting the 
years as they pass.   
 
Already in the earliest phase of this creation the seed of destruction is planted. Odin and Ymir 
each sire a race, the Æsir and the Jötnar, who are constantly engaged in conflicts. Simplified, 
one might say that the original, primordial chaos is manifest in the Jötnar, while the Æsir is 
the opposing force, attempting to maintain order and stability. Among the Jötnar are counted 
the Midgard Serpent and the wolf Fenrir, who during Ragnarök assist in the downfall of the 
gods, but in turn succumb to the power of the gods in this all-consuming battle. 
 
A central element in the creation of the gods is the world tree Yggdrasil, which represents 
stability and life force. Below the roots of the ash Yggdrasil flows a sacred source, nourishing 
the world tree. The three Norns live by this source, participating in the act of creation by 
weaving the fates of gods and mankind. The three Norns represent the three manifestations 
of time: past, present, and future. During the golden age of the gods, Yggdrasil is strong and 
green, but it is later discovered that the tree suffers more than what is known to humanity. 
Several creatures are sapping its strength, and the tree is rotting,14 which forewarns the 
impending destruction of the world.  
 
When Ragnarök approaches, many bad omens appear. Forces of chaos, long kept in chains, 
break loose. Yggdrasil quakes, and moral decline becomes rampant throughout the world of 
Men. Finally, war can no longer be avoided, and the wild hordes of the Jötnar, including the 
wolf Fenrir and the Midgard Serpent, charge forward; from the East they are led by Loki, 
Odin's treacherous foster brother, and from the South by Surt, a Jötunn from the realm of fire. 
In this final battle, all the gods perish alongside their powerful enemies among the Jötnar. The 
wolf Fenrir kills Odin but is slain in turn by Vidar; Thor kills the Midgard Serpent but dies from 
the wounds inflicted by the worm upon him. As Æsir and Jötnar die, the world ends. The sun 
turns black and sinks into the sea while Midgard burns. Thus, Ragnarök ends in moral 
collapse, natural disasters, and war. 
 
                                                     
11 According to Sørensen & Steinsland, Ragnarök means “the fate of higher powers” or “the downfall of 
higher powers”. 
12 Narratology is among others shaped by writers such as Greimas and Todorov. 
13 This device is not from Sørensen & Steinsland, but my own attempt towards an analytical model. 
Whether this device has been used before in sources unknown to me, I cannot say. 
14 This description comes from the poem “Grímnismál” in Lembek & Stavnem's translation and 
interpretation of Snorri Sturluson's “Edda”. Gyldendal 2013.  
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After Ragnarök, however, the world is resurrected and restored to vitality while freed from the 
disorder and chaos of the Jötnar. Many of the old gods, though Odin and Thor are not among 
them, are also resurrected; similarly, humanity is also restored to life in this new world. One of 
Odin's sons chooses the new world tree, and the “new” gods take up residence upon Odin's 
former grounds. The continued line of the gods shall live in the wide halls of the windy sky, 
while Men will live in peace and harmony at Gimlé, which offers shelter against the fire.  
 
With these words and short of breath I conclude my presentation of the Völuspá to make 
room for a reflective description of economic mythology.  
 
Gods and people of economic mythology  
 
As a system of collective beliefs, economic mythology is polytheistic akin to its Norse 
counterpart, meaning it is populated with several gods. Unlike its Norse counterpart, however, 
economic mythology does not contain a central story that clearly progresses into several 
phases. Therefore, I will not begin with a narrative mirroring but instead begin by describing 
some of the most important gods of the economic mythology. 
 
The first god I wish to discuss is Market. Market is the god eternally creating structure, 
keeping the primordial forces Supply and Demand in check. This way, Market resembles the 
gods creating order in the Norse world. However, Market cannot control the market forces 
without a helper. This is where the god Price becomes important. Practically speaking, Price 
maintains the balance between Supply and Demand, thereby ensuring the equilibrium of the 
Economy. Through the market mechanism, which describes an eternal interaction between 
Supply and Demand, Market can be considered the creator of the Economy, the legendary 
world of the economic gods. 
 
There is also a number of other important gods in the economic mythology besides Market 
and Price. Without a doubt, the god Growth is chief among these. Growth is the deity 
overseeing wealth, happiness and prosperity. The more sacrifices upon the altar of Growth, 
the greater wealth and happiness shall flow into the society of mankind. 
 
In particular, natural resources, time, and democratic rights were sacrificed to Growth around 
the year 2000. Goods such as clean drinking water, biodiversity, and picturesque landscapes 
were all sacrificed on the altar of Growth. Similarly, people had to contribute an ever-
increasing amount of work hours to Market, and the various countries had to yield certain 
democratic rights to make room for multinational corporations with the capacity to be of 
service to Growth. 
 
Same as with Market, Growth also has its helpers: Productivity and Competition. Productivity 
is a kind of fertility god, who is able to constantly create bigger yields with less effort, while 
Competition is the god of war, strengthening the countries in their economic wars against 
each other.   
 
But no mythology is without forces of darkness, and in economic mythology, these are called 
Recession and Unemployment, representing disorder, chaos, and impoverishment. One 
might be tempted to consider these as the counterparts of the wolf Fenrir and the Midgard 
Serpent in economic mythology. Recession is the archenemy of Growth, while Unemployment 
is the eternal woe plaguing Market. Unlike Norse mythology, there is no tale in economic 
mythology of how these opposing forces will confront each other and perish in Ragnarök. It is 
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implied that Growth and Market will be victorious as long as we remember to make our 
sacrifices.  
 
It is not certain who the supreme deity among the economic gods was. This was often 
dependent on the specific context in which this faith was practised. In state administrations, 
Growth reigned undisputed while for some political parties and independent temples, Market 
was most likely the supreme divine authority. If one takes a more general look at the era, 
however, there is a clear tendency for Growth to be considered standing tallest. Nearly every 
economic sage, politician, businessman, and journalist bowed before Growth in service to its 
every whim, regardless of how strong or weak their faith in Market.        
 
As in Norse mythology, there is a human being in the economic mythology. This person is 
called Homo Economicus and is an important element in the market mechanisms. Unlike the 
Norse example, the economic man is omniscient, yet has but one thing in sight, the god Price, 
and one objective, to optimise his own utility.  
 
Circles and lines 
 
Whereas Norse mythology contains a progressive story, economic mythology is completely 
devoid of history. In every case, it is the same story of Price creating and maintaining the 
balance of the market, which is repeated ad infinitum. In spite of this, the two mythologies 
share certain dynamics. For instance, both can be viewed from a linear and a circular 
perspective. If you view Völuspá as a series of events from creation to Ragnarök, you will find 
a linear story. If you choose to incorporate the part concerning resurrection, you find the 
possibility of a cyclical cosmology, where the Völuspá merely describes one rotation in the 
eternal circle of birth and death15.    
 
This circular theme can also be found in economic mythology, where a constant cyclical 
exchange between households and businesses results in steady growth, continuing 
indefinitely and only disrupted by temporary business cycles surrounding a steadily increasing 
growth trend. These upwards and downwards economic trends can be seen as cyclical and 
understood as the rotation inherent in economic mythology between crises and affluence, 
birth and death16.  Thus we find in both Norse and economic mythology an interesting 
reciprocity between linear progress and cyclical repetition, where it becomes nearly 
impossible to imagine linear progression without cyclical repetition and reverse.  
 
Besides these basic dynamics, Norse and economic mythology have a deterministic 
understanding of the world in common. However, while Norse determinism is characterised 
by dream-like visions, economic mythology presents a kind of hyper-determinism, where the 
market forces are always forced into balance. This way, there is never an actual confrontation 
between the primordial forces and Market. Market is always superior and brooks no 
resistance. This is clearly the opposite of Norse mythology, escatological in nature, meaning it 
moves towards an end of days where forces of order and chaos eradicate each other. In this 
                                                     
15 Finally, you can also view the different phases of the prophecy as concurrently existing aspects of 
human life and life in society. I will not pursue this interpretation further here, however, since it has no 
obvious counterpart in economic mythology. 
16 This theme is also found in Schumpeter's hypothesis regarding creative destruction. 
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manner, economic mythology is a myth of eternity, always suppressing chaos, disorder, and 
unpredictability.17  
 
 
Times of upheaval  
 
As mentioned, the times surrounding the year 2000 were times of upheaval; human 
destruction of the planet's vital systems and the threat of future climate change became 
widely acknowledged. This is also reflected in economic mythology, which during this age 
became forked into new, conflicting directions. A contradiction arose inside the mythology 
where certain higher deities were considered forces of darkness by a smaller group of heretic 
skalds and their supporters. This was the case in particular with the god Growth, who was 
portrayed as a false idol to be rejected. Growth became a decisive point of contention, making 
heretic skalds denounce their fealty to this god.18 
 
Due to the schism between those who worshipped and those who denounced Growth, two 
new myths arose: Green Growth and Degrowth.19 Both arose in response to the emerging 
environmental and social crises of that age. Green Growth was the myth presented by the 
ruling priesthood on how the economic growth engine could continue in a greened version 
with the gods Growth and Market as supreme authorities, while Degrowth was proposed by 
the heretic skalds and included an extensive, radical transformation of the economic 
cosmology.  
 
A central point of opposition between these two myths is that the same gods and worlds 
appear as good and evil forces, respectively. Here, I am in particular referring to Growth but 
also to the very world of the mythology, the Economy. In Green Growth, these are both 
benign while Degrowth portray the former as evil and the latter as an organism out of balance 
with its surroundings, which requires it to be transformed and limited.   
 
Both Green Growth and Degrowth are myths of transformation, in which the Economy is 
transformed. In Green Growth, transformation happens due to the intervention of heroes. The 
most important heroes in connection to this are: the Government,20 the Investor, the 
Entrepreneur and the Innovator. The government acts by helping Price send the right market 
signals to make environmentally damaging behaviour costly while environmentally friendly 
behaviour is rewarded. The investor acts by sending financial capital to the greenest areas of 
the Economy, while the entrepreneur and the innovator create new green products, which are 
surrendered to Market and thereby supplying Growth with vitality.   
 
An important demigod, who has a central role in the traditional divine belief in Economics, 
also appears in Green Growth. This demigod is Technology; a demigod because it has its 
origin in mankind, but possesses divine powers. Technology is generally believed to be able 
                                                     
17 It is important to highlight that this is primarily in reference to neoclassical mythology, which unlike e.g. 
Keynesianism did not acknowledge unpredictability. 
18 It is important to note that many of these heretic skalds still considered Market to be a central and 
important deity. 
19 The following interpretation of these two myths is the continued development of ideas proposed by 
Urhammer & Røpke in “Macroeconomic narratives in a world of crises: an analysis of stories about 
solving the system crisis”, Ecological Economics 2014. 
20 The fact that the government is shown as one of the heroes indicates that Green Growth is not a 
purely neoliberal myth. According to neoliberalism, it was irrefutably damaging if the state interfered in 
the affairs of the market. 
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to solve all unsolved problems in the future. In this manner, technology has a reassuring 
presence and ensures that people need not be worried about the future.   
 
Whether Degrowth can be considered a coherent myth is doubtful; it is simply too complicated 
and lacking in structure. Yet it is still useful to consider it a form of collective myth with many 
mythological elements, however, characterised in part by its lack of heroes. On the other 
hand, it has many villains and dark forces that in time proved to be as dangerous as predicted 
by the myth. Here, I am particularly thinking of the multinational villains, the financial shadow 
lands, and gods such as Growth and Competition.  
 
While Degrowth largely defines itself as a myth in opposition to the reigning economic 
mythology, it also contains a wealth of constructive, political proposals; these are difficult to 
gather into a simple, coherent myth, however. Examples of such proposals are localisation as 
a response to deregulation and globalisation, fewer work hours, and a guaranteed basic 
income to prevent poverty, inequality, and stress, and finally certain measures to wrest control 
over wealth and happiness from Growth by measuring these as circumstances determined by 
a larger range of social and environmental conditions.  
 
Akin to the Norse vision of Gimlé, the golden land where mankind shall live in peace after 
Ragnarök, Degrowth also contains the vision of a harmonious life after growth, where 
humanity has reached a balance between itself and the habitats of all living things. The path 
to this harmonious existence is through enacting a large number of political proposals, of 
which the aforementioned are merely a few.  
 
Lastly, it should also be noted that a form of agnosticism towards Growth found a foothold in 
the economic mythology around the year 2000. Its primary belief was that Growth was a deity 
of no importance and whose fate was of no concern. Instead, people should devote 
themselves to questions concerning righteous life in society and the state of nature, letting 
Growth perish from a lack of attention; this was based on the belief that a god or false idol no 
longer being worshipped or denounced would cease to be either a god or false idol. 
 
 
Final thoughts  
 
Over the years, much has been written about the 21st century and its climate changes, social 
crises, and devastating wars. These works have tried to explain the conditions of society, 
which were the reason why highly developed societies did not react and adapt in time. Some 
of these works have also included the divine belief in Economics as part of their explanations. 
However, as far as I am aware, nobody has made a comparison between the divine belief in 
Economics and Norse mythology. This has been my attempt, and an important insight of this 
effort is the difference between the fundamental acceptance of the downfall in Norse 
mythology and the complete lack of this in economic mythology. In this manner, the Völuspá 
can be used as a commentary on a younger faith's lacking ability to understand its own age 
and the terrible calamities approaching.  
 
If one lets the Völva be a voice whose prophecy apply to the future of the world more 
generally, her predictions are not merely relevant to the men and gods of the Norse world, but 
also to the societies and divine worship of future ages. From this perspective, the Völva has 
the power to explain the terrible crises of the 21st century along with the demise of the gods 
of Economics.  
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That the gods of Economics were gradually swallowed up by twilight is because they, similarly 
to the Norse gods, lost their connection to the surrounding world, which was swiftly changing. 
Blinded by their withdrawal from the world, the worshippers of Economics overlooked the 
actual problems of society and devoted themselves to worshipping dying gods. The economic 
preachers, the ruling political parties, and the elite of society were thus guilty of ignoring the 
advancing moral, social, and natural disasters, which might have been avoided by paying 
attention to the prophecy of the Völva. 
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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to offer a new view on economic growth and use this view to add
to the explanation of economic growth as a powerful agent that determines policies regarding urgent
issues such as climate change, loss of biodiversity and pollution.
Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on analysis of scholarship and media,
interviews and observations in a multi-sited ethnography of economic growth.
Findings – The article argues that the circulation of economic growth has contributed to a shaping of
institutions and language to an extent where environmental policy proposals framed as harmful to
economic growth can easily be rejected. Furthermore, the article offers an operationalisation of the term
ecologisation by promoting a new inclusive language in decision-making.
Originality/value – The paper fills a gap in literature by offering an empirical philosophical take on
economic growth and by offering a suggestion for the operationalisation of the term ecologisation.
Keywords Economic growth, Translation, Circulation, Ecologisation, Monster
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
The Earth is changing: a growing ecological crisis comprising overwhelming problems,
such as climate change, the loss of biodiversity and pollution, heralds the age of the
Anthropocene (Crutzen, 2005; Rockström et al., 2009). At the same time, many countries
still face economic difficulties in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. This situation
places economic growth at the centre of a controversy. On one hand, mainstream
economists and politicians prescribe further economic growth to restore struggling
economies. On the other hand, a growing chorus of voices argue that economic growth is
in a process of transgressing fundamental ecological limits and that we must free the Earth
from economic growth before it is too late (Jackson, 2009; Simms and Johnson, 2010; Dietz
and O’Neill, 2013).
At the centre of the controversy stands the gross domestic product (GDP), the calculative
technology that quantifies economic growth. According to Fioramonti (2013), GDP is the
world’s most powerful number due to its ability to determine the success of governments
and the progress and the international status of nation-states. However, economic growth
is not merely a number that aggregates economic transactions, it assumes multiple shapes
and appears in many places. Thus, economic growth appears in the literature as a
production process (Mankiw, 1992), on the Internet as an entity with human virtues such as
health and strength (Kumar, 2013) and in political discourse as a powerful propaganda tool
(Fioramonti, 2013).
The multi-shaped and multi-sited existence of economic growth appeals to the use of
Latour’s (1992) notion of monster: an entity that circulates in collectives and shapes them
by its presence. Hence, in this article, economic growth is conceptualised as a monster,
whose existence depends on circulation; the purpose of the article being to identify
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facilitators of circulation and to highlight indicative examples of how this circulation shapes
our common world and political decisions.
To interpret economic growth as a monster, the terms collective and translation are
essential. In Latour’s (2013) work, the term collective replaces the concept of Society, a
human domain that is distinguishable from Nature. Instead, a collective is a messy ecology
that comprises both humans and non-humans (Blok and Elgaard, 2011). In this sense, a
collective is an assemblage of diverse elements, such as humans, technologies, plants,
symbols, animals and scientific disciplines. This makes our common world a multiplicity of
collectives that is inhabited by humans and non-humans (Latour, 2013). It is also in these
habitats that we find the economic growth monster.
When a monster is circulating in a collective, it means that the monster is constantly passed
on from one agent to the next in various forms (Blok and Elgaard, 2011; Latour, 2013). At
one instant, economic growth is a number in a spreadsheet; later, this number becomes a
dot in a graph, and later again, is verbally uttered in a news broadcast. Often, circulation
changes the appearance of that which is circulated. This change happens when a
multitude of economic transactions is transformed into a single number, when a column of
numbers is turned into a graph and when this graph is later interpreted in a sentence such
as “the economy is growing”. This transformation of appearance can be termed translation
and is central to the existence of a monster.
This mode of existence can be compared to the emergence of a viral hit, a YouTube video,
for instance. At first, the video is merely a video, but as soon as Internet users begin to pass
it on to each other, and it goes viral, it changes from a video into a hit. Suddenly, it does not
only exist in its YouTube habitat: it crosses borders to new sites and changes appearances.
At one instant, it is a verbal account in a conversation; at another instant, it is a story in a
newspaper that later becomes the subject of a heated discussion. As I will argue in the
following, economic growth maintains its status as a monster “hit”, not least due to a similar
type of circulation.
In relation to the rising ecological crisis, economic growth is, at least, a threefold problem.
First, evidence clearly indicates that global economic growth is closely correlated to
increased global resource use, carbon emissions and pollution (Wackernagel and Rees,
1996; Krausmann et al., 2009; Ewing et al., 2010). Second, the imperative for continued
economic growth is often used as the main argument for not addressing these issues[1].
Third, the pursuit of economic growth fosters the legitimisation of continued environmentally
harmful activities such as oil drilling, land grabbing and the expansion of infrastructure for
cars. The motivation for this study is thus to generate a better understanding of how
economic growth has become the ultimate trump that can reject proposals for addressing
ecological issues of extreme urgency.
Empirical philosophy
It is not expedient to try to frame Latour’s (1992) work in a singular fashion, and his
approach has several different labels. However, for practical reasons, I refer to it here as
empirical philosophy, a term Latour himself has used to describe his methodology. In
empirical philosophy, monsters can be studied by tracing their circulation in sequences of
translations, where translation can be defined simplistically as the process by which an
entity transforms from one appearance into another (Callon, 1996; Blok and Elgaard, 2011).
Thus, translation, as used in this approach, bears many similarities with linguistic
translation, where words are translated between languages. Within linguistics, the issue of
the conservation of meaning during the act of translation is important (Chandler, 1994).
However, to empirical philosophy, this issue is not as important because translation does
not concern how to change from one representation of meaning to another; each translation
creates a new entity with a life of its own. Thus, the GDP is not a mere representation of an
objective reality, but is a being in its own right. This beingness is also evident in the graph
VOL. 22 NO. 4 2014 ON THE HORIZON PAGE 309
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y A
alb
or
g U
niv
ers
ite
t A
t 1
0:2
7 1
3 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 (
PT
)
that can be constructed based on a series of measurements of the GDP or the statement
“the economy is growing”. These three entities are closely associated, but they should not
be considered merely as representations of the same objective phenomenon. However, the
interconnectedness and the circulation of these entities perform, collaboratively, the
economic growth monster.
Despite the dissimilarity between empirical philosophy and linguistics, the empirical
philosophical notion of translation is related to the concept of language. Although an
empirical philosophical translation does not entail transporting a specific meaning from one
domain of representation to another, translation can often be regarded as a transformation
from one semiotic form to another. A row of numbers has a different semiotic quality than
does a graph composed of dots; the statement “the economy is growing” assumes yet a
third mode of appearance. In this manner, the notion of discourse also figures into this
analysis because numerous translations of economic growth are discursive and occur in
inscriptions and verbal utterances.
Finally, I would like to emphasise that ecology is a core issue for empirical philosophy. This
is evident in the articulation of ecologisation as the solution to the ecological crisis of our
age. According to Latour (1992, 2013), this crisis arises from the modern division of the
world into domains, such as Nature, Society and Economy. Interpreting Latour, these
domains are harmful because they misrepresent the messy world in which we live and
conceal the fact that humans and non-humans constantly connect in multiple indivisible
ecologies. This misrepresentation hinders recognition of the consequences of our current
mode of living, in which legitimate members of our collectives[2] are systematically
excluded from participation in democratic processes and are thus effectively silenced. This
leads to exploitation and destruction of that which is considered external to Society and
Economy. Empirical philosophy can therefore be considered to be a quest for
ecologisation, where ecologisation means the constitution of human–non-human ecologies
and the recognition of multiple excluded or silenced members of our collectives (Latour,
2013).
Economics
Exploring economics using empirical philosophy implies that we must reject the objective
existence of the economy as a phenomenon that economists observe and measure and
that exists regardless of measurement and description. However, adopting an empirical
philosophical approach also means that we must dispense with the idea of the economy as
a purely human construction that only exists in the vocabulary of economists. Instead, the
economy is a collective construction that is created by means of an interplay of multiple
human and non-human agents.
This interpretation is closely related to similar approaches that emphasise the performative
aspects of economics (MacKenzie, 2006; Callon, 2007). The performative understanding of
economics is exemplified by Callon’s statement, “no economy without economics” (Callon,
1998), which implies that the economy is not a phenomenon that economists merely
observe and try to represent; rather, it is an assemblage of diverse elements that create a
totality in which theories and statements about this totality are fully absorbed (Callon, 2007).
However, the performativity approach to economics has thus far been primarily concerned
with the construction of markets, not with macroeconomic constructs such as economic
growth. Thus, this article intends to contribute to the performativity literature by analysing
economic growth and more generally, to economics literature, by introducing an empirical
philosophical perspective on the issue.
Empirical approach
The empirical approach of this article combines analysis of scholarship and media,
interviews and informal conversations and observations at events such as seminars and
conversations. Rather than analysing a clearly bounded set of data, I have examined many
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interrelated sources. In this respect, my approach could be called a multi-sited
ethnographic study conducted in the stream of my life. I do not refer to a specific country,
but to tendencies observable simultaneously in rich and less rich countries. However, the
main focus of the article is Western industrialised countries, though the growth monster
roams well beyond their borders.
Ecology of circulation
As my work on this article has progressed, I have gradually become able to sketch the
contours of an ecology of circulation, namely, the activities and technologies of a series of
agencies. The first such agency I would like to mention is national statistical offices, which
possess the necessary infrastructure to collect data and the technological procedures to
calculate the GDP. When data are processed, and the latest GDP figure is inscribed into
spreadsheets and other transportable formats, the GDP figure is easily passed on to other
agencies. Some of the first agencies to take notice of the latest economic growth number
are departments in the treasury and other ministries. At these sites, civil servants are
continuously updating databases with the most recent numbers from the national statistical
office, GDP being the most prominent number. In these departments, the numbers are
used for different purposes and are passed on to other agencies either in translated form
or as they were received. Some of the new receivers count instead ministers, presidents
and other parliamentary politicians. Again, the GDP number is used for new purposes, for
instance, to support an argument at a negotiation table or make a statement at a press
conference.
The latest growth figure soon appears in various news media stories and can be found all
over the ecology of circulation, translated into many different appearances, such as
statements from business leaders, blog posts or debates on public radio. Because this
process constantly recurs, the economic growth monster is kept present and alive. The
main observation in this case is that there are well-designed procedures that cut across
such agencies as national statistical offices, ministries and media and facilitate the
circulation of the economic growth monster. However, despite the incomplete and relatively
linear description provided here, it is important that circulation not be understood as a
process with a specific beginning or end. Circulation is messy and impossible to map in an
orderly fashion. National statistical offices are, nonetheless, a good place to start the
description because they repeatedly create the most recent GDP figure.
Shaping of collectives
Having now indicated some elements of an ecology of circulation, it is necessary to
address another important aspect of the economic growth monster: its ability to shape the
collectives within which it circulates. To clarify this ability, it is helpful to recall that economic
growth has not always been integrated into public administration; it was institutionalised[3]
by the help of factors such as the GDP and the promotion of national accounting by
organisations such as the UN (Miller, 1986; Fioramonti, 2013). Thus, the calculation and the
circulation of economic growth have gradually become integrated into the activities of state
agencies to an extent that they rely entirely on it to assess their own success and for
decision-making (Fioramonti, 2013). In this way, economic growth has become integral to
governmental decision-making: a compass that governments use for navigation. To
maintain this compass function, economic growth must constantly be circulated. This
dependency even extends into the future in the sense that not only is the present growth
figure circulated, but future economic growth, as it is forecasted by multiple agencies, is
also circulated in numerous versions (Reichmann, 2013).
This dependency on navigation based on economic growth and the wider economic
discourse that promotes it has further necessitated the presence of economic expertise in
public administration (Cobb et al., 1995). Economists spawned the monster, so who better
to consult regarding its well-being? In this respect, the circulation of economic growth has
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shaped public administration by increasing the dependency on economic expertise, in turn
necessitating continued circulation due to a maintained concern about economic growth in
many departments of the administration. However, not only does public administration
navigate its actions and policies according to present and future economic growth, but the
decisions of businesses and private investors are also influenced by future growth
expectations. Thus, again, the integration of economic growth in decision-making makes
continued circulation necessary. The basic observation of this section is that shaping and
circulation are closely connected. Circulation shapes the collective, and this shaping
necessitates further circulation.
Language and discourse
Yet, shaping does not end here. According to Cobb et al. (1995), economic growth as
measured by the GDP has become the very language of America’s economic reportage
and debate. Along these lines, it makes sense to say that economic growth has influenced
our language and made new metaphors possible. When listening to a debate or reading an
article about economic growth, metaphorical skills are required to comprehend that a
sentence such as “brighter times are ahead of us” means “we expect economic growth in
the future” and that “the economy is healthy and getting stronger ” means “the economy is
growing”. These examples indicate a widespread propensity to associate economic growth
with terms that are generally perceived as positive, while decline is associated with terms
that are perceived as negative. This tendency is also evident in descriptions of economic
growth that use words such as health and strength, while decline is often described in
terms of sickness and weakness (Calmes and Appelbaum, 2011; Goodman, 2011; Kumar,
2013). This shaping of language necessitates continued measurement of GDP, for how else
would we know whether the economy is sick or healthy, or whether brighter or darker times
lie ahead?
Economic growth is also present in semiotic discourse[4]. A researcher from a think tank
reported, based on his observation of governmental departments that he had seen banners
on the walls promoting economic growth and, according to him, economic growth is
engrained in these departments to such an extent that it extends beyond theoretical
equations to a general discourse promoting economic growth as an ultimate good and the
solution to all our problems. Additionally, Seaford observes “[. . .] that in practice GDP does
tend to be treated rather like a single welfare function” (Seaford, 2013, p. 27), an
observation also supported by Fioramonti, who confirms the widespread use of economic
growth as a proxy for well-being (Fioramonti, 2013). Thus, the economic growth discourse
has shaped the ability to imagine what well-being is by reducing it to a monetary
phenomenon. To use Fioramonti’s formulation, this shaping is a form of domination, or
discursive power (Haugaard, 2003), which can also be detected in the ability to determine
what wealth and valuable contributions to society entail, namely, increased GDP, as well as
that which contributes to this increase, regardless of social and environmental
consequences (Fioramonti, 2013).
Measurement
According to Fioramonti, measurement is fundamental to our way of understanding the
world. Hence, a multitude of measurements have been institutionalised in our daily
activities (Fioramonti and Bell, 2014). This institutionalisation is also the case for the
measurement of economic growth, which is now so fundamentally built into agencies of
public administration that abandoning it would be equivalent to a captain throwing the GPS
overboard in high seas.
GDP has become the ultimate measure of progress, which means that “no government or
society is really able to think of progress outside of GDP” (Fioramonti and Bell, 2014). Thus,
GDP immensely influences parliamentary politics and affects the outcome of referendums.
The magnitude of these influences implies the ability of measurement to determine our
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decisions, and in the case of GDP, the ability to reduce humans and non-humans to
instruments and commodities serving its own maximisation (Fioramonti, 2013).
State instruments
Another important mechanism necessitating circulation is the connectedness of GDP to
other accounting entities and state instruments, such as the national budget and taxation.
As Cobb et al. (1995) explain, this connectedness is centuries old and is rooted in attempts
to measure economic growth to facilitate tax collection. In our present epoch, this
technological dependency is so precisely manufactured that if GDP declines, then tax
revenues rapidly decrease, consequently pressurising the budget. Thus, GDP influences
governments’ economic latitude and makes GDP a top priority for public administration.
This influence necessitates circulation and explains why economic growth forecasts are
integrated into public budgeting (Larch and Salto, 2005), as well as why administrators are
eager to be kept informed of the most recent GDP prognoses.
Having attempted to describe some dynamics of circulation and the shaping of collectives
and language, I will spend the next section discussing the issue of contestation.
Contestation
Although economic growth and its proponents seem to occupy a nearly hegemonic
position, there exists a well-established but scattered choir of voices expressing the
devastating effects of further economic growth. Compared to the army of growth
protagonists, this ensemble of voices seems small, yet it is sufficiently substantial to make
economic growth a controversial issue.
An important dimension of contestation is the GDP’s inappropriateness, which can be
incompletely summarised as the exclusion and the neutralisation of data. The exclusion of
data implies, among other things, that the state of ecosystems, the condition of natural
resource stocks and the value of unpaid work are not part of the GDP calculations. The
neutralisation of data refers to the lack of distinction between positive and negative
contributions to the GDP (Cobb et al., 1995; Røpke, 1997). This shortcoming allows harmful
events, such as oil spills, murders and accidents, to contribute positively to the GDP
because spill clean-up, murder investigations and rescue work generate income that is
considered a positive contribution.
Criticism of the GDP is just one of many areas of economic growth contestation. According
to Friman (2002), limits to growth have been an area of contestation since the classical
economists; after the advent of neoclassical economics, these limits were rarely expressed.
However, since the middle of the twentieth century, limits to growth have again become an
issue, not least due to mounting evidence of environmental havoc, which many scholars
explain as the result of economic expansion (Friman, 2002).
The main observation here is that economic growth is not a monster without a habitat: it
inhabits a human–non-human ecology, while numerous entities in this habitat come
together to protest and impose limits. Thus, endangered species, ecosystems and the
climate form ranks with new indicators, models and activists to constrain the monster. This
limits-to-growth assemblage is not maintained by a single organisation, programme or
strategy, but various spokespersons have expressed what could be termed core points of
contestation. For the sake of simplicity, these can be divided into three main points. The first
regards the economy as a biophysical process, the growth of which requires increasing
energy use and materials and begets increasing waste outputs (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013).
Economic growth thus has severe consequences for the Earth’s ecology and is in a
process of transgressing vital boundaries securing the living conditions on Earth
(Rockström et al., 2009). The second point states that economic growth is actually not the
panacea that provides wealth and well-being to all. Despite economic growth, poverty
remains pervasive; inequality is growing; and beyond a certain, relatively low, level of GDP
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per capita, there appears to be no correlation between an increased GDP and well-being
(Jackson, 2009; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). The third point argues that the growth rates of
Western economies have been steadily declining for decades and that, due to falling
productivity, it is questionable whether the high growth rates of the past will return (Chancel
et al., 2013). In sum, these points offer sufficient reason for choosing another path and
starting to compose stable economies independent of economic growth as soon as
possible (Jackson, 2009; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013).
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that these contestations do not slow the
circulation; in fact, they encourage it by producing new translations. Hence, even though
these translations make the monster far less lovable, they expand its existence. Attempts
to surmount this problem by making something else circulate can be found in the so-called
Beyond GDP indicators, which are alternative progress indicators intended to replace the
GDP (Seaford, 2013). These indicators have not, so far, been successful in doing so. In
the quest for finding an answer, Seaford has sought boundaries for the institutionalisation
of the Beyond GDP indicators. Reviewing Seaford’s results reveals that these indicators
basically lack a well-constructed ecology for circulation. Among many examples of lack,
Seaford describes how data for calculating these indicators are often insufficient or lacking,
how there is no popular narrative to support them and how they are disconnected from the
work that is performed in ministries, organisations and businesses. Furthermore, Seaford
observes that these alternative measures do not fit a widely accepted economic model, that
there is no widespread expertise capable of handling the indicators and that there is no
clear idea about which Beyond GDP indicators to pursue (Seaford, 2013). This collective
uncertainty regarding the viability and the use of Beyond GDP indicators explains the lack
of circulation of these indicators and also deepens the understanding of the economic
growth monster, for which all of these facilitators are in place. The main task for the
promoters of Beyond GDP indicators is thus to determine how to change the ecology of
circulation in favour of indicators that consider ecosystems, well-being and natural
resources when calculating the progress of nation-states. How this consideration could be
accomplished in greater detail is beyond the scope of this article, but in the next section,
I will elaborate a bit more on approaches to fighting the economic growth monster.
Ecologisation
An important aim of this article is to explain how economic growth has become a pervasive
policy objective able to trump ecological concerns. Examples of this ability are numerous
and can be found in the rejection of proposals such as higher taxes on pollution, stricter
environmental regulation and regulation of international trade and in the necessitation of
so-called development, such as new highways, free trade and oil fields. The first proposals
are rejected by the argument that they would harm economic growth, while the latter are
recommended to secure it. In my view, the ability of economic growth to influence decisions
regarding these issues lies in an entanglement of institutions[5], state instruments and a
widespread economic growth discourse. A range of public institutions, the tax system and
the national budget have all become dependent on economic growth, and this
dependency is constantly reinforced by the discursive reproduction of economic growth as
an ultimate necessity. Therefore, as long as economic growth remains the ultimate political
objective, anything that is framed as a threat to that objective will be rejected. This makes
it nearly impossible to imagine proper solutions to the ecological crisis by means of
conventional policymaking. Thus, if one believes in conventional policymaking as an
important agency for solving the ecological crisis, it is necessary to determine how to
reduce the power of the economic growth monster and the discourse promoting it.
The economic growth discourse can be considered to be part of an activity, which Latour
(2013) has termed economisation. An important element of economisation is a discursive
practice that claims to capture values using the language of economics. The use of this
language implies that only that which can be given a price and exchanged in a market has
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value and can be taken into account. Everything else is external and must be internalised,
i.e. given a price, before it can be taken into consideration. This discourse conceptualises
Economy and Nature as two separate domains, and entities belonging to Nature can only
be acknowledged if they are internalised and thus become part of the economic domain.
In empirical philosophy, this type of reasoning can be seen to be a part of a greater
misconception of the world in which we live, a misconception that provides the basis for the
current ecological crisis, the solution to which is a move towards ecologisation (Latour,
2013).
In the context of the present article, a move towards ecologisation could be the promotion
of a language that allows the presence of multiple voices and the expression of values that
are currently excluded or oppressed by the economic growth monster. In its role as
excluder and oppressor, this monster becomes a passage point for values and voices. If
a certain concern or value can be phrased in the economising language of economic
growth, it can be part of the discussion. If not, it is excluded. This means that value
articulations that are compatible with economic growth can enter the discourse of
decision-making, while those that are not are silenced. According to Medina (2004), the
solution to this type of problem is a linguistic transformation that requires a multitude of
radical changes. One way to start such a cascade of changes could be the explicit
dismissal of the economising framing of political issues and an insistence on speaking an
inclusive language that articulates the beauty of landscapes, the rights of non-human
beings and justice for marginalised people without the use of monetary valuation (Monbiot,
2014). Second, the discipline of economics and its calculative technologies, such as GDP,
that dominate vital ecologies of circulation should continually be challenged and replaced
by other disciplines and measures that are more open to multiple values and voices. Third,
it is necessary to facilitate the collection and circulation of data that speak on behalf of
excluded or misrepresented members of our collectives or, if possible, to invite these
members to speak on their own behalf. Finally, the new inclusive language, the alternative
measures and the multitude of voices and values must be incorporated into the institutions
of public decision-making. If all these changes are made successfully, there is hope that
they would lead to a weakening of the economic growth monster and to the empowerment
of excluded voices and values to address the rising ecological crisis of our age.
Conclusion
This article is inspired by empirical philosophy and offers a new perspective on economic
growth to extend the explanation of how this monster has become so powerful. My
explanation builds on an entanglement of institutions, state instruments and discourse that
facilitates easy circulation and makes economic growth a nearly omnipresent concern in
certain collectives. I also try to exemplify how this monster has shaped institutions,
instruments and language and thereby has necessitated its own presence.
I am aware that economic growth is not the only obstacle to solving the multiple crises
today. Nonetheless, it epitomises the current mode of economisation and constantly
appears as the main argument for overruling ecological concerns. As such, economic
growth has become a main trope in a technocratic language that suppresses other
languages and rejects all values that are not monetary. In this way, economic growth has
become a monster necessary to attack.
An important feature of economisation is the tendency to separate ecology and economy
into two separate realms, such that ecology is reduced to a realm of control and
exploitation. This divide is, according to Latour (2013), the fundamental source of the rising
ecological crisis of our age, and until we understand that there is no economy–ecology
divide and that humans and non-humans inhabit the same ecology, there is bleak hope that
we will overcome the overwhelming problems of our age. In the context of the present
article, an answer to these problems is the promotion of a new inclusive language that
empowers the voices and values of silenced members of our collectives.
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Notes
1. Here, I refer to the rejection of such proposals as eco-taxes and environmental regulation, using the
argument that such measures will make businesses less competitive and, in turn, harm economic
growth.
2. The term “members of our collectives” must be understood in the widest possible sense and
includes entities such as landscapes, non-human species and homeless people.
3. By institutionalisation I mean the incorporation of certain norms or rules in various practices.
4. The term semiotic discourse is used to emphasise that discourse is more than verbal and textual,
it also comprises a large range of signs, such as images, sounds and postures.
5. By institution I mean a set of norms or rules enacted through various practices.
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Celestial bodies and satellites  
– energy issues, models, and imaginaries in Denmark since 1973 
 
Abstract 
This article uses the history of macroeconomic energy modelling in Denmark as a 
case for presenting a theoretical framework which describes issues, publics and 
imaginaries as an important nexus for energy policy. The story evolves around the 
actions, tensions, and entanglement of two publics – the traditionalist and the 
environmentalist – and presents macroeconomic modelling as an instrument for issue 
articulation and the construction of energy policy imaginaries. The article concludes that 
macroeconomic modelling is an effective instrument for articulating the economic 
realities of energy policy, and that economic growth plays a key role in these 
articulations by determining the basic preconditions for collective imaginaries of 
energy system futures.  
 
Keywords: macroeconomic modelling, energy issues, publics, imaginaries, economic 
growth  
 
1. Introduction 
The world is on the verge of climate disaster. Human-induced temperature increase 
is threatening societies across the planet, and global energy system transformations 
are urgently needed1 (IPCC 2014). At the same time, governments all over the world 
are staring fixedly at the economic growth indicator in the hope of upward-sloping 
tendencies, which are synonymous with better times ahead in their view. This 
situation is well captured by Jackson’s term the dilemma of growth (Jackson 2009), 
which means that modern societies have become heavily dependent on economic 
growth in order to secure social stability, employment and welfare institutions, 
despite mounting research which suggests that economic growth has undesirable 
effects on the planet (Wackernagel et al. 2002, Weinzettel et al. 2013, Wiedmann et 
al. 2015). Thus, the dilemma of growth encompasses two thus far conflicting 
concerns: continued economic growth and global environmental havoc. The first can 
justly be termed as being top priority for states and governments, whereas the latter 
takes up a less prominent spot further down the list of government priorities and is 
often represented by publics less connected to the core operations of the state and its 
government.  
 
Since the early seventies, it has become increasingly apparent that energy is a vital 
component of economic growth, societal order and stability. However, the use of 
energy, especially fossil fuels, for this purpose comes with severe environmental 
disadvantages such as carbon emissions and climate change (IPCC 2014). Hence, the 
issue of energy encompasses the same concerns as the dilemma of growth, in relation 
to which the state and its government historically has been mostly interested in 
energy as a means for securing economic growth and stability, while those concerned 
                                            
1 In fact, much more is needed; however, due to the limited scope of this article, I mainly focus on 
energy system issues. 
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with environmental issues have focused on the adverse effects of energy 
consumption.  
  
In this respect, energy has, since the emergence of the first oil crisis in 1973, become 
an increasingly important political issue and the subject of perpetual policy-making 
and dispute (van Dalen et al. 2002). This increased political interest has also led to 
inquiry into the energy issue, which began to make use of computational2 
macroeconomic modelling already in the early seventies. The treatment of energy by 
this type of modelling is a key theme of the present article. By tracing the joint 
enterprises behind such modelling activities, this article provides insight to the 
apparatus behind the creation of energy policy imaginaries. This is achieved by 
addressing the following research question: how has macroeconomic energy modelling 
been developed as an instrument for energy policy in Denmark since 1973, and what can be 
learned from this story about the role of macroeconomic modelling in Danish energy policy?        
 
The treatment of this question reveals a tension between the aforementioned 
concerns regarding economic growth, but also between different epistemic traditions, 
where mainstream macroeconomics is a tradition in favour of continued economic 
growth, while thermodynamics and system dynamics have been favoured by 
academics who are growth-antagonists (Georgescu-Roegen 1971, Meadows et al. 
1972). Mainstream macroeconomics conceptualises energy as a market good and a 
substitutable factor of production (Andersen et al. 2010), while the antagonistic 
perspective emphasises the systemic and entropic aspects of energy. The former 
perspective explains economic growth by enhanced factor productivity as a result of 
technological progress (Solow 1956), whereas the latter holds that energy - or more 
precisely exergy3 - is the key term in understanding economic growth (Ayres & Warr 
2005). Furthermore, the latter perspective points to the entropic consequences of 
economic growth, which means that maintaining low entropic societal order and 
stability (especially by means of fossil fuels) comes at the price of high entropic 
environmental degradation (Georgescu-Roegen 1971).   
 
The epistemic divide between mainstream economics and growth antagonistic 
perspectives is also key to understanding the title of the present article, which is 
inspired by macroeconomic modelling language. In this language, it is common to 
speak of an appendix model to a macroeconomic4 model as a satellite. Hence, the 
macroeconomic model can be seen as a celestial body around which various satellites, 
such as energy models, orbit and whose gravity they have to obey. Taking an exergy 
view on this metaphor, however, requires a radically different explanation in which 
                                            
2 Computational, as opposed to theoretical, means that the model consists of a set of equations, 
which is solved by a computer, thus providing a numerical result. Since all the models treated in this 
article are computational, this will not be stated explicitly.   
3 Ayres & Warr define exergy as ‘available’ or ‘useful’ energy, which means the potential for physical 
work contained in a given quantity of energy (Ayres & Warr 2005). The high exergy content of 
fossil fuels is, thus, key to understanding the rapid economic growth, which has taken place since the 
Second World War. 
4 To be more precise, satellites are developed for so called macro-econometric models, which are a 
special type of macroeconomic model.   
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the role of celestial body is played by exergy, while the economy is a satellite under 
its command.   
 
The analyses of this article are a combination of sociology of science and policy 
analysis with an inclination towards the former. This means that the article does not 
attempt to trace the influence of modelling on concrete policy-making, but rather 
investigates the historical development of a specific type of modelling as a certain 
mode of inquiry with the ability to produce energy policy imaginaries. Even though 
the article relates to several strands of literature, one of its main purposes is to 
contribute to on-going discussions of politics as a matter of issues, publics and 
imaginaries (Dewey 2012 (1927), Marres 2005, 2007, Brown 2009, 2015, Jasanoff 
2009, 2013). Epitomising these strands of analysis, Marres has emphasised the 
significance of issues and publics to politics and democracy (Marres 2005, 2007, 
Brown 2015), while Jasanoff & Kim (2009, 2013) have highlighted the important role 
of sociotechnical imaginaries in policy-making. However, these two perspectives 
have, to my knowledge, not yet been merged together, which is what I do in the 
following.   
 
Also of interest to this article are two different literary strands covering two different 
kinds of modelling: macroeconomic and energy/environmental modelling. The former 
investigates the role of macroeconomic modelling in various contexts of political 
decision-making (Andersen & Madsen 1995, Evans 1997, den Butter & Morgan 2000, 
Henriksen 2013, Reichmann 2013), while the latter does the same for 
energy/environmental modelling (Midttun & Baumgartner 1986, Baumgartner & 
Midttun 1987, Hogan 2002, van Daalen et al. 2002, Nilsson et al. 2011, Upham et al. 
2015). Even though they discuss two different types of modelling, these two strands 
are closely connected since discussing one makes it hard to ignore the issues and 
concerns which motivate the other. Thus, energy has become part of macroeconomic 
modelling and macroeconomics has become part of energy modelling. For the 
purpose of elaborating on this relationship, this article puts the connection between 
macroeconomic and energy modelling at the centre of attention and investigates 
activities of developing a discipline which I have labelled macroeconomic energy 
modelling (MEM). Denmark – one of the leading renewable energy nations of the 
world – was chosen as the case for this historical investigation. Due to its compelling 
history of energy system transformations, Denmark provides an interesting case of 
entangled grassroots mobilisation and governmental policy intervention (Jørgensen 
& Karnøe 1995, Karnøe in progress). This article focuses primarily on the 
governmental policy side of the matter and investigates how macroeconomic 
modelling has been mobilised as a tool for articulating energy policy imaginaries in 
Denmark.  
 
The story focuses on three characteristic MEM collections from three different 
decades: the 1970s, the 1990s and the 2010s. Each of these decades saw events and 
were characterised by themes of special interest to MEM and, therefore, provide a 
good background for telling the story. The models of the seventies are called the 
  4 
IFIAS5 models, EMMA6 is the model of the nineties, while a model collection named 
IntERACT7 represents the current decade.  
 
The rest of the article is organised as follows: in section 2, a brief account of the 
empirical material is given, while, in section 3, some of the limitations of the research 
are considered. The theoretical framework is presented in section 4, and section 5 
discusses macroeconomic modelling and national accounting. Section 6 unfolds the 
story; section 7 discusses some aspects of the story, while a conclusion is provided in 
Section 8.   
 
2. Empirical material  
The empirical material of this article consists of fifteen semi-structured, audio 
recorded and transcribed interviews, and one audio recording from a seminar on 
multi-sector models8 (see appendix 1 for a list of interviewees and their institutional 
affiliation). This material conveys the worldviews and stories of key actors including 
economists, civil servants and energy system researchers involved in the story of 
MEM in Denmark. Since all the interviews were performed in Danish, I have 
translated direct quotes from the interviews to English. The interviews and the 
seminar are referred to in square brackets. To supplement the audio recorded 
material, I rely on academic articles and book chapters and a body of reports and 
documents from central agencies such as the Danish Energy Agency, Statistics 
Denmark9 and the Danish Ministry of Finance.   
   
3. Limitations  
The following story naturally has several limitations, two of which are the missing 
treatment of the impact of computer technology on macroeconomic modelling, and 
the fragmentary ethnographic detail concerning the linkages between policy change 
and modelling. It is widely recognised that the evolution of digital computers had a 
tremendous impact on computational modelling, and I am convinced that this 
influence also provides an opportunity for interesting investigations in relation to 
macroeconomic models. Yet, due to the focus on issues, publics and imaginaries, this 
part of the story has been omitted, leaving a gap for further research. Regarding the 
linkages between policy change and modelling, it is not easy to acquire the desired 
ethnographic detail since these linkages require access to rather closed and secretive 
environments such as the Danish Ministry of Finance. Several times during the 
research, I realised that access to such sites was quite limited and often beyond my 
reach.  
 
4. Theoretical framework   
In order to analyse the case at hand, a selection of different, yet kindred theoretical 
perspectives have been weaved together, the purpose being to highlight the relation 
                                            
5 The International Federation of Institutes for Advanced Study. 
6 Energy and eMissions Models for ADAM (Annual Danish Aggregate Model). 
7 INTegrated Economic eneRgy Applied Computational Tool. 
8 All together comprising approximately 24 hours of audio recordings. 
9 The Danish National Bureau of Statistics. 
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between issues, publics, and imaginaries as an important nexus for energy policy, in 
which macroeconomic modelling plays a significant role. Thus, one of the main 
observations of the article is that macroeconomic modelling cuts across this nexus by 
being commissioned and commanded by certain publics, by participating in the 
articulation of issues, and by being used in the drafting of energy policy imaginaries. 
In the following, a more elaborate description of the theoretical perspectives 
deployed to develop this argument is provided.  
 
The first thread in the patchwork is the concept of issue articulation, which according 
to Marres, is a constituent element of politics and democracy (Marres 2007). Roughly 
speaking, issue articulation concerns the construction of objects by means of 
associating material circumstances through activities such as data collection, 
measurement, and calculation. In this sense, issues, such as the oil crisis in 1973, can 
be seen as objects which enter our common world through socio-material 
associations and acquire specific traits and qualities depending on how they are 
measured, calculated, and by other means expressed. As the following story hopefully 
reveals, macroeconomic models are able to participate in such socio-material 
articulations, and, hence, they can be understood as effective instruments of issue 
articulation.  
 
The next perspective in the patchwork is Dewey’s idea of the public as a pivotal 
notion in understanding democracy, societal change and the transformation of the 
state. In order to explain the public, Dewey takes indirect consequences of conjoint 
human actions as his point of departure: “The public consists of all those who are 
affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is 
deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for” (Dewey 
2012:48). Thus, a public is a social group which emerges as people who are affected 
by the consequences of conjoint actions engage in systematically caring for and 
dealing with these consequences.  
 
In her contemporary reading of Dewey, Marres translates the indirect consequences 
of conjoint actions into issues and suggests that, “issues spark a public into being” 
(Marres 2005:title). Using this phrasing, Dewey’s theory of societal change becomes 
a theory of how specific social groupings named publics are called into being by 
emerging issues and how these organise and act in order to respond to these issues. 
Along these lines, it is important to emphasise that Dewey considered the state and 
its government to be a public (Dewey 2012); a public in which multiple modes of 
organisation have turned into stable institutions and regimes of regulation in order 
to care for and handle a multitude of issues. In this perspective, societal change is 
highly dependent on how the state reacts to emergent issues and on interactions 
between the state and new publics called into being by these issues.  
 
In the following, tensions between two publics dubbed the traditionalist and the 
environmentalist public (or simply the traditionalists and the environmentalists) 
constitute a fulcrum for telling the story of MEM in Denmark. The traditionalist 
public is anchored in core ministries of the Danish state, such as the Ministries of 
State, Finance and Commerce, whose main economic concerns are strongly tied to 
national accounting, whereas the environmentalist public is constituted by research 
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groups, NGOs, and grassroots movements called into being by the environmental 
consequences of economic growth.  
 
The question of how the state and new publics react to emergent issues leads to 
Dewey’s notion of inquiry, which is a certain instrumental mode of knowledge 
production that regards the clarification of indeterminate situations, instances of 
ambiguity and confusion (Brown 2009). As such, inquiry plays an important role as 
articulator of emergent issues and devisor of ‘appropriate’ responses (Marres 2007). 
As Brown explains, “[i]nquiry begins with the desire to respond to [a] disturbed 
and troubled situation, followed by the transformation of the indeterminate situation 
into a “problematic situation”, and then into a specific “problem” to be solved” (Brown 
2009:153). By virtue of this ability to transform a troubled situation into a specific 
problem, inquiry is core to determining what can be thought of, planned and chosen 
(Dewey 2012). In the story which follows, macroeconomic models are investigated as 
instruments of inquiry, which help to transform troubled situations into solvable 
problems by providing frameworks for articulating energy issues and drafting energy 
policy imaginaries.   
 
Continuing along these lines, the final theoretical thread I wish to add to the 
patchwork is an emphasis on the imaginary; in this case visions of the future Danish 
energy system. For this purpose, I draw inspiration from Jasanoff and Kim, who use 
the term sociotechnical imaginaries to describe “collectively imagined forms of social 
life and social order reflected in the design and fulfilment of nation-specific scientific 
and/or technological projects” (Jasanoff & Kim 2009:120). In a later article, Jasanoff 
& Kim use the case of energy system transformations to exemplify sociotechnical 
imaginaries as important guides for energy policies (Jasonoff & Kim 2013). Adding to 
this line of research, the present article investigates macroeconomic  inquiry engaged 
in the articulation of energy policy imaginaries for the purpose of governmental 
decision-making regarding the transformation of the energy system in Denmark.  
 
5. Macroeconomic modelling and national accounting    
Adding to the previous reflections on issues and issue articulation, it is interesting to 
observe that, ever since their inception, macroeconomic modelling and energy 
modelling have been engaged in the articulation of emergent issues from the Great 
Depression to present day climate change. To exemplify this, the world’s first 
computational macroeconomic model was developed by Tinbergen in a response to 
the hardships following the Wall Street crash in 1929 (Zalm 2000), while the first 
large-scale energy models in the USA came as a response to skyrocketing oil prices 
in 1973, which very quickly became a national security issue for the US government 
(Hogan 2002). This modelling mobilisation can be interpreted as publics – in this 
case nation states – responding to emerging issue by incorporating modelling inquiry 
in their perception of these issues and their responses to them.  
   
This connects to Dewey’s notion of inquiry or more precisely a specific 
instrumentality of inquiry named, national accounting, which serves as a foundation 
for macroeconomic modelling (Bjerkholt 2000). Thus, one way to understand 
macroeconomic modelling is that it concerns causal relationships between national 
accounting variables and the investigation of other forces which cause national 
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accounting variables to change. Modern systems of national accounting date back to 
the Great Depression, which called for tangible accounts of the economic status of 
nation states (Vanoli 2008). Since then, national accounting has gradually been 
formalised and harmonised such that most countries employ comparable standards 
(Vanoli 2008). This institutionalisation has also induced a very strong political focus 
on national accounting, such that emergent issues which affect, or merely threaten to 
affect, these indicators have the potential to become issues of great concern to 
governments.  
 
Cast in the vocabulary of this article’s theoretical framework, this can be interpreted 
as an example of traditionalist issue articulation, which at least partly explains the 
need for macroeconomic models in policy-making since such models provide 
frameworks for imagining the future status of national accounting variables and the 
effects of various policy proposals on these variables. Having this in mind, it is 
noteworthy that macroeconomic forecasts are notoriously flawed, yet they are used 
for multiple political purposes (Evans 1997). One explanation for this is that they 
provide consistent, non-contradictory frameworks in which fundamental national 
accounting identities are respected (Smith 2000). In Denmark, the macroeconometric 
model, ADAM, maintained by Statistics Denmark and operated by the Ministry of 
Finance, plays an important role in this regard. Since the late seventies, it has been 
the main celestial body for managing the macroeconomic concerns of shifting Danish 
governments.  
   
6. The story 
 
6.1 The pioneers  
The story begins in 1973 on November 25th with the introduction of car free Sundays, 
a government intervention banning all car driving10 in Denmark11 on Sundays. A 
complex situation in the Middle East, spurred by the Yom Kippur war, had led to 
skyrocketing oil prices in the wake of which followed disturbing national account 
articulations such as an increasing balance of payment deficits, decreasing 
consumption and growing unemployment (Bjørnholm et al. 1976, Handelsministeriet 
1976, Issawi 1978, Meyer 2000). This threatened economic growth12 and stability in 
the West and left many oil importing countries in a state of emergency; also 
articulated as the first oil crisis (Tennant 2013). The Danish government needed to 
act, and car free Sundays aimed at immediate cuts in oil consumption. However, 
probably more than anything else, car free Sundays was a moral statement telling the 
Danes to stand together in this critical situation [Bjørnholm].  
 
The year before, in 1972, another important event had taken place: the publication of 
the first Club of Rome report named Limits to Growth (LtG) (Meadows et al. 1972). 
LtG was based on computations performed on a system dynamics model named, 
                                            
10 There were some emergency exceptions to the law, and it was possible to acquire a permission to 
drive for certain vital purposes.    
11 Actually, this intervention was also introduced in other European countries.    
12 At that time, growth had in fact already been declining for some years (Midttun & Baumgartner 
1986), which only made the crisis more disturbing for the government.    
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World3, which, “[…] became an important vehicle in bringing the new problem 
perception of a global ecological crisis to national and international policy attention” 
(van Dalen et al. 2002:5). Even though LtG was not the first publication to 
problematise perpetual economic growth, its global scope and far-reaching narrative 
marked the advent of a ‘new’ issue and called an international environmentalist 
public into being.  
 
The concerns of this public immediately turned out to be in stark opposition to the 
concerns and interests of the traditionalist public for whom continued economic 
growth, employment and societal stability were the primary political priorities. 
These two publics carried the potential for severe conflict, and soon after its 
publication, LtG became subject to aggressive attacks from traditionalists, and 
heated discussions broke out [Meyer].  
 
In spite of this controversy, the LtG issue had the ability to mobilise both competent 
business leaders and long-haired students [Bjørnholm]. Along these lines, 
Bjørnholm explains how the LtG issue influenced the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
Nobel Foundation to establish a scientific network called, IFIAS, which involved 
high-ranking research institutes from several countries. The basic idea of this 
initiative was to see whether international, interdisciplinary research collaborations 
could lead to useful responses to the complex, multifaceted future challenges 
articulated by LtG and other related studies [Bjørnholm]. The famous Niels Bohr 
Institute for theoretical physics in Copenhagen was invited to join IFIAS and the 
invitation was accepted. Using Dewey’s vocabulary, the IFIAS community can be 
understood as a public which brought the traditionalist and environmentalist 
together around a somewhat common agenda. 
 
At the first IFIAS meeting in Copenhagen in February 1973, it was decided that the 
Danish contribution would be a pilot study of energy issues in Denmark. Later that 
same year, the oil crisis emerged and pushed the Danish IFIAS project up the 
political agenda. Thus, the oil crisis became a factor in turning the project focus 
towards the concerns of the traditionalists, such that the main question for the 
Danish project became: how to become independent of oil from the Middle East? Denmark 
was the perfect case for such a study due to its utter dependence on foreign energy 
and the availability of well-ordered statistics in many categories [Holm]. 
  
The oil crisis and the economic concerns of western nation states thus became factors 
which directed the Danish project focus towards energy supply security and 
increased the government’s attention, to such an extent that the project was subject 
to continuous interest from high-ranking officials in the Danish ministries of State, 
Finance and Commerce; the latter being responsible for national energy issues at the 
time [Holm]. The high priority status of the project was also reflected in the 
appointment of Thorkil Kristensen – the first secretary general of OECD and former 
Danish Minister of Finance – as the public face of the project.  
 
The daily work of the IFIAS group consisted of talking to representatives of a wide 
range of professional capabilities within the energy industry and gathering energy 
system data from every corner of the country in order to build a model strongly 
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grounded in empirical data [Holm]. This work was facilitated by the high priority 
status of the project, which made almost anything possible, or as Holm expresses it, 
“all doors were open so to say, and if information existed at all, it was accessible to 
us”. 
 
However, as Holm also remembers, they needed a framework for the figures: “we had 
plenty of data for houses, gasworks and oil burners, but needed a framework in order 
to say something about the overall economy and energy consumption”. For this 
purpose, it was decided, under the influence of the economist, Bent Thage, a high-
ranking official from Statistics Denmark, that a macroeconomic model would be built 
based on the Norwegian Multi-Sector Growth (MSG) framework [Holm]. Hence, 
Holm, the programmer of the group, reconstructed the Norwegian MSG model to fit 
Danish data. As the work progressed, the IFIAS group developed a joint instrument 
consisting of two models: MSGE (E for energy), an energy demand model, and ESM 
(Energy System Model), an energy supply model. This description exemplifies issue 
articulation as a process of associating material circumstances – 
houses, gasworks, and oil burners – by means of data collection and the incorporation 
of these data into a wider framework of macroeconomic calculation.  
 
Using the article’s theoretical patchwork to express the procedure of operating the 
IFIAS models, one could say that the interests and economic concerns of the 
traditionalist public came to dominate the operation. To begin the procedure, MSGE 
would receive an exogenous input, which was the official economic growth forecast 
provided by the Ministry of Finance. Based on this input, MSGE would calculate the 
total amount of energy needed to achieve the level of production forecasted by the 
ministry. By means of an input-output13 (IO) matrix, MSGE would disaggregate the 
total energy demand into sectors and energy sources. ESM was then used for 
exploring energy system opportunities and developing scenarios of less oil-
dependent energy system configurations able to meet this demand. There was no 
programmatic feedback from ESM to MSGE. Thus, ESM had no direct influence on 
the total energy demand or the disaggregation into energy sources demanded by 
industry and households [Holm]. Based on this procedure, the IFIAS group 
produced and published energy system scenarios for the purpose of policy debate and 
decision-making, thus articulating imaginaries in agreement with the traditionalists’ 
economic growth priority.  
 
The theoretical interpretation of the preceding section is that it exemplifies the role 
of macroeconomic calculation in a nexus between issues, publics and imaginaries: an 
issue – the oil crisis – emerges and is articulated by means of national accounting. 
The traditionalist public reacts by making the IFIAS project a high priority, which 
leads to inquiry into the Danish energy system and macroeconomic articulations with 
the purpose of informing governmental decision-making and public debate.  
 
 
 
                                            
13 An IO matrix is a mathematical subdivision of the economy into sectors of production and final 
consumers. For more information, see Leontief (1970). 
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6.1.1 Publications and confrontations  
The Danish IFIAS project terminated in 1976 when two group members were 
headhunted to work in the Ministry of Commerce on energy issues. Even though the 
project finished abruptly and the work of the group has now been more or less 
forgotten, the project must be recognised as a pioneer project. As an economist, who 
was later involved in similar projects, puts it, “the IFIAS group started a tradition” 
[Morthorst].  
 
A part of this tradition was to publish energy policy scenarios, and the year 1976 
witnessed no less than three such publications. First came the IFIAS scenarios 
(Bjørnholm et al. 1976), then the first official energy plan of Denmark 
(Handelsministeriet 1976), and finally, a so-called alternative energy plan (Blegaa et 
al. 1976) authored by growth sceptical members of the environmentalist public. The 
IFIAS scenarios and the official plan were actually more or less identical - reflecting 
the high level of coordination between the IFIAS project and the Ministry of 
Commerce (the publisher of the official plan) – whereas the alternative energy plan 
especially deviated on one specific issue: nuclear energy.  
 
The IFIAS scenarios and the official plan both relied on the introduction of nuclear 
energy (amongst many other very well-considered technical solutions, which would 
later prove to be successful) to reduce the oil component of the overall energy mix. 
However, the introduction of nuclear energy was a highly controversial issue in 
Denmark (Meyer 2000), and in spite of the fact that most of the authors of the 
alternative plan held strong antagonistic views on economic growth, they accepted 
this priority in order to fight the battle against nuclear.  
 
They did this by first explicitly denouncing the economic growth imperative, 
although they accepted the overall projections of economic growth presented in the 
official plan in order to show that it was possible to make an energy system scenario 
which was able to saturate the overall demand for energy projected in the official 
plan without nuclear. For this purpose, the alternative plan relied on coal and, to a 
much greater extent than the two other plans, on renewable energy. As history has 
shown, nuclear has not been introduced in Denmark and the country has since 
witnessed what could reasonably be termed a renewable energy revolution (Karnøe 
in progress). The growth sceptical authors of the alternative energy plan (and the 
environmentalist public more generally) thus ended up as winners of the nuclear 
power battle, albeit at the cost of accepting the economic growth imperative. Since 
nuclear has not yet become part of the Danish energy system, the preceding 
exemplifies how the battle over nuclear in Denmark was always a battle of 
imaginaries, and how imaginaries can be understood as strong political forces able to 
determine actual decision-making.   
 
The authors behind the alternative energy plan belonged to a group of researchers14 
centred at the Technical University of Denmark, spearheaded by the physics 
professor and economic growth antagonist, Niels I. Meyer. As was also the case for 
                                            
14 This group based their understanding of economic growth and energy systems on, amongst other 
things, systems dynamics and thermodynamics. 
  11 
the LtG authors, Meyer’s group was occasionally met by attacks from mainstream 
economists and a general distrust from the traditionalist public. This is exemplified 
by one of the former group members in the following way: “we operated in a hostile 
environment and were often met by hard feelings” [Member of Meyer’s group, who 
wishes to remain anonymous]. This indicates a sharp divide between the 
traditionalist and the environmentalist public. However, this is not entirely precise 
since the boundaries between the two were blurred by multiple crossing and 
interrelations. An example of this is the fact that some members of Meyer’s group 
actually ended up working in state organisations such as the Energy Agency, while 
Meyer himself chaired various governmental renewable energy committees and 
councils from the seventies and several decades onwards (Meyer 2000).   
 
Regarding the energy issue more generally, the members of Meyer’s group held an 
entirely different view than most mainstream economists. In mainstream economics, 
energy was, and for many practical purposes still is, considered one of the less 
influential factors of production, whereas a former member of Meyer’s group 
emphasises how the energy crises revealed energy as a key socio-economic factor 
having multiple environmental implications [Josephsen].  
 
6.2 The golden age 
In the early eighties, the energy question was, from a traditionalist perspective, still 
mainly a question of security of supply, while environmental problems in relation to 
energy consumption was a marginal concern (Meyer 2000). This changed in the late 
eighties with the emergence of the international sustainable development discourse, 
spearheaded by the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987 (Hajer 1995, Blok 
2005, Røpke 2005). As opposed to LtG, the sustainable development discourse was 
more in line with the traditionalist agenda since it promised a reconciliation between 
environmental concerns and the unquestionable economic growth imperative. Thus, 
the Brundtland Report became a turning point, which marked an increased interest in 
environmental issues in Danish policy-making (Miljøstyrelsen 2015).  
 
The increased interest led, among many other things, to the establishment, in 1992, 
of the Strategic Environmental Research Programme, the objective of which was to 
provide environmental knowledge for policy-making in Denmark (Blok 2005). 
Amongst many research projects, the programme also funded a project with the 
purpose of creating a modelling tool for the coherent assessment of economy-
environment relations in Denmark (Andersen et al. 1998). This project resulted in 
the development of a collection of models named EMMA, which is still used by 
different state agencies for energy demand forecasting today [Andersen, Pedersen].  
 
The main organisations involved in developing EMMA were the sectoral energy 
research institute, Risø, and Statistics Denmark. Risø employed an interdisciplinary 
energy systems group (also including economists), while Statistics Denmark 
commanded a macroeconomic modelling group (comprising only economists). 
Economists in the Risø group had previously been involved in MEM projects funded 
by the European Community (Fenhan & Morthorst 1981, Bâtiment 1993), while the 
group at Statistics Denmark were in charge of maintaining and developing the 
macroeconometric model ADAM used by the Danish Ministry of Finance for 
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forecasting and policy assessment. The connection between the groups at Risø and 
Statistics Denmark has been vital to the MEM community in Denmark, not least due 
to the fact that most of the economists involved in the development of this discipline 
received their training in either one or both of these groups.  
 
The relatively long history of EMMA indicates how changing policy issues and 
public interests are able to influence the development of a model. Even though I do 
not possess all the ethnographic detail and empirical pieces to fully explain this, I 
argue that there is a connection between the sustainable development agenda, the 
environmental issues it brought along, and the demand for further macroeconomic 
inquiry for which purpose EMMA was developed. Indicating this, the first version of 
EMMA15 was merely a single energy demand satellite to ADAM [Andersen], while 
during the nineties, EMMA evolved into a collection of ADAM-satellites able to 
couple several environmental issues, such as CO2, SO2 and NOx emissions, to 
ADAM’s macroeconomic machinery.  
 
An important force in this development was the then Minister of Energy and 
Environmental affairs, Svend Auken, who had a strong voice in the centre-left 
government (1993-2001) and was able to bring environmentalist concerns further up 
the traditionalist agenda. This resulted, amongst other things, in the passing of a law 
which dictated environmental assessments of policy plans and the annual budget 
(Andersen 2000). The environmental assessments of the annual budget quickly 
became subject to heavy criticism, and they were abandoned already after three years. 
However, they left an imprint on EMMA by being the catalyst for its expansion and 
elaboration in terms of environmental detail. This development required much time 
and labour, however, according to one of its designers, EMMA was actually capable 
of handling the assessments at the time of the abandonment [Andersen].  
 
Broadly speaking, EMMA is a collection of energy specific satellites to ADAM. In 
concert, this setup is able to perform three core articulations: first to quantify 
industry and household energy consumption and disaggregate it into different 
energy types16, second to model the energy supply sector’s conversion of fuels into 
other forms of energy, and finally to calculate the total amount of CO2, SO2 and NOx 
emissions due to energy consumption17 (Andersen & Trier 1995). In order to do so, 
EMMA is dependent on an exogenous projection of economic growth (provided by 
the Ministry of Finance using ADAM). In this respect, EMMA can be seen as an 
energy/emissions extension of the macroeconomic concerns of the traditionalist 
public.  
 
                                            
15 This was before the model was actually dubbed EMMA during a naming session involving two 
model builders and a bottle of red wine [Grinderslev]. 
16 In the 1997 version, the six energy types were: transport fuel, electricity, natural gas, district 
heating, solid fuel and liquid fuel. A subsequent version included seven types: gasoline, electricity, 
gas, district heating, coal, oil and biomass (Andersen et al. 2010). 
17 The disaggregation into energy types is necessary in order to provide a good description of 
emissions since each fuel type has a specific emission intensity and results in the emission of different 
pollutants. 
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Even though the IFIAS models and EMMA thus exhibit a basic similarity, there are 
still quite a few differences between the two. First of all, the development of EMMA 
reveals an interesting double movement: increasing interest in environmental issues and a 
gradual take over by the economics discipline. The first aspect has already been treated, 
while the second refers to the fact that the IFIAS project was an interdisciplinary 
project characterised by a mix of physics, engineering and economics competencies, 
whereas EMMA was developed by economists, who incorporated energy systems 
engineering knowledge in their framework. This is indicative of how economists 
gradually expanded their sphere of influence on the inquiry into the energy issue, 
which is also exemplified by the fact that the IFIAS collections was a combination of 
a macroeconomic and an energy systems model, whereas EMMA is solely 
macroeconometric. In other words, IFIAS’s energy system model was a mathematical 
model based on an engineering approach to the energy system, whereas EMMA is 
based on estimated behavioural equations (and IO-matrices) determined by 
mainstream economic theory.  
 
As opposed to the IFIAS models, feedback from EMMA to ADAM is technically 
possible (Andersen et al. 2010). However, interviews reveal that this is a slightly 
tricky business, and such iterations can easily go astray [Andersen]. Over the years, 
the emissions and supply satellites and the feedback possibility of EMMA have not 
been employed for many practical purposes (Energistyrelsen 2015). EMMA has, 
thus, always been mainly used for imaginary purposes such as the articulation of 
energy demand forecasts.   
 
6.2.1 More energy plans  
During the eighties and nineties, new energy policy imaginaries in the form of three 
official energy plans – Energy Plan 81 (Energiministeriet 1981), Energy 2000 
(Energiministeriet 1990) and Energy 21 (Miljø- og Energiministeriet 1996) – where 
published. These three plans were exponents of the changing policy focus described 
in the preceding. Thus, Energy Plan 81 was mainly concerned with energy security 
(Meyer 2000), whereas the latter two plans exhibited an increased emphasis on the 
concerns of the environmentalist public, especially climate change. However, all the 
plans still consisted of imaginaries which complied with the official economic growth 
forecasts provided by the Ministry of Finance using ADAM.   
 
Providing a more nuanced perspective to this general tendency, it is interesting to 
observe that the 81 plan actually presented a so-called low growth scenario, which 
halved the official future economic growth rate to 1.5 per cent and relied on tighter 
government control of energy system developments. The reason for incorporating 
this imaginary was, most likely, parliamentary pressure motivated by the concerns of 
the environmentalist public (Meyer 2000). That said, Energy 81 emphasised that the 
low growth approach would substantially affect the balance of payments and 
employment negatively. Furthermore, it was emphasised that the low growth 
projection of GDP was not the Ministry of Finance’s official forecast 
(Energiministeriet 1981).  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the official 81 plan was followed by the 
publication of a very elaborate alternative plan in 1983 (Hvelplund et al. 1983), 
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authored by a group including several of the authors of the first alternative plan 
(Meyer 2000). This plan was characterised by a holistic systems perspective with 
serious attention paid to renewables, which inspired the makers of Energy 2000 
seven years later (Meyer 2000). Once again, this exemplifies the ability of 
imaginaries, to exercise influence; influence which is traceable in actual policy and 
energy system transformations.  
 
5.3 Present trends 
During the 2000s, Denmark witnessed a policy shift from a willingness to an 
aversion to financially support state institutions to care for the environment 
[Holten-Andersen]. The main protagonist of this shift was Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
head of the right-wing government, which came into office in 2001. According to 
public myth, one of Rasmussen’s aims was to demolish Auken’s empire. This aim was 
carried out, amongst other things, by shutting down several environmental boards 
and councils [Holten-Andersen]Holten-Andersen], (Jerking 2009) and establishing 
a new institute of environmental assessment headed by the now notorious climate 
action obstructer, Bjørn Lomborg (Jerking 2009).  
 
As a consequence of Rasmussen’s low concern for environmental issues, his reign 
became a dark era for the environmentalist public [Holten-Andersen]. However, 
during his second term, Rasmussen changed his attitude towards climate change, and 
not long after18, an interdisciplinary climate commission to explore the possibility of 
achieving a zero-carbon energy future by 2050 was commissioned. This shift in 
political attention characterises the present day where the focus on climate change 
and a zero-carbon future dominates the public debate on environmental issues.  
 
Not least thanks to impressive grassroots activities and innovative entrepreneurship, 
Denmark is, at least for the time being, one of the leading renewable energy nations 
in the world (Karnøe in progress, IEA 2011). This status makes it realistic for Danish 
politicians to discuss the possibility of a zero-carbon energy system in 2050. Even 
though the coming into office of a new right-wing government in 2015 has added 
serious doubts to the feasibility of this ambition, the Danish Energy Agency still 
possesses a large selection of instruments with which to explore this issue. As the 
main agency handling the government’s energy concerns, the Danish Energy Agency 
thus provides an appropriate site for an account of energy models currently in use for 
energy issue articulation and the drafting of energy policy imaginaries.  
 
At the beginning of the story in 1973, the energy concerns of the state were more or 
less handled by two people, who kept track of coal imports in the Ministry of 
Commerce [Holm]. With the outbreak of the first oil crisis, it quickly became 
apparent that the number of employees and level of expertise was insufficient. Hence, 
in 1976, the Danish Energy Agency19 was established, and since then, the agency has 
expanded dramatically, to the extent that it has approximately 300 employees today.  
 
                                            
18 At that time, however, Rasmussen had left office to become the new Secretary General of NATO. 
19 The Danish Energy Agency is now a part of the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Housing. 
  15 
In the early seventies, the general selection of energy models was sparse (Hogan 
2002), whereas today a diverse array of such models is in use at university 
departments and sectoral research institutes. This is also the case for the Danish 
Energy Agency, which has a large model selection including energy models for areas 
such as transportation, housing, district heating and electricity [Pedersen]. This 
reflects a very different situation from the situation in which the IFIAS models 
operated. The IFIAS project consisted of a small group of people who had two 
models at their disposal, whereas the models in the Danish Energy Agency are 
distributed amongst several areas of responsibility. This is indicative of an increase in 
modelling capabilities, which has taken place over the years and has led to a situation 
where the energy agency is able to respond to many different political requirements 
using its models either separately or in concert. In the latter case, the agency’s 
selection of models is a fairly streamlined apparatus held together by a so-called 
compilation model. This apparatus regularly provides an elaborate baseline forecast 
of the energy situation in Denmark approximately ten years ahead in time 
[Pedersen]. 
 
As was also the case for the previously described models, the models in the Danish 
Energy Agency can be grouped according to an economic conceptualisation of the 
energy issue. A central distinction in this regard is made between supply and demand 
models. On the demand side, EMMA is responsible for the overall energy demand 
forecast, which is dependent on the official macroeconomic forecast provided by the 
Danish Ministry of Finance. This reveals a one-directional demand forecasting 
procedure, where the agency’s energy models are not in a position to provide any 
feedback to ADAM.  
 
In relation to this ‘deficiency’, it is noteworthy that a new integrated modelling 
collection is currently under construction at the Energy Agency. This collection is 
called IntERACT20 and is supposed to become a supplement to the model selection 
already in use at the agency [Termansen]. The decision to initiate the IntERACT 
project was part of a parliamentary energy agreement from 2012 (under a centre-left 
government 2011-2015), in which it is stated that 15.2 million Danish Kroner has 
been earmarked for the, “[d]evelopment of a general equilibrium (GE) model for 
modelling the energy system and economic system to identify effective policies and 
future regulatory initiatives” (Termansen et al. 2013).  
 
As a part of the energy agreement from 2012, the objective of which is to push in the 
direction of making Denmark fossil-free by 2050, IntERACT is designed to articulate 
the effects of a transition to a zero-carbon-future on the Danish economy. IntERACT 
consists of two integrated models: a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
and an energy supply model named TIMES-DK21. The CGE model is based on 
neoclassical assumptions such as rational economic behaviour, utility and profit 
maximisation (consumers and firms respectively) and perfect information. These 
                                            
20 The IntERACT project had a time frame of three years and the initial funding terminated in 2015. 
21 TIMES is one of the modelling tools of the Energy Technology Systems Analysis Program 
(ETSAP), a consortium, under the International Energy Agency (IEA), which includes a large 
number of member countries. 
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assumptions combined with the mechanics of prices and market forces make it 
possible to obtain a general equilibrium solution for the entire economy, where all 
markets achieve equilibrium simultaneously (Termansen & Gersfelt 2013).    
 
TIMES-DK, on the other hand, is a very detailed linear programming energy 
systems model, which optimises a single objective function under a number of 
constraints. The objective which TIMES-DK optimises is: how to deliver a specified 
amount of energy services in the most cost-efficient way? To answer this question, TIMES-
DK uses a rich technical description of the Danish energy system.  
 
Even though both models operate by optimisation, they are considered to represent 
two opposite approaches: top-down (CGE) and bottom-up (TIMES-DK). According 
to Termansen, integrating the two is not straight forward. In intERACT, the 
integration goes through energy services such as heating, light and transportation. 
The basic idea is that the CGE model provides an overall demand for energy services, 
while TIMES-DK calculates how this demand can be met ‘at the lowest cost’22 under 
specified constraints [Termansen]. 
 
Unlike the two previously described model collections, feedbacks between the energy 
system and macroeconomic variables are of high priority to IntERACT, and the 
collection is designed to perform iterations between the two models. The iterative 
loop starts in the CGE model, which is calibrated according to the latest national 
account figures from Statistics Denmark. Based on these figures, the model provides 
an energy service demand output, which is fed into TIMES-DK, which then performs 
its optimisation and feeds the result back into the CGE model, which reacts by 
adjusting prices and, consequently, the entire macroeconomic output from total 
production and energy services to unemployment and export. The new demand is 
then fed into TIMES-DK and so on. Termansen refers to a similar Swedish model 
when he states that it will take three to four iterations before convergence is 
established23. 
 
Basically, IntERACT is designed to calculate the ‘costs’ of a transition to a zero-
carbon future, which is calculated by means of a comparison between IntERACT 
scenarios and the Energy Agency’s baseline forecast [Termansen]. The deviation 
between the baseline projection and the scenarios determines the overall future 
societal costs (or benefits) in terms of GDP. This procedure is indicative of a very 
common approach to articulating the future costs to society of sustainable energy 
transitions (or any other economic policy proposal for that matter). The procedure is 
not well know to the public and the end result is often communicated as if it was 
scientific fact, which reveals how mainstream macroeconomic articulations are so 
ingrained in economic policy that they have become solid reality which is hardly ever 
contested. This is a good example of ‘successful’ issue articulation.  
 
                                            
22 The quotation marks are inserted to stress that what is considered the lowest cost depends on the 
context and the regime of valuation in use. 
23 Convergence means that the difference between output t and t_1 remains within a predefined 
numerical interval. 
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Comparing IntERACT with the two previously described models reveals a stronger 
resemblance to the IFIAS models than EMMA. As was the case with the IFIAS 
models, IntERACT also consists of a combination of a CGE model and a technical 
energy systems model. However, the IFIAS models were not designed to investigate 
feedbacks, and its energy systems model was not based on linear optimisation. 
Furthermore, the range of research questions which characterised the IFIAS project 
also deviated from IntERACT. Thus, the main focus of the IFIAS project was energy 
security and independence from the Middle East regarding oil, while the cost of a 
renewable energy transition is the main focus of IntERACT.  
 
5.3.1 The Climate Commission  
Since the publication of Energy 21, Denmark has not seen any new official energy 
imaginaries. However, in 2010, the aforementioned Climate Commission published 
the results of its study (based on several models, two of which was ADAM and a 
model similar to IntERACT) of the possibility of achieving a fossil-free energy future 
in Denmark. More precisely, the research question was as follows: is it possible for 
Denmark to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by more than 80 per cent by 2050? 
(Klimakommissionen 2010b:18). The commission concluded: yes it is possible, and 
the ‘costs’ will be modest; an uplifting imaginary, but in my view, it has not been as 
strong and influential as the authors probably hoped it would be.  
 
What the authors actually mean by costs in the report is the welfare loss induced by 
higher energy prices (Klimakommissionen 2010b:79), where welfare loss simply 
means negative effects on GDP (the mainstream macroeconomic proxy for societal 
welfare). Thus, the welfare aspects of the energy transition were assessed by means of 
GDP, the traditionalist’s value metric par excellence. Once again, this reveals the 
ability of the economic growth imperative to determine and assess energy policy 
imaginaries. This imperative is further highlighted by the fact that the commission’s 
mandate, decided by government, explicitly stated that the commission had to take 
continued high economic growth rates as a given (Klimakommissionen 2010a:16). 
Thus, economic growth entered the imaginary policy space and constrained it by 
only allowing growth imaginaries.  
 
7. Discussion 
The empirical focus of this article is macroeconomic modelling involved in 
articulations of Danish energy policy imaginaries. An important observation in this 
regard is that MEM articulations are political and have concrete policy implications. 
An example of this is their ability to provide calculations for drafting energy policy 
scenarios, which define a spectrum of possible energy futures for politicians to discuss 
and decide upon. In this respect, MEM is part of determining what can be thought of, 
planned and chosen regarding the future energy system.  
 
An important factor in these choices is the economic growth imperative, which must 
be preserved thereby ruling out any possible energy futures which violate this rule. 
This is indicative of the reciprocity of policy and modelling, where the former sets 
the conditions for the latter with the latter then producing results which determine 
the imaginary scope of the former. To describe this reciprocity, I show how 
concerned publics use instruments of enquiry such as national accounting and 
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macroeconomic models in order to articulate troubling situations, turn them into 
well-defined problems and, finally, propose energy policy imaginaries (in the form of 
energy plans).   
 
This leads back to the celestial bodies and satellites mentioned in the introduction 
and the epistemic divide between mainstream macroeconomics and inquiry which 
takes a thermodynamics perspective on energy systems (Illum & Gibson 2006). In 
the preceding story, the role of celestial body was always played by a macroeconomic 
model (in most cases ADAM), which secured the top priority of traditionalist 
concerns such as economic growth, unemployment and the public balance of 
payments. This choice meant that energy system futures became subordinate to these 
concerns and had to conform to the demands of a growing economy, rendering no-
growth energy system futures more or less unthinkable. Thus, the choice of celestial 
body is a political choice, which determines the range of energy policy imaginaries.  
 
Conversely, choosing exergy as the celestial body changes the conditions for policy 
imaginaries and renders economic growth a subordinate of thermodynamic forces 
and concerns. This leads to precaution, serious attention to the environmental 
consequences of energy consumption and calls for energy system futures determined 
not first and foremost by the need for economic growth, but a deeper understanding 
of the thermodynamic aspects of energy systems (Illum & Gibson 2006). More 
practically, such an approach emphasises collective energy system planning and 
allows for zero-carbon energy scenarios based not only on renewable energy and 
efficiency improvements, but also on voluntary simplicity (Heikkinen 2015). Thus, 
such approaches contribute to the expansion of energy policy imaginaries and make 
alternative approaches to energy transitions thinkable. However, due to a non-
existent anchoring in traditionalist strongholds such as the Ministry of Finance, 
exergy imaginaries are not very likely (not yet at least) to determine any concrete 
energy policy decisions.  
 
8. Conclusion  
In the preceding, a historical case for the promotion of two interconnected arguments 
– one theoretical and one empirical – has been presented. The first argument regards 
issues, publics and imaginaries as a nexus for energy policy, while the latter concerns 
the dominant role of economic growth in the articulation of energy imaginaries. A 
recurring pattern in the story is the emergence of issues, which publics respond to by 
means of articulation of these issues and imaginaries of how to deal with them. In this 
sense, energy policy can be seen as a battle of imaginaries, where environmentalists 
have achieved some significant victories over the years, yet have never been able to 
seriously challenge the dominance of economic growth over the imaginary space of 
energy system futures.  
 
The answer to the research question proposed in the introduction is that  
macroeconomic energy modelling has been developed as an instrument for energy 
policy in Denmark as a result of a traditionalist public responding to energy issues in 
the need for imaginaries of the future energy system. Gradually, some of the concerns 
of another public – the environmentalists – entered the traditionalist policy agenda, 
which led to an expansion of modelling capabilities in relation to environmental 
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detail. Ever since the early 1970s, economic growth has played a key role in the 
energy imaginaries by being incorporated as a basic precondition provided by the 
Danish Ministry of Finance.  
 
The lesson to learn from it all is that macroeconomic modelling can be used as a 
powerful articulator of issues and imaginaries, and is, hence, to be understood as an 
effective instrument for constructing the realities confronting governmental 
decision-makers and the wider public. Thus, if someone wishes to change the world 
of economic policy, changing the models and the imaginaries they articulate might be 
a good place to start.     
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Appendix 1: interviewees and seminars  
 
Interviewees   
− Andersen, Frits M.; professor of economics, Technical University of Denmark, Risø. 
Involved in the development of several macroeconomic models for energy and 
environmental analysis since the late 1970s.  
− Bjørnholm, Sven; senior lecturer of physics (retired), the Niels Bohr Institute, 
Copenhagen. Day-to-day head of the Danish IFIAS group from 1973 to 1976.  
− Blegaa, Sussanne; high school teacher (retired). During the 1970s employed at Technical 
University of Denmark. Co-author of the first alternative Danish energy plan. 
− Grinderslev, Dorte; at the time of the interview, consultant at The Danish Economic 
Councils. Currently, chief consultant at The Danish Council on Climate Change. 
Previously, also consultant in the macroeconomic modelling group at Statistics Denmark. 
− Holm, Anders; senior lecturer of physics (retired), the Niels Bohr Institute, Copenhagen. 
Member of the IFIAS group in charge of coding and programming from 1973 to 1976.   
− Holten-Andersen, John; senior lecturer in engineering (emeritus), Aalborg University 
Copenhagen. Previously, head of the secretariat of the Danish Nature Council.  
− Jespersen, Jesper; professor of economics, Roskilde University.  
− Josephsen, Lars; consultant (retired), the Danish Ministry of Energy and Environment. 
Co-founder of the Danish environmental NGO NOAH. Previously, also involved in some 
of the IFIAS publications.   
− Knudsen, Dan; chief consultant in the macroeconomic modelling group at Statistics 
Denmark.  
− Meyer, Niels I.; professor of physics (emeritus), Technical University of Denmark. Key 
figure in the Danish alternative energy transition since the 1970s.  
− Morthorst, Poul E.; professor of economics, head of the systems analysis division at 
Technical University of Denmark, Risø. Involved in the development of several 
macroeconomic models for energy and environmental analysis since the late 1970s.  
− Nørgaard, Jørgen; senior lecturer in physics and engineering (emeritus), Technical 
University of Denmark. 
− Pedersen, Sigurd L.; chief consultant, the Danish Energy Agency. 
− Thomsen, Thomas; economist, self-employed developer of solution algorithms for 
macroeconomic models. 
− Werner, Morten; consultant in the macro-policy centre at the Danish Ministry of Finance.  
 
Seminars  
− Multi-sector models, Danish Energy Agency, Copenhagen, Denmark, March 20, 2015. 
The seminar consisted of several presentations. I only refer to the presentation about 
IntERACT by Termansen, Lars B., specialist consultant, the Danish Energy Agency. 
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To model or not to model - that is the question 
(but is it an epistemic one?) 
 
Introduction 
Since the financial crash in 2008 and the long lasting subsequent period of economic 
crisis, it has become increasingly common to speak of the current global state of 
affairs as one of multiple crises, where climate change, income inequality, high 
unemployment rates and widespread ecological degradation act in concert with 
financial volatility and low economic growth rates to create a complex situation of 
threat and uncertainty. This situation presents a hitherto unseen challenge to the 
global community of nation states and their governments and calls for novel 
approaches to economic policy. As the main academic discipline of economic policy, 
macroeconomics is tightly connected to this challenge and can be considered a 
central battlefield for academics in favour of radical economic policy changes.   
 
Traditionally, macroeconomics concerns the economies of nation states and consists, 
for a large part, of theorising over forces which cause national accounting variables, 
such as the gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment and the public balance, to 
change. The history of the modern theory of such causal relationships dates back to 
the Great Depression and the work of Keynes (Jespersen 2007), although, at present, 
Keynes’s ideas have, for the most part, been replaced by neoclassical approaches, 
which now constitute the main methodological basis and set the tone for mainstream 
macroeconomics.  
 
Yet, more recently, the aforementioned conglomerate of crises has lead to an 
increasing interest in heterodox schools of economic thought, including post-
Keynesian economics and the development of an ecological macroeconomics, better 
suited to the multiple crises of the 21st century (Jackson et al. 2015). With this 
revitalisation of heterodox approaches, macroeconomics has become an increasingly 
contested issue, which different economic schools struggle to define according to 
their respective worldviews and methodological frameworks. A key part of this 
struggle is fought by means of models, and in recognition of this circumstance, this 
working paper focuses on macroeconomic models and modelling as tools for 
engaging with the multiple crises of our age from an economic policy perspective.   
 
Ecological macroeconomics is rooted in the wider, interdisciplinary field of ecological 
economics and can be seen as an attempt to situate the traditional concerns of 
macroeconomics in an ecological framework, which conceptualises economies as 
metabolic organisms, the growth of which is constrained by biophysical limits. While 
this basic ontology dates back to the early history of ecological economics (Røpke 
2004), attempts to develop a consistent macroeconomic framework rooted in this 
ontology are more recent and have been especially intensified since the financial 
crash in 2008 (Berg et al. 2015, Jackson et al. 2015, Naqvi 2015).  
 
Given the complexity of the issue, reducing ecological macroeconomics to a few key 
elements is not straight forward, yet in my view, the basic objective of ecological 
macroeconomics is to integrate traditional macroeconomic concerns into an 
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ecological framework, which acknowledges biophysical limits to economic growth 
(Berg et al. 2015). In line with this, a key issue for ecological macroeconomics is how 
to achieve a stable non-growing economy (in material terms) with high levels of 
employment and equity and low levels of pollution and resource consumption 
(Jackson et al. 2015). This focus demands special attention be paid to the account of 
the biophysical scale of economies, fair distribution of income and wealth, but also to 
the design of a stable financial system to the benefit of the wider public and the quest 
for a sustainable transition.  
 
Not least in order to handle the complexity and interconnectedness of such problems 
in a consistent manner, ecological macroeconomists have turned to the building of 
computational macroeconomic models capable of incorporating a wide range of 
environmental, financial and social aspects in different macroeconomic modelling 
frameworks (Berg et al. 2015, Jackson et al. 2015). Such attempts have also been 
carried out by several mainstream economic model builders since the early 1970s. 
These endeavours have resulted in the creation of a vast amount of models and have 
led me to propose the existence of a very wide spectrum of macroeconomic models 
for sustainability (MMS).  
 
Several model families on the mainstream side of this spectrum have been surveyed 
and documented (Bhattacharyya 1996, Bergman 2005, Krey 2014), while an attempt 
to survey the growth-sceptical side is also currently underway (Bunse & O’Neill in 
progress). Nonetheless, to my knowledge, no one has yet been crazy enough to 
engage in a survey which cuts across mainstream and growth sceptical approaches. 
This was my initial intention, and the scattered results of this ambition are what I 
present in the following chapters.  
 
The working paper can be seen as some preliminary steps in the direction of drafting 
a journal article, which means that it is not organised as a traditional research article, 
but as a selection of thematic chapters treating a host of different topics in relation to 
MMS. Chapter 1 concerns the scope of MMS and discusses the most common 
modelling methodologies and a few examples of applications. Chapter 2 provides a 
brief historical overview of MMS. Chapter 3 presents an overview of critical issues in 
relation to pro-growth MMS. Chapter 4 tries to challenge MMS and asks questions 
regarding the purpose and soundness of this type of modelling, while Chapter 5 
briefly summarises.  
 
The empirical basis of the paper consists of scholarly literature, interviews and 
seminars. When I refer to an interview, this is indicated by a square bracket […]. To 
see the institutional affiliation of the interviewees and a list of relevant seminars, the 
reader can consult the list of data material presented in appendix 1 of the thesis.   
 
In the title of this paper, I ask whether the question ‘to model or not to model’ is an 
epistemic question. By this I refer to the dichotomy between a domain of objective 
science on the one side, and a value-laden domain of politics on the other, where 
macroeconomic modelling often appears to belong to the former. By asking this 
question, I try to challenge the perception of macroeconomic modelling as a ‘pure’ 
epistemic discipline which is merely interested in knowledge and discovering 
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economic ‘truths’. One of my approaches in this regard is to use the concept of 
‘politics as world making’ (Brown 2015 ), which is presented in the theory chapter of 
the general introduction to the thesis, as a means of interpreting macroeconomic 
models as scientific technologies which engage in politics by formatting economic 
realities.  
 
Chapter 1: the spectrum   
The intention of this working paper is to provide useful perspectives on the role of 
computational modelling in the development of ecological macroeconomics and the 
quest for a sustainable transition. A part of this intention concerns the wish to obtain 
some sort of comprehensive overview of existing computational models that try to 
incorporate macroeconomic concerns and sustainability issues in various modelling 
frameworks. One way to approach the provisioning of such an overview is to define 
an overall spectrum of models and then to divide it into (overlapping) segments 
according to different criteria. The overall spectrum of models which is investigated 
in this paper is computational macroeconomic models for sustainability (MMS)1, where the 
prefix ‘computational’ is implicit. Thus, in order for a model to belong to the MMS 
spectrum, it has to fulfil three criteria: computational, macroeconomic, and for 
sustainability.  
 
The first criterion implies that the models under investigation can be defined as 
equations that are solved using a computer, thus providing numerical results, which 
are often presented in tables and visualised in various graphs. Whether the 
computational model is estimated or calibrated to actual country-specific, regional or 
global data is not crucial, which means that numerical results may equally well be 
based on ‘synthetic’ data without any reference to specific geographical locations just 
as they may concern actual countries or regions and be based on data from these 
locations. Adding to this, it should be mentioned that the computational models 
investigated here are also often presented in the form of visual diagrams explaining 
the causal relations and flows between variables in the model. 
 
The second criterion means that in order for a model to belong to the spectrum it has 
to incorporate national accounting entities such as unemployment, balance of 
payment and total production. How many of these variables and how they are 
incorporated varies, but they have to be present because I am interested in models 
that try to integrate the core concerns of economic policy and the environmental 
problems confronting today’s global community, which can not be ignored any 
longer.  
 
This leads to the third criterion –sustainability – which means that the models have 
to have some sort of environmental or ecological focus and, hence, incorporate one or 
more environmental variables such as energy, emissions of pollutants, or material 
flows. In the case of ecological macroeconomics, the models often incorporate ‘social’ 
parameters, such as inequality and the distribution of income, as sustainability 
                                            
1 I also sometimes use MMS to signify computational macroeconomic modelling for sustainability. When 
doing so, I wish to highlight MMS as a spectrum of practices or activities.  
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parameters. However, such parameters do not need to appear in order for a model to 
qualify as being ‘for sustainability’ in this review.  
 
Description of the spectrum 
Before proceeding with an explanation of some of the properties of the MMS 
spectrum, it must be stressed that it is an intellectual construct devised with the 
purpose of defining a research object. This is achieved by identifying and grouping 
models and modelling methodologies used in research and policy regarding 
macroeconomics and sustainability.  
 
The MMS spectrum is a wide selection of models which can be grouped in different 
segments and methodological families, a description of which could beneficially be 
initiated with a few historical considerations. Since its inception in the early 1970s 
(more about this in the following chapter), MMS has been carried out by means of 
mainstream macroeconomic methods, especially the neoclassical general equilibrium 
approach, and the neoclassical synthesis2 framework named macroeconometric 
modelling. Due to this reliance on mainstream methodologies, MMS is dominated by 
GDP and a strong focus on economic growth. This means that all environmental 
issues and concerns incorporated in mainstream MMS are adapted to an overall GDP 
growth framework. This tradition, however, has been challenged more recently by 
model builders within the ecological macroeconomics research community. Thus, 
since 2007, a new family of models has entered the scene and established a small 
niche of growth sceptical models within the MMS spectrum. To begin with, MMS 
can, thus, be crudely divided into a pro-growth regime and post-growth niche, where 
the former includes all modelling families to which GDP is the fundamental value 
metric, and hence the backbone of the calculation of societal costs and benefits, while 
the latter is sceptical of GDP and acknowledges biophysical limits to economic 
growth (Berg et al. 2015).  
 
Within these two segments, models have been built for multiple purposes using a 
wide range of methodologies, such that the two segments can again be divided into 
overlapping sub-groups according to methodologies and research interests. 
Complicating things further, models all across the spectrum share multiple modelling 
tools. Exemplifying this, production functions, input-output (IO) tables, and social 
accounting matrices (SAM) are deployed widely across the pro-growth/post-growth 
boundary. Furthermore, MMS models depend on statistical environmental 
accounting in order to incorporate aspects such as energy, materials and emissions. 
So called environmentally extended IO tables are widely used for this purpose in pro-
growth as well as post-growth models. Another tool for incorporating energy and 
materials in the models is the production function, which can be designed to do this 
in various ways (Thomsen 2014, Berg et al. 2015).  
 
The preceding remarks highlight the complexity of the spectrum, which is not easily 
dealt with. Nonetheless, with the purpose of providing some sort of insight, I now 
                                            
2 For a brief explanation of this concept, see the theory section of the general introduction to this 
thesis. 
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proceed to present some of the most salient overall modelling methodologies applied 
in MMS and a few examples of applications.  
 
Methodologies 
Having surveyed what I believe to be a fairly representative selection of the MMS 
modelling literature, I am inclined to conclude that the most important 
methodological concepts to take into consideration in a review of MMS are: general 
equilibrium (GE), welfare optimisation, macroeconometrics (ME), system dynamics (SD), 
stock flow consistency (SFC), and agent-based modelling (ABM).  
 
GE and welfare optimisation are neoclassical methods mostly deployed in pro-
growth MMS. ME is widespread and used by pro-growth and post-growth modellers 
alike, while SFC and SD are more or less only used in post-growth MMS. Finally, 
ABM seems to be attractive to a very wide range of modellers, from systems ecology 
to finance, however, it has not yet gained a strong foothold in MMS, although its 
potential for macroeconomic modelling has been emphasised by several authors 
(Farmer & Foley 2009, Seppecher 2012, Gräbner 2014) [Willis]. In the following, I 
very briefly introduce the methodologies sorted into three categories: pro-growth, 
shared, and post-growth methods. ABM is finally treated in a section of its own because 
it does not fit into any of these categories.    
 
Pro-growth methods 
 
General equilibrium  
A GE model is one in which all markets clear in equilibrium. This means that the 
equations of the model are constructed in such a way that there will always exist at 
least one set of prices at which all markets clear, meaning that supply equals demand 
on all markets simultaneously (Bhattacharyya 1996, Bergman 2005, Stanton et al. 
2009). More concretely, GE models try to mimic market interactions between 
consumers and producers and portray the “whole” economy as a set of aggregate 
sectors described as markets for: goods, services, capital and labour (Löschel 2002). 
Hence, GE models are often referred to as multi-sector models, as opposed to partial 
equilibrium models, which portray one sector or a sub-set of sectors of the entire 
economy.  
 
When GE models are calibrated to specific data and solved on a computer, they are 
often referred to as computable (CGE)3. CGEs can be designed for a single country, a 
region or a global setting and focus on the so-called ‘real’ side of the economy, which 
means that they do not incorporate markets for financial assets. This choice is 
justified by the theoretical assumption that money is neutral, i.e. that money per se 
has no effect on the economy (Gräbner 2014).  
 
The GE methodology depends heavily on a set of a priori assumptions about 
economic agents and markets. Probably the most important of these is the existence 
                                            
3 It should be mentioned that the most dominant approach to GE-modelling today is dynamic 
stochastic GE (DSGE) (Gräbner 2014). I, however, do not cover this methodology since it is not 
widely used for addressing environmental and sustainability issues. 
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of a representative agent, who optimises utility (on the demand side) and profits (on 
the supply side) (Termansen & Gersfelt 2013). To do so, the agent needs to be 
rational, meaning that he has a clear ordering of preferences and always knows the 
outcome (at least probabilistically) of his choices (Hodgson 1988).  
 
As mentioned, there are many different approaches to CGE and several ways of 
applying the method to specific data. The most frequently used approach is 
calibration, which means that a specially drafted data set, a SAM, for a given year is 
assumed to be the expression of a general equilibrium situation, where supply equals 
demand on all markets. The model is then calibrated such that its GE solution equals 
the SAM entries. When this has been achieved, experiments can be conducted by 
exogenously changing parameters and solving the equations to achieve new 
equilibria (Gräbner 2014). In order to perform such experiments, it is common to 
make a so-called business as usual (BAU) scenario, against which alternative 
exogenous settings can be tested. Such alternatives are often referred to as counter-
factual, assigning a certain factual status to the BAU scenario.  
 
CGE modellers distinguish between static, quasi-static and dynamic approaches. 
These distinctions all concern the time dimension of the models. A static model is 
solved for one equilibrium representing one time step. Depending on the 
assumptions, this step could be interpreted as one year or a period of years. A quasi-
static model is solved for a series of consecutive equilibria, each representing a time 
step, where the first equilibrium is used as the initial condition for taking the next 
step and so on (Krey 2014). The fully dynamic approach attempts to endogenise time 
steps by making further assumptions about the forward-looking behaviour of 
households and firms, and by endogenising stock accumulation (Bergman 2005).  
 
To conclude, it should be emphasised that CGE is a deterministic modelling 
approach, which portrays the economy and economic transactions by means of 
mechanistic market interactions. The main focus of CGE is equilibrium allocation 
and economic growth, and thus, CGEs are not built to handle business cycles or 
disequilibrium phenomena (Bergman 2005).  
 
Application of GE in MMS 
GE is probably the most widely used methodology in MMS, and this methodology 
has been applied in an increasing number of studies investigating economy-energy-
environment relations since the1990s (Böhringer & Löschel 2006). Thus, the two 
most common applications of GE in MMS have so far been to couple CGE models to 
energy systems models or climate models, with the purpose of investigating 
problems such as: the costs of greenhouse gas abatement, the costs of environmental 
policy measures, the cost of climate change, and the connections between energy 
system developments and climate outcomes. In relation to costs, it should be 
mentioned that, in the GE methodology, cost is always calculated in terms of GDP, 
such that a cost is defined as a loss of GDP. The investigation of economy-energy-
environment relations and research interests is often referred to as sustainability 
impact assessment (SIA) or integrated assessment modelling (IAM), in which the GE 
methodology is a very widespread approach.  
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Furthermore, since the early days of MMS, more and more sector-models, such as 
agriculture, fishery, forestry and transport models, have been coupled to CGEs. The 
purpose in these cases is very often to assess the impacts of policies regarding a 
single sector on the rest of the economy, but also how wider economic changes affect 
a single sector (Löschel 2002). 
 
Well-known examples of GE applied in MMS are: the GEM-E3 model used by the 
European Commission and the GREEN model developed by the OECD (Næss-
Schmidt et al. 2013).  
 
Welfare optimisation  
As mentioned, CGE and welfare optimisation are closely related, not least since they 
both rely on the idea of utility maximisation and on GDP as an aggregate welfare 
metric. However, in comparison with GE models, welfare optimisation models tend 
to be less specific in terms of markets and smaller in terms of equations. In fact, a 
welfare optimisation model is often simply a so-called economic growth model 
inspired by scholars such as Solow and Ramsey.   
 
The ethical basis of welfare optimisation is the concept of utility, which, according to 
neoclassical theory, can be measured for all individuals and then aggregated into 
societal utility or social welfare. More practically, this is done by optimising an 
aggregate economic objective function, which “refers to economic well-being (or 
utility) associated with a path of consumption” (Nordhaus & Sztorc 2013:6). 
Although consumption might include non-market goods, it is closely related to 
economic output measured by GDP, such that a reduction in GDP is equivalent to a 
reduction in consumption and, hence, a loss of welfare.   
 
Application of welfare optimisation in MMS 
As was the case for GE, welfare optimisation is an important method in IAM, where 
it can be applied by connecting a social welfare function to a climate model with the 
purpose of calculating the optimal consumption path. Given the output from the 
climate model, the welfare optimisation might imply a decrease in consumption at 
present in order to achieve emissions reductions, so that harmful climate change does 
not diminish future consumption. In order for such a calculation to be meaningful, it 
is necessary to assume that countries, regions or the entire world (depending on the 
analytical scope) have well-defined preferences, so that different paths of aggregate 
consumption can be ranked and the optimal path can be chosen (Nordhaus & Sztorc 
2013:6).   
 
Well-known examples of welfare optimisation models in MMS are: DICE and RICE 
developed by Nordhaus, and WHITCH, a growth model developed by Fondazione 
Eni Enrico Mattei (Næss-Schmidt et al. 2013).   
 
Shared methods  
 
Macroeconometrics  
Macroeconometrics refers to both a certain approach to macroeconomic modelling 
and to a set of statistical techniques for estimating parameters and systems of 
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equations, where the latter is used as a tool to draft the former. Macroeconomectric 
modelling is the earliest example of computable macroeconomic modelling and dates 
back to the interwar period, when Tinbergen drafted the first such model for the 
Dutch economy (Zalm 2000). With the development of computer science, 
macroeconometric models became easier to solve, grew bigger and gained influence 
on economic policy (Zalm 2000).  
 
Macroeconometric modelling can be considered part of the neoclassical synthesis, 
which is an attempt to integrate aspects of Keynesian economics into the neoclassical 
framework (Jespersen 2007). Very briefly, this means that macroeconometric models 
are short or medium-term models built to investigate business cycles and the 
adjustment to a long-term general equilibrium. In accordance with the synthesis, 
macroeconometric models are demand driven as opposed to GE models, which are 
considered to be supply driven. Macroeconometric models are often labelled 
empirical models, which means that macroeconometric techniques have been applied 
to estimate the parameters of theoretical equations using time series of specific 
countries.  This sort of estimation has, by the way, also been applied in several GE 
models (Bhattacharyya 1996). 
 
Application of Macroeconometrics in MMS 
Since the early 1970s, macroeconometric models and techniques have been applied in 
multiple MMS models. One common application in this regard has been to couple 
one or more so-called ‘satellite models’ to a macroeconometric model in order to 
calculate energy demand and various emissions, such as CO2, SO2, NOx, and waste, 
associated with a certain level of future economic growth (Andersen & Trier 1995). 
Exemplifying this type of application, one could mention the Danish model EMMA 
(the history of which is told in Article 4 of this thesis), which is a good and rather 
elaborate example of this type of modelling (Andersen et al. 1998).  
 
More recently, macroeconometrics has also been deployed by post-growth modellers, 
such as Victor & Jackson, who have incorporated the Keynesian demand driven 
approach and used econometric estimation techniques in models such as LowGrow 
and SIGMA (Victor & Rosenbluth 2007, Jackson et al. 2015).  
 
Post-growth methods  
 
Stock-flow consistency  
SFC is a macroeconomic modelling framework built upon a very detailed financial 
accounting method, which dates back to the mid-twentieth century and, more 
recently, has been adopted and elaborated on by the Post-Keynesian school of 
economics (Caverzasi & Godin 2015). The fundamental concept of SFC is that any 
financial asset is somebody else’s liability, which means that a matrix of financial 
transaction flows for the entire economy can be devised by accounting for the 
aggregate assets and liabilities of all sectors (Berg et al. 2015). This matrix puts extra 
constraints on the possible macroeconomic modelling outputs and expands the 
consistency inherent in national accounting to the financial side of the economy 
(Berg et al. 2015). According to Berg et al., SFC makes macroeconomic models 
behave differently and brings them closer to the institutional realities of modern 
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monetary systems. In relation to SFC, it ought to be mentioned that it can also be 
applied in neoclassical modelling frameworks (Berg et al. 2015), however, this is not 
very common, and I have not discovered any examples of this in pro-growth MMS.   
 
Application of SFC in MMS 
When applied in MMS, SFC has been used by post-growth modellers to obtain a 
consistent account of the financial aspect of the economy in post-growth models. 
Exemplifying this, SFC has been incorporated in models such as FALSTAF, EcoGro, 
and an unnamed model by Berg et al. (Jackson & Victor 2015, Naqvi 2015, Berg et al. 
2015). In these studies, FALSTAF was calibrated using empirical data from Canada 
and the UK (Jackson & Victor 2015), EcoGro was calibrated to model the EU region 
using publicly available databases or literature (Naqvi 2015), while Berg et al. did not 
calibrate the model to any particular country or region, thus achieving more 
theoretical simulations (Berg et al. 2015). FALSTAF has been used to investigate 
whether credit creates a growth imperative; EcoGro has been used to perform post-
growth policy assessments using a scenario approach, while Berg et al.’s model was 
used for basic research concerning the incorporation of biophysics, real economy and 
finance in one modelling framework (Berg et al. 2015).  
 
System dynamics 
SD is a very simple approach to thinking about and modelling dynamic processes, 
which takes its point of departure in stocks and flows, and the feedback loops 
between them (Yamaguchi 2013). Due to its very basic building blocks, the SD 
methodology can just as well be applied in ecosystem analysis as economic analysis 
since stocks and flows play key roles in both. Stocks and flows of natural resources, 
material goods or financial assets are the same in this methodology, however, the big 
challenge lies in determining the causal relations and feedback loops between them. 
This is where theory enters the discussion, and the SD methodology is definitely 
sensitive and flexible in the direction of many different theoretical inclinations.  
 
Similar to the GE methodology, SD is a deterministic framework based on cause-
effect relationships, yet in a far more multifaceted manner, which allows for so-called 
chaotic dynamics, where equilibrium states are not considered universal laws, but 
more or less stable attractors in a chaotic system (Yamaguchi 2013). To exemplify 
this, Yamaguchi shows, by means of numerical simulations, how chaotic features can 
emerge from basic market transactions, thus debunking the GE assumption of 
neoclassical macroeconomics (Yamaguchi 2013).     
 
Application of SD in MMS 
One of the most famous modelling applications of SD is the World3 model, which 
was used to draft the Limits to Growth scenarios (Meadows 1972). However, due to 
its lack of macroeconomic variables, this model cannot be considered an actual MMS. 
Hence, in order to find examples of SD applications in MMS, one has to turn to 
Victor’s LowGrow model and Jackson & Victor’s models, where SD has been used as 
a framework for modelling Keynesian inspired, demand driven macroeconomic 
dynamics (Victor & Rosenbluth 2007, Jackson et al. 2015). 
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Although I have labelled SD a post-growth methodology almost solely deployed in 
this segment of MMS, it ought to be mentioned that SD has in fact also been applied 
in a model used for pro-growth purposes. By this, I refer to the T21 model, which 
was built using the SD methodology and has been deployed by UNEP to draft its 
green growth scenarios (UNEP 2011).   
 
Agent-based modelling  
The basic building blocks of ABM are agents and and their environment, where the 
agents are equipped with a host of behavioural rules determining how they respond 
to their environment and to other agents. This combined focus on both individual 
behaviour and environment makes ABM appealing to neoclassical method 
individualists as well as systems ecology modellers. However, the computational 
aspect of ABM is quite different from all other modelling methodologies mentioned 
so far. One way to explain this difference is to emphasise the non-causality of ABM, 
which means that an ABM is not based on causal equations, which can be solved 
numerically (Seppecher 2012). Instead, it is a set of algorithms which iteratively 
perform the choices and actions of a number of agents. This, however, does not mean 
that ABM is theory free since the behavioural rules, which are coded into the 
algorithms, are often based on various theories, such that the agents might be able to 
perform optimisation in accordance with neoclassical assumptions for instance.  
 
One of the compelling features of ABM is its ability to produce emergent ‘macro’ 
dynamics (changes of aggregate variables over time), which is not predefined by any 
macro-theory. Such aggregate dynamics can be coded to influence individual agents 
in various ways, which induces complex interactions between agents and their 
‘macro’ environment. Similar to this, Farmer & Foley (2009) explain how ABM can 
be seen as a methodology in which decision makers and institutions interact through 
prescribed rules. In its capacity to produce emergent un-prescribed dynamics, ABM 
presents a radical alternative to the GE methodology, where explanatory and 
predictive laws are imposed from the beginning and assumed to be time and space 
invariant (Gräbner 2014).  
 
As economists with a predilection for ABM, Farmer & Foley (2009) highlight how 
this modelling approach can handle the non-linearity and complexity of financial 
bubbles and crashes, which is far beyond the reach of the GE methodology. 
Furthermore, they emphasise how adaptation and learning can be incorporated into 
the ABM framework, thus mimicking the behaviour of observable agents (Farmer & 
Foley 2009).  
 
An interesting question in relation to ABM is whether it is able to transcend method 
individualism or whether it is stuck in a fairly reductionist reliance on the behaviour 
of agents. Given my rather limited knowledge, I must admit that I am simply not 
capable of providing a reliable answer to this question. Yet forced to do so, I would 
observe that, on the one hand, ABM seems utterly dependent on individual 
behaviour, yet on the other hand, it is also able to produce emergent dynamics, which 
is not dictated by any individualistic behavioural rules. Furthermore, ABM seems 
void of institutions and the possibility for institutional change. Yet, if institutions are 
considered to be norms and rules shared and followed by individuals, institutions are, 
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in fact, possible to model in ABM, and if learning is part of the framework, 
institutional change might be modelled by means of agents learning and developing 
new norms and rules.  
 
Application of ABM in MMS 
So far, ABM has been applied in both macroeconomic (Dosi et al. 2010, Seppecher 
2012) and environmental sustainability research (Cao et al. 2009). Yet, I have not 
been able to find an ABM which integrates the two research fields to an extent which 
would grant it the label MMS. One explanation for this might be the degree of 
complexity, which this integration induces. Generally, as models grow bigger, and 
more and more variables and relations are incorporated, the risk of messy outcomes 
that can not be interpreted increases [Knoeri]. This problem seems especially salient 
in ABM, where fairly simple behavioural rules and patterns tend, very quickly, to 
lead to incredibly complex outcomes [Knoeri]. Having said this, I am confident that 
ABM can be used for MMS purposes, and I am aware of modellers who intend to 
pursue these opportunities.  
 
General remarks  
In the preceding, I have tried to sketch the spectrum of MMS and present some of 
the methodologies deployed in this type of modelling. When describing the spectrum, 
I have proposed a division between a pro-growth regime and a post-growth niche, 
where pro-growth is characterised by orthodoxy and method monism in the form of a 
heavy reliance on neoclassical methods and economic growth, while post-growth is 
characterised by heterodoxy and the acknowledgement of biophysical limits to 
economic growth.  
 
Pro-growth MMS has branched out in multiple directions, yet the most important 
applications for this survey are satellite modelling and IAM, where the former 
concerns the calculation of entities such as future energy demand, carbon emissions, 
and waste associated with a specific economic growth path (Andersen & Trier 1995), 
while the later primarily regards the investigation of impacts between the economy 
and the climate system (Stanton et al. 2009). IAM has so far mainly consisted of 
combining one or more different disciplinary models – a CGE and a climate model in 
many cases. More recently, however, authors have promoted so-called hard-linking, 
where the CGE approach is deployed to handle both economy and climate in one 
model (Böhringer & Löscel 2006). Furthermore, pro-growth MMS is characterised 
by a strong emphasis on policy and policy-making, which is often framed as a 
question of finding the policies which lead to the optimal consumption path as a 
trade-off between economic growth and climate change (Nordhaus & Sztorc 2013).  
 
Due to its rather recent emergence, it is not straight forward to pinpoint the 
characteristics of post-growth MMS, although limits to growth and planetary 
boundaries seem to be key terms (Bunse & O’Neill in progress, Berg et al. 2015). 
Thus, one way to interpret these models is to see them as attempts to operationalise 
various aspects of the post-growth agenda in computational macroeconomic models. 
Some modellers have been especially concerned with the achievement of full 
employment in a stable non-growing economy (Victor & Rosenbluth 2007, Jackson et 
al. 2015); others have focused on more basic research concerning how to impose 
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planetary boundaries on a macroeconomic model by integrating several different 
accounting frameworks (Berg et al. 2015), while questions of inequality, interest 
rates, and climate change have also been addressed in post-growth MMS (Chancel et 
al. 2013, Jackson & Victor 2015, 2016). Furthermore, one ambition, which seems to 
recur in several post-growth models, is a desire to integrate real economy, finance, 
and biophysics in one framework. Perhaps the most elaborate example of this 
ambition can be found in Berg et al. (2015). Finally, the question of long-term green 
investments in favour of a sustainable transition is also an important concern of post-
growth modellers (Jackson 2009, Jackson et al. 2015, Berg et al. 2015).   
 
Chapter 2: a short history of MMS 
In the following, I briefly sketch some contours of the historical development of 
MMS focussing on the emergence and accumulation of research questions which 
these models have been deployed to address. The account is divided into two sections 
covering the history of pro-growth and post-growth MMS respectively. The chapter 
ends with a few considerations regarding the importance of the development of 
modern computers for the craft of macroeconomic modelling.  
 
Pro-growth 
Although it is always a challenge to figure out where to begin a historical account, 
1973 presents itself as a good starting point for the history of (pro-growth) MMS. At 
the end of that year, the world witnessed its first oil crisis caused by skyrocketing oil 
prices, which very quickly became a serious threat to the stability and future growth 
of most Western economies (Hogan 2002). As Hogan describes it, the Yom Kippur 
war and the Arab oil embargo of October 1973 had the effect of transforming energy-
policy from an afterthought to a first-order security issue (Hogan 2002). 
Governments wanted answers to the crisis, and, as so many times before and after, 
the discipline of economics quickly got involved.  
 
In the US, the Ford Foundation had, already prior to the oil embargo, initiated a 
major energy-policy project, which focussed on energy conservation and energy 
efficiency (Hogan 2002). As a part of the Ford studies, Hudson & Jorgensen designed 
a GE model for addressing relations between energy-policy and economic growth 
(Hudson & Jorgenson 1974). Due to Hudson & Jorgensen’s work, the USA became 
the first country to command a macroeconomic energy-policy model, however, the 
widespread urgency of the oil crises, soon led to similar modelling projects in several 
other Western countries (Zalm 2000, Urhammer Forthcoming).       
 
These modelling efforts gradually accumulated into a wider family of models, which 
integrated energy issues into mainstream macroeconomic frameworks and had a 
strong focus on energy security and economic growth. The research questions which 
the models were build to answer reflected this focus: how to become independent of oil 
from the Middle East? How much energy will the economy demand in the future? What are 
the impacts of energy prices on economic growth? And how will changes of the energy system 
impact the economy? (Bhattacharyya 1996, Bergman 2005, Urhammer forthcoming).  
 
Following the increasing focus on energy, environmental aspects of energy 
consumption also gradually entered Western policy arenas and made an impact on 
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macroeconomic modelling. Exactly how this happened is not clear to me, yet it is 
unquestionable that the ‘acid rain’ issue, which emerged during the 1980s, played an 
important role in getting environmental issues on the political agenda (Hajer 1995). 
This development gained momentum with the publication of the Brundtland report 
in 1987 and the sustainable development discourse which it disseminated, and during 
the late 1980s and the 1990s, the world saw a significant increase in macroeconomic 
models designed to address economy-environment relations, with carbon emissions 
and climate change being the most prominent issues (Bhattacharyya 1996, Bergman 
2005, Urhammer forthcoming). What especially characterised this second generation 
of MMS was not so much path breaking methodological innovation as it was the 
introduction of other environmental problems, which led to models capable of 
addressing questions such as: how to forecast the emission levels of CO2, SO2 and NOx? 
What are the costs of greenhouse gas abatement? What are the costs of environmental policy 
measures?  (Bhattacharyya 1996, Bergman 2005, Urhammer forthcoming). An 
important example of an environmental policy measure in relation to the last 
question is environmental taxation, which has been the subject of macroeconomic 
modelling for decades.   
 
During the 1990s, the modelling activities became the foundation of a research 
programme often labelled SIA, which includes IAM, the most prominent example of 
which is the DICE model developed by Nordhaus (Nordhaus & Sztorc 2013). The 
development of these programmes included the formulation of new research 
questions, such as: how to estimate the cost of climate change? And how to analyse 
connections between energy system developments and climate outcomes? (Nordhaus & Sztorc 
2013, Krey 2014), which were added to the list of research interests.   
 
In recent years, SIA and the IAM programme have further expanded and have 
gradually integrated more and more sustainability indicators to the framework, thus 
engaging in addressing questions such as: how to expand the integration of sustainability 
indicators? And how to model the joint development of human and natural systems? (Krey 
2014). This latest development is most likely indicative of increasing attention to the 
multiple dimensions and entangled nature of today’s environmental problems.   
 
To put the preceding into perspective, pro-growth MMS and the research questions 
it addresses are characterised by a strong reliance on GDP as a universal value 
metric and on GDP growth as a predicament for a stable economy and a prosperous 
society. This reliance implies a calculation of societal costs based on calculating the 
optimal trade-off between environmental havoc and economic growth.   
 
Post-growth  
Post-growth MMS is rooted in several models such as World3, designed to draft the 
Limits to Growth scenarios (Meadows 1972), Ricker’s GE models, used to 
investigate and confirm the existence of biophysical limits to economic growth 
(Ricker 1997), and Ayers & Warr’s exergy production functions, deployed to 
challenge and reject mainstream economic growth theory (Ayres & Warr 2005). 
However, in spite of these earlier ancestors, I propose the great financial crash, 
culminating in 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, to be the main historical 
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incubator, which spurred the emergence of the still expanding post-growth family of 
MMS.  
 
The crash in 2008 and the subsequent economic policy disruptions led to a new 
opening for growth scepticism and for the formulation of a policy agenda which can 
be labelled ‘prosperity without growth’ (Jackson 2009) and a research programme 
dubbed ecological macroeconomics. This programme often articulates the multiple 
environmental, social, and economical crises of our age as a growth crisis and uses 
MMS as one of the means for paving the path to a post-growth economy. As such, 
post-growth MMS is a radical modelling alternative to pro-growth, not least due to 
its intention to demonstrate the feasibility of a stable, non-growing economy (Victor 
& Rosenbluth 2007).  
 
Since the publication of the LowGrow model in 2007, more and more research 
questions have been added to the post-growth modelling agenda including questions 
such as: how to assess low-, no- and de-growth policies? How to model the transition to a 
sustainable economy that respects planetary boundaries? How to integrate the financial and 
the ‘real’ economy in a model with explicit ecological boundaries? And how to investigate the 
stability of a non-growing economy? (Victor & Rosenbluth 2007, Berg et al. 2015, 
Jackson et al. 2015). Adding to this, some of the post-growth models have also been 
applied to debunk various theoretical propositions, which have challenged the 
feasibility of a non-growing capitalist economy (Jackson & Victor 2015, 2016).  
 
Summarising the short history of post-growth MMS, one could claim that it started 
with a very simple model showing how to manage without growth (Victor & 
Rosenbluth 2007). Then came the financial crash in 2008, which led to increasing 
efforts to incorporate finance into the models (Berg et al. 2015, Jackson et al. 2015). 
Along with this came ambitions to make unified models incorporating real economy, 
finance and biophysical aspects in one framework (Berg et al. 2015), while recently, 
some of these models have been deployed to address and debunk certain theoretical 
propositions by investigating whether credit creates a growth imperative, and 
whether slow growth leads to rising inequality (Jackson & Victor 2015, 2016:32 and 
206).  
 
Finally, it ought to be stressed that post-growth MMS can also be seen as part of a 
critical movement, the roots of which go as far back as the classical economists, some 
of whom also questioned the feasibility of perpetual economic growth (Friman 2002). 
In this respect, post-growth MMS can also be interpreted as an obvious next step for 
the growth critique turning the critique in a more positive direction by asking “can 
we do a better job?”  
 
The significance of digital computers 
To end this chapter, I wish to emphasise the importance of the emergence of digital 
computers for computational macroeconomic modelling. Although the first 
computational macroeconomic model became operational as early as 1936 (Zalm 
2000), the gradual enhancement of digital computing, especially from the 1960s 
onwards, had a tremendous influence on the size, complexity, number and availability 
of models (Bjerkholt 2000, Hogan 2002, van Daalen et al. 2002). Thus, already in the 
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1970s, computers allowed a significant expansion in the number of models by 
providing tools for solving fairly large sets of equations. Yet, as Andersen explains, 
the procedure for solving the models would still involve punch cards, their manual 
transportation to a large (in spatial terms) computer somewhere in town, and a 
couple of days of waiting for the results [Andersen]. This situation, however, 
changed rapidly, and a few decades later, personal computers were able to perform 
far more complex calculations in a split second. Altogether this reveals a historical 
development from computational modelling being a ‘manual’ process of solving 
equations on paper to a situation where software packages and programming 
languages, such as GAMS (for GE), STELLA (for SD), and NetLogo (for ABM), 
provide opportunities for practically anyone to engage in computational modelling. 
This means that, nowadays, models can very easily be shared and adapted to new 
purposes.    
 
Chapter 3: critique  
There exist multiple critical issues in relation to MMS, almost all of which concern 
the pro-growth segment. This bias can be explained by the fact that post-growth 
MMS is a new and fairly marginalised modelling approach, the discussion and 
critique of which is mainly confined to ecological macroeconomic and post-Keynesian 
circles, whereas pro-growth MMS rests on methodologies and worldviews which 
have been subject to criticism for ages. Taking this into consideration, the following 
critical chapter only concerns pro-growth MMS and the methodologies it employs.  
  
To begin with, I wish to divide the critique of pro-growth MMS into two overall 
themes, where the first is the critique of neoclassical methodologies in general, while 
the latter concerns the application of these methodologies in MMS. Although a 
substantial body of literature covering the first theme exists, I still wish to say a few 
words on it, not least due to the fact that the financial collapse in 2008 spurred a 
renewed critique of neoclassical economics. Hence, the next section is devoted to the 
critique of neoclassical methodologies and models, while the subsequent section 
treats the application of these methodologies in MMS.  
 
Critique of neoclassical methodologies  
The critique of neoclassical economics often concerns its highly mechanistic 
framework inspired by classical mechanics. The founding fathers of neoclassical 
economics wanted to devise an economic theory based on rigorous mathematical 
principles and used classical mechanics as an inspirational model for doing so 
(Mirowski 1984). This approach, however, did not go unnoticed with contemporary 
physicists stressing that the subject area of social theory was not quantifiable in the 
same manner as that of classical mechanics and they criticised neoclassical 
economists for using a non-measurable quantum – utility – as the foundation of their 
theory (Mirowski 1984).  
 
Following these nineteenth century physicists, many economists have confronted 
neoclassical economics, not least Keynes, who entirely rejected its basic tenets and 
introduced a fundamentally different approach to economics (Jespersen 2007). 
Likewise institutional economists have attacked the basic assumptions of neoclassical 
economics and elaborately argued why its methodological individualism, based on 
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rational behaviour, utility optimisation and perfect information, is flawed and 
inadequate (Hodgson 1988). In a similar vain, Keen has debunked more or less all the 
basic tenets of neoclassical economics, showing that it is fundamentally unsound 
(Keen 2011).       
 
Thus, the critique of neoclassical economics dates as far back as neoclassical 
economics itself and has persisted ever since. Yet, in spite of this long tradition, 
neoclassical economists hold on to their mechanistic principles, and neoclassical 
economics is probably more influential and widespread than ever. More recently, 
however, the calamitous financial crash in 2008 and the following economic 
upheavals have strengthened the critical positions and revitalised the opposition 
against neoclassical economics. One of the explanations for this renewed momentum 
is that neoclassical economists where not able (or did not want) to use their expertise 
and models to predict the crash in 2008, while various heterodox economists actually 
managed to do so (Bezemer 2010).       
 
The post 2008 crash critique of neoclassical economics has emerged from several 
angles and is not merely forwarded by the usual suspects such as institutional and 
post-Keynesian economists. Thus, a more mainstream critique has also emerged as 
exemplified by Colander et al. (2009), who consider the inability of neoclassical 
economics to understand financial crises to be a systemic failure of the economics 
profession; a failure rooted in an equilibrium methodology, which conveys the view 
that “markets and economies are inherently stable and that they only temporarily get 
off track (Colander et al. 2009:250). Adding to this, Colander et al. argue that 
economists were partly responsible for the financial crisis, first by providing flawed 
models, which have been used by market actors, and second by not seeing it as their 
role to warn the public of potential financial threats (Colander et al. 2009). Along 
these lines, Colander argues that contemporary GE models have acquired an aura of 
policy relevance, which is strongly contradicted by their unrealistic assumptions of 
economic behaviour; assumptions which imply that such models have to be equipped 
with ad hoc additions in order to make them fit empirical data (Colander 2011). 
 
Furthermore, the debunking of neoclassical models has emerged from modelling 
quarters such as econometrics, SD and ABM. From the econometrics side of the 
spectrum, Juselius (2009) argues that econometrics has wrongly been reduced to the 
art of providing models with parameter estimates, without asking the fundamental 
question of whether the models are in fact empirically relevant at all. This has led 
Juselius to propose ‘reality first’ instead of ‘theory first’ as the correct research 
approach in econometrics (Juselius 2009). More concretely, this approach rejects a 
priori acceptance of neoclassical assumptions and encourages economists to: “use a 
strict econometric methodology based on sound statistical principles”,  “assess the 
empirical relevance of influential theory models”, and “learn from data how to best 
modify or change economic theory when needed” (Juselius 2009:1). Following these 
principles, Juselius has devised methods for taking GE models to the data and 
concludes that most of their assumptions do not pass the test (Juselius & Franchi 
2007). Clearly, this is a complicated matter, which I am not able to explain in any 
detail, yet one important result of the ‘reality first’ approach has been to show that 
there is no empirical evidence of the fundamental stable behavioural rules on which 
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the neoclassical models depend. Instead, economic time series are characterised by 
nonstationarity, which implies that there is no long-term parameter stability 
(Juselius 2009).  
 
Taking another methodological approach, Yamaguchi has used the SD methodology 
to build a macroeconomic simulation model able to perform so-called off-equilibrium 
analysis, in which equilibrium prices are not a general rule and markets do not 
necessarily clear (Yamaguchi 2013). In order to do so, Yamaguchi introduces an 
inventory to the classical supply-demand relation to facilitate the possibility of excess 
supply and off-equilibrium market situations (Yamaguchi 2013). Using this basic 
building block, Yamaguchi builds a full macroeconomic model (including finance), 
which exhibits chaotic price dynamics, where general equilibrium is merely a fairly 
unlikely special case of a more general model. In this respect, Yamaguchi’s model is 
better equipped to model observable economic dynamics including financial bubbles 
and busts, and, thus, his model can be seen as an indirect critique of neoclassical 
economics, which works by presenting a ‘better’ model.  
 
In a similar vain, Gräbner explains how ABM can be used to generate chaotic 
economic dynamics in which general equilibrium is merely one rather unlikely stable 
attractor out of multiple possible attractors (Gräbner 2014). This can be done by 
abandoning the axiomatic foundation of neoclassical economics and introducing 
heterogeneous agents, who follow diverse behavioural rules. Thus, also ABM can be 
used to create a positive critique of neoclassical models by providing simulations, 
which present a more general spectrum of market outcomes, thus, more adequately 
mimicking actual macroeconomic dynamics.  
 
Critique of pro-growth MMS 
Now turning to the critique of neoclassical methods applied in MMS, I initially wish 
to present a few general reflections concerning the increasing divergence between 
the problems of our age, epitomised by climate change, and an economics discipline 
stuck in a nineteenth century enlightenment state of mind. Articulating this 
divergence, Nelson uses the phrase ‘enlightenment beta’ to describe the neoclassical 
worldview characterised by a perception of nature as clockwork and a fondness for 
disembodied rationality and mathematical crispness utterly disconnected from the 
“unsafe, interdependent, and uncertain world” we actually live in (Nelson 2013). In 
Nelson’s view, the enlightenment ethos of neoclassical economics is characterised by 
an inadequate vocabulary, misguides our decisions, and is party to preventing the 
immediate climate action which is needed. Thus, the neoclassical conception of costs 
and benefits, and finding the optimal is simply not the right vocabulary in a situation 
where the issue instead concerns how to avoid the worst rather than find the optimal. 
In this respect, neoclassical economics misguides our decisions by asking the wrong 
questions and putting an emphasis on irrelevant issues and prevents a radical 
responses to climate change by prescribing further research instead of immediate 
action (Nelson 2013). Adding to this, Nelson explains how neoclassical economics has 
managed to acquire an ethos of being value-free, objective, and rational, while it is, in 
fact, value-laden, normative and subjective. Recognising this, Nelson argues that 
there is a strong need to redefine the ethical dimension of economics and abandon the 
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narrow neoclassical emphasis on the individual as the fundamental ethical unit 
(Nelson 2013).  
 
Following these brief introductory remarks, I wish to delve into more modelling-
specific issues and present some of the contemporary critique of pro-growth MMS 
especially SIA, IAM and the use of CGE.  
 
Economic growth  
The general critique of GDP as a welfare metric and GDP growth as the source of 
welfare par excellence also applies to pro-growth MMS. Adding to this line of 
critique, Scrieciu (2007) stresses that the CGE approach assumes economic growth to 
be inherently pro-poor, meaning that poor people will always benefit from GDP 
growth. This assumption removes the incentives to address issues of inequality and 
distribution because economic growth is assumed to be beneficial to all (Scrieciu 
2007). Furthermore, there is a common assumption across pro-growth that the world 
will constantly grow richer over time, meaning that future generations will always 
be richer than present generations (Stanton et al. 2009). This assumption has the 
effect of weighing the expenses of future generations, due to climate change for 
instance, lower relative to the present expenses of avoiding such changes because, 
due to this assumption, future generations will be better equipped to pay for the costs 
of climate change than present generations are to pay to avoid them (Stanton et al. 
2009).  
 
Trade-off’s 
In the pro-growth MMS literature, environmental or climate action is regularly 
expressed as a well-defined trade-off between welfare (GDP growth) and 
environmental benefits. According to DeCanio, this is an unrealistic simplification 
inherent in neoclassical maximisation assumptions, which imply that “something 
must be given up in order to gain something else” (DeCanio 1997). Stanton 
exemplifies this by explaining how carbon abatement costs are considered dead-
weight loss, which leads to diminishing welfare. According to Stanton, many costs, 
however, do not fit this pattern (Stanton et al. 2009); abatement costs are likely to 
have unexpected benefits and are widely considered to be a necessity in order to 
avoid catastrophic climate change.  
 
Money and finance 
According to Scrieciu (2007), the CGE methodology assumes money neutrality, 
meaning that money per se has no effect on the economy. This means, roughly 
speaking, that financial aspects of the economy are ignored in CGE (Bergman 2005) 
and in all pro-growth MMS I have examined. Hence, pro-growth models are not 
built to take financial booms and busts into account. As demonstrated by the financial 
crash in 2008, this omission is questionable in a world of interconnected markets, 
where financial crashes can rapidly lead to global economic crises. Furthermore, from 
an ecological economics point of view, it is problematic that such models are not 
capable of accounting for interconnections between finance and the state of 
ecosystems.  
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Technological change  
Technological development is a crucial element of neoclassical growth theory and, 
thus, also of many pro-growth models (Löschel 2002). One central discussion in this 
regard concerns opportunities to endogenise technological change, especially in 
relation to energy and resource efficiency (Löschel 2002). However, regardless of 
many efforts, mainstream models for sustainability assessment still depend on an 
unrealistic description of technological change, which favours future technological 
fixes against rapid large-scale climate abatement in the present (Stanton et al. 2009).   
 
Uncertainty, complexity and catastrophic outcomes  
A large part of the critique of pro-growth MMS regards IAM and addresses the clash 
between hyper-deterministic neoclassical ‘mechanics’ and the uncertainty and 
complexity of climate and environmental sciences (Scrieciu 2007). To illustrate this, 
the neoclassical part of an IAM can be considered a mathematically consistent, yet 
empirically irrelevant model pretending knowledge and precision, which is illusory 
(DeCanio 1997, Pindyck 2013). Such an illusion fits climate modelling frameworks, 
characterised by complex, chaotic features and uncertainty, poorly (Stanton et al. 
2009). Yet, in IAM, neoclassical models dominate other disciplinary models, such 
that models and results are harmonised to fit the neoclassical framework (Scrieciu 
2007). Exemplifying this, Stanton stresses that IAMs seriously underestimate the 
potential dangers, risks and damages of climate change (Stanton et al. 2009) because 
only average climate outcomes are incorporated, and the possibility of catastrophic 
outcomes is ruled out (Stanton et al. 2009, Pindyck 2013).  
 
Long term projections  
The critique of IAM for not taking uncertainty seriously also applies to the practice 
of making extremely long-term projections (sometimes up to 200 to 300 years into 
the future) based on calibrations to one single year (Scrieciu 2007). When these 
models address highly uncertain issues, such as climate sensitivity, which is likely to 
belong to the realm of the ‘unknowable’ (Allen & Frame cited in Pindyck 2013), this 
can fairly be termed a presumptuous approach to modelling future events.  
 
Judgement calls, politics and value choices  
A key critique of the integrated assessment literature regards a prevalent tendency to 
present judgement calls and debatable hypotheses as if they were hard science. The 
result is that IAM has become a modelling practice, which appears to be value free 
and objective, but influential value judgments are in fact buried deep inside computer 
code and mathematical functions (Stanton et al. 2009). This discourages democratic 
debate (Stanton et al. 2009) and turns such models into political black-boxes (Scrieciu 
2007). For policy-models designed to inform processes of policy-making, this seem 
particularly problematic.  
 
Finally, adding an extra point to the list of critical issues, I wish to highlight the lack 
of focus on special interests and political institutions in the pro-growth models (and 
in post-growth for that matter). Thus, these models tend to assume the economy is 
ruled merely by the fundamental laws of economics, while the interests of 
multinational corporations and the influence of governmental institutions are left out 
of the equation. Acknowledging this deficiency, I am, however, not proposing that 
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such forces ought to be built into these models; rather I tend to think that the 
difficulty of doing so might be an argument in favour of scepticism towards the entire 
project of MMS altogether.    
 
Chapter 4: to model or not to model 
In this chapter, I explore what macroeconomic modelling and MMS are used for, 
whether they are useful, and their role in policy-making.  
 
Why do we model? 
Obviously there are multiple reasons for devising models. In natural sciences, for 
instance, models are often drafted with the purpose of understanding and explaining 
observed phenomena. Yet, when it comes to computational macroeconomics, 
modelling is very often directed towards contributing to policy debate and decision-
making, which is most certainly also the case for MMS, particularly the pro-growth 
side of the spectrum. Thus, policy, policy advice, and decision-making can be seen as 
key to pro-growth MMS, as exemplified by Böhringer & Löschel, who explain how 
SIA modelling starts with a policy issue – such as resource depletion, stock pollution, 
or the regulation of energy technologies – which demands some kind of 
epistemological (own phrasing) treatment (Böhringer & Löschel 2006).    
 
Having thus indicated a close link between pro-growth MMS and policy-making, I 
must admit that opening the interface between the two and explaining how 
interactions between them take place more concretely is not straight forward. 
However, it is possible to list a set of well-established general applications of 
computational macroeconomic modelling and MMS, which appear, somehow and 
through multiple channels, to influence economic policy-making. The three most 
common applications are: forecasting, policy assessment and scenario building. 
Forecasting very often concerns the prediction of future GDP, yet it could also be the 
prediction of future energy demand and various emissions for instance [Andersen]. 
Although forecasting is very much a pro-growth discipline, growth opponents have 
also practiced this form of soothsaying, as exemplified by Randers, who has used the 
SD methodology to devise a general prospect of the world in 2052 (Randers 2012).  
 
Traditionally, policy assessment is a discipline that attempts to assess the outcomes 
of a given policy change under the assumption that everything else remains 
unchanged. Such assessments are very often carried out in terms of GDP and, thus, 
explore how a given policy – ecological tax reform for instance – will impact 
economic growth; or in neoclassical terms, whether the policy will impose a ‘welfare 
loss’ on society. This type of application is widespread in pro-growth MMS, where 
the ceteris paribus assumption makes such uses ‘meaningful’. Policy assessment has, 
however, also been performed on post-growth models, as exemplified by LowGrow, 
which was used to test a series of policies including the reduction of the working 
week in a Canada (Victor & Rosenbluth 2007).  
 
Scenario building consists of devising one or more imaginaries of the future given 
different initial conditions and key drivers. As opposed to forecasting, scenario 
building does not concern prediction, but the envisioning of possible futures and the 
provisioning of a basis for dialogue and discussion [Blegaa]. A very famous example 
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of the scenario approach is the Limits to Growth report, which consisted of a set of 
future world scenarios, drafted using the World3 model. Since the publication of the 
report, the scenarios have often been framed as predictions, but they were, in fact, 
meant as the basis for discussion and dialogue (Cerasuolo 2012). In retrospect, 
however, it is interesting to note that one of the Limits to Growth scenarios – the 
collapse scenario – has, in fact, turned out to be a rather precise prediction of actual 
developments (Turner 2008).  
 
In the pro-growth segment, scenarios are a standard tool for calculating the cost of 
policy changes. For this purpose, a so-called BAU or ‘baseline’ scenario is compared 
to one or more so-called ‘counterfactual’ scenarios, to which a so-called policy-shock 
has been applied in order to calculate the GDP-difference between a scenario in 
which the policy is implemented and one in which it is not. Traditionally, BAU 
scenarios have been ‘no policy baselines’, where it is assumed that no new policies are 
implemented, while more recently, ‘policy baselines’, which incorporate certain very 
likely or already decided future policies (climate policies for instance), seem to be a 
new trend.   
 
In relation to scenarios, Krey states that scenarios “provide ‘a plausible description of 
how the future may develop based on a coherent and internally consistent set of 
assumptions about key driving forces” (Krey 2014: 369). This statement underlines 
how computational macroeconomic models and MMS are often considered to be 
means for providing consistent and non-contradictory results, which the human mind 
is not capable of producing due to the complexity which arises from a large number 
of variables, relations, and accounting identities involved in macroeconomic and 
environmental analyses (Böhringer & Löschel 2006). The value of consistency and 
non-contradiction is evident in economic policy debate, where inconsistency and 
contradiction are considered to be weaknesses which invite debunking and 
invalidation [Knudsen]. 
 
The issue of consistency, however, induces the discussion of consistency in relation to 
what? In macroeconometric modelling, consistency could mean compliance with 
national accounting identities [Knudesen], in a GE model, the consistency could 
mean abiding by very rigorous neoclassical principles (Böhringer & Löschel 2006), 
while in post-growth MMS, the emphasis is often on consistency in relation to a 
certain conceptualisation of financial stocks and flows (Jackson et al. 2015). Thus, 
consistency is contingent and dependent on worldviews and theoretical frameworks.   
 
A final reason for producing models which I would like to mention is that there 
seems to be something rather persuasive about models and they provide the 
commanders of such technologies a certain aura of authority and reliability. Thus, the 
mere fact that a policy agenda is based on a model increases its strength and 
knowledge claims.  
 
In summary, computational macroeconomic models and MMS are built for multiple 
purposes not least to support activities of prediction and to intervene in policy 
debate. Furthermore, such models can be used to introduce various forms of 
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consistency to arguments and reasoning, and finally, they can provide debaters with 
an aura of authority and reliability.   
 
Which battles to fight? 
Taking a controversy perspective on MMS makes it relevant to talk of models as 
epistemic weapons engaged in struggles to draft the economic realities which 
decision-makers try to navigate, govern and decide about. In this regard, it is 
interesting to observe the explicit concern with policy and policy-making of pro-
growth MMS, and the confident attitude with which this concern is attended to; a 
confidence which includes using the vocabulary of societal costs, optimal 
consumption paths, and counterfactual scenarios as if such words referred to 
scientific facts in the same league as gravity, the speed of light and electromagnetism. 
To me, this indicates the confidence of a ruling discipline, which is able to set the 
tone for and shape the reality of economic policy-making, not least by providing its 
basic vocabulary. In relation to this, pro-growth MMS can be seen as the extension 
of a ruling economics regime (the neoclassical) into new territories such as the 
environment and climate.   
 
Although the post-growth segment of MMS has a strong normative aspiration, it is 
noteworthy that the policy orientation is less outspoken. Thus, it is not easy to detect 
a clear set of policy objectives for post-growth MMS. However, the LowGrow model 
(Victor & Rosenbluth 2007) expresses a spirit of confidence, in spite of a fairly 
unsophisticated framework, which has the aspiration and perhaps even some power 
to turn the world around by showing, amongst other things, that GDP growth is not 
a necessity for securing full employment. This ethos of confidence and policy 
purpose, however, seems somehow lost in more recent post-growth studies, where 
the emphasis has moved to grand unified modelling ambitions, extensive consistency, 
and the answering of slightly esoteric research questions mainly of interest to narrow 
ecological macroeconomics debates (Jackson & Victor 2015, 2016).   
 
This tendency makes it relevant to ask whether ecological macroeconomists are, in 
fact, building the right models and using them to fight the right battles. If the 
objective is to overthrow the GDP-regime and engage in radical policy change, is it 
appropriate to choose huge, universalistic macroeconomic models, which are 
designed to incorporate biophysics, real economy and finance, and answer the 
question of whether credit creates a growth imperative (Jackson & Victor 2015)? Or 
are smaller, simplistic models with a clear policy message more useful arms in the 
battle? Asked to choose between the two, I would probably go for the latter, arguing 
that the important battle is not one of universal models and deep truth, but a battle 
over who defines the realities of economic policy.  
 
A telling example in relation to this discussion was presented to me by a former UK 
Treasury employee, who explained how the chief economist of the newly-elected 
Thatcher government in 1979 declared that he had no trust in the Treasury’s current 
grand, Keynesian-inspired macroeconometric model, and that he would not take 
notice of its results. Yet, he realised that it was not possible to get rid of it and fire all 
fifty or so employees who operated it. Instead, he installed a few economists in his 
own office to operate a far smaller monetarist macro-model consisting of 
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approximately six to twelve equations, on which he based his advice to the 
government [Laslett]. This can be seen as part of the paradigm shift from Keynesian 
to monetarist economics in the UK also described by Hall (1992), yet it is interesting 
to observe that this shift required a longer period of institutional change, during 
which old routines and models were only gradually changed and replaced [Laslett].    
Along these lines, ecological macroeconomists and post-growth MMS could perhaps 
learn a few tricks from the global institutionalisation of neoliberalism, elaborately 
explained by Mirowski (2014). 
 
Which models to build?  
If we accept that models are useful weapons in battles for change, it is relevant to 
continue along this line of reasoning and ask which models to choose for which 
battles. Starting with the intention to change economic policies and overthrow the 
GDP-regime, one question concerns whether to go for heavy artillery or smaller 
weapons. I tend to think that both are useful, yet in a time of guerrilla warfare 
against an empire (neoclassical economics and neoliberalism), smaller weapons might 
be easier and less resource demanding to operate. Thus, one way to proceed could be 
to draft smaller very specific policy models intended to continuously provide 
alternative results and undermine the truth regime of neoclassical models. 
Furthermore, such models could be used to push post-growth agendas, as was the 
case with the LowGrow model (Victor & Rosenbluth 2007).  
 
However, the strength of such models would most likely increase if they had a strong 
and convincing organisational base. Thus, along with the development of policy-
models, the post-growth agenda could benefit from the establishment of a network of 
think tanks and media platforms to promote post-growth viewpoints and modelling 
results. If such a stronger organisational base were established, larger and more 
elaborate models might then be used to reinforce the aura of authority and reliability 
and as a means for drafting more elaborate policy plans and documents. For this 
strategy to work, however, the post-growth modelling community would have to 
come together and establish an agreement about the most important issues and 
policies to push and leave the more subtle epistemic challenges and disagreements to 
the academic battlefields.  
 
Thus, accepting the relevance of academic battles and the usefulness of basic research 
concerning ecological macroeconomics, I now wish to briefly present a few more 
fundamental considerations in relation to the modelling practices and models I have 
engaged with during the last three years.   
 
Intention versus method 
When reading on the topic of macroeconomics and models, it is evident that the 
method is central, and that the battle for economic truth is often presented as a 
methodological one (my interpretation of Jespersen (2007)). Clearly this 
understanding is fair and valid, not least because methods tend to incorporate and 
materialise powerful theories and worldviews. Yet, to supplement this view, I wish to 
make the point that the intention of the model builder is a force, which can stretch 
methodology in multiple directions and make a given methodology a weapon for 
multiple, even opposing purposes. Exemplifying this, Ricker has used the CGE 
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methodology to show that there are limits to growth (Ricker 2007), while CGE is 
most often used to promote eternal growth. In a similar vain, SD has been used to 
promote both ‘limits to growth’ (Meadows 1972) and ‘green growth’ (UNEP 2011), 
ABM can be built to exhibit general equilibrium as well as highly non-stationary 
dynamics, and SD can be used equally well for post-Keynesian (Jackson & Victor 
2015, 2016) and the analysis of off-equilibrium dynamics (Yamaguchi 2013).   
 
My point here is that methodologies and models are malleable media for all sorts of 
theoretical and political intentions, and without the modellers’ deliberate steering, 
the model-output would more often than not be useless nonsense. Hence, tinkering 
and ad hoc adjustments are common in macroeconomic modelling and a necessity for 
making these technologies useful. Exemplifying this, Danish macroeconomic 
modellers explain how their models can easily run astray, how specific data points 
sometimes have to be removed from time series, and how the interaction between a 
macroeconomic model and a satellite is a highly handheld procedure [Andersen, 
Grinderslev]. Furthermore, I have been informed that a model run of the Danish 
Ministry of Finance’s model ADAM, requires months of preparation [Werner] and 
is likely to involve all sorts of tinkering, debugging and troubleshooting along the 
way. Finally, as will be explained later, models can become subject to political 
demands, which force their operators to tweak them to give certain pre-ordered 
results [Sakai]. Thus, instead of being truth machines, macroeconomic models are 
rather human-method interfaces, constantly adapted to specific tasks, circumstances 
and purposes under the influence of theoretical and political intentions.  
   
Grand ambitions  
A topic of specific interest in relation to MMS is the ambition to build what I 
somewhat ironically have referred to as ‘grand unified models’. This term is inspired 
by particle physics, which nurtures the ambition to draft a ‘grand unified theory’ 
incorporating different, so far disjointed, theories into one. In the world of MMS, an 
equivalent ambition has been formulated by Böhringer & Löschel, who promote the 
CGE methodology as a tool for building fully integrated economy-environment 
models by means of hard-linking, as opposed to soft-linking (Böhringer & Löschel 
2006). The soft-linking approach is currently the predominant approach in pro-
growth MMS and consists of combining two or more models, based on different 
disciplinary frameworks and methodologies – a macroeconomic, an energy system, 
and a climate model for instance. In soft-linking, the models are developed 
independently and are able to run separately, while the flow of information between 
models is highly controlled either by the modeller or some sort of algorithm. In some 
cases, the flow is one-directional: flowing from the macroeconomic model to the sub-
models, which use this output as an exogenous input. However, a feedback from sub-
models back to the macroeconomic model can also be established, in which case the 
risk of models running astray increases[Andersen].   
 
Hard-linking, on the other hand, consists of one single model, which takes care of 
everything – economy, climate, energy, etc. According to Böhringer & Löschel 
(2006), the advantage of this approach is the attainment of a greater consistency and 
the absence of problems of iterations between models. However, as Böhringer & 
Löschel also observe, the hard-linking approach requires substantial data 
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adjustments and the prefabrication and simplification of outputs from other 
disciplinary models such as climate models (Böhringer & Löschel 2006). 
Consequently, hard-linking is, in my opinion, just another form of soft-linking, where 
the input from models from other disciplines is meticulously, ‘manually’ formatted to 
be incorporated in the CGE model, so that nothing interferes with the crisp and clear 
consistency of the CGE methodology. In a sense, this ambition can almost be seen as 
a trademark of neoclassical economics: the conquering of method-worlds and the 
inauguration of neoclassical method as the ruler of worlds, such as energy, climate 
and biodiversity, which were previously investigated by other methods.        
  
In post-growth MMS, somewhat similar Universalist ambitions can be observed, yet 
here, the ambition does not so much concern how to conquer all worlds using one 
single methodology, but rather to incorporate as many aspects of interest to 
ecological macroeconomics as possible in one unified model. This implies that various 
methodologies, such as SFC, environmentally extended IO and Keynesian dynamics, 
are used in combination in order to incorporate real economy, finance and biophysics 
in one single modelling framework (Berg et al. 2015).   
 
These ambitions of unified modelling prompt me to ask what the use and benefit of 
such models is, and consistency appears to me to be one of the keywords. In the case 
of hard-linking, the consistency concerns neoclassical theory, while in post-growth 
MMS, the consistency concerns the desire to build models in accordance with the 
basic worldview of ecological economics. The first is to me an example of the 
ongoing strengthening of the neoclassical growth regime, while the latter seems to 
me a sympathetic research activity, yet perhaps a dead end, when it comes to 
overthrowing the neoclassical growth regime; the commensuration and unification of 
disjointed method-worlds is possible, but it requires time, energy and effort, which 
might be put to use more effectively in smaller models with a more direct policy 
focus.    
 
Complexity  
In relation to model building, the issue of complexity is a recurring theme. Thus, 
model builders I have interviewed explain how the size of a model and the amount of 
detail incorporated can easily induce a level of complexity which makes the model 
useless due to incomprehensible outputs or problems of solving or running it. 
Formalising this problem, Grimm describes how the level of complexity of a model is 
related to its usefulness (Grimm et al. 2005). Thus, the question of complexity can be 
phrased as a question of finding the right balance between the purpose of the model 
and the level of complexity which serves this purpose best. To give an example of 
this, I, once again, wish to highlight the LowGrow model, which, in spite of its 
simplicity, was used to produce a very clear message and show that a non-growing 
economy might not be such a stupid idea after all. The production function of 
LowGrow was a traditional Cobb-Douglas function with two inputs: capital and 
labour (Victor & Rosenbluth 2007). To ecological economists this may seem rather 
limited, and the incorporation of energy, materials or even exergy in the production 
function is tempting, yet the model was brilliantly used to tell a strong post-growth 
story without the use of such extensions.  
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Hence, if the purpose is to overthrow the GDP-regime and install some sort of new 
post-growth paradigm, the question might well be whether super complex, fully 
consistent models are really that important, or whether more simplistic models which 
are easy to operate and disseminate would be better suited to the task.  
 
Data and statistics  
The question of data is core to MMS, and any modeller has to deal with this issue 
along the way. If a model is intended to portray a country or a region, for instance, 
significant amounts of data from this country or region must be available in a 
compatible format. And if a model is built to incorporate environmental 
circumstances, data of these circumstances must be accessible and compatibility must 
be established. Sometimes modellers go a long way to compile databases in a format 
which suits their modelling purposes, while at other times they might prefer to adjust 
their models to fit available data and the format of official databases. In this vain, the 
availability and format of data can influence the choice of modelling methodology 
[Winning], and the battle of models may, thus, also be a battle of data.  
 
Since the 1930s, national accounting and mainstream macroeconomic modelling have 
co-evolved, such that they tend to match each other. This means that alternative 
modellers are either stuck with databases which fit mainstream frameworks or have 
to venture into resource demanding efforts to draft databases fit for their own 
modelling frameworks and purposes. At a workshop on exergy-economics which I 
attended as a note-taker during my stay in Leeds, I experienced a telling example of 
this problem. Here the issue of gathering data and formatting databases for the 
purpose of exergy-economics took a prominent position in the plenary discussions.  
 
Adding to this comes the question of which statistical methods to apply when 
analysing the data and incorporating them into the model. This question involves 
problems of how to incorporate static accounting frameworks in dynamic models. 
There is no unique solution to this problem, and model builders have ventured into 
multiple approaches to turning static accounting into dynamic frameworks, which 
can alter over time.  
 
Models travel and breed  
The question of what models to build also concerns the ability of models to travel 
and breed and hence to transform in multiple unpredictable directions. As such, a 
‘new’ model is never really new since it always builds on something which went 
ahead of it. The first Danish macroeconomic energy model, for instance, was drafted 
using a Norwegian prototype (Urhammer forthcoming), the CGE framework builds 
on the theoretical endeavours of Arrow & Debreu (Gäbner), and LowGrow depends 
on multiple building blocks from the mainstream and Keynesian toolboxes (Victor & 
Rosenbluth 2007). As such, macroeconomic models are perhaps dynamic networks of 
heterogeneous elements, such as equations, solution algorithms, theoretical tenets, 
figurative diagrams, memories, and databases, rather than tangible and confinable 
entities.     
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The modelling-policy interface  
Using Brown’s concept of politics as world making (Brown 2015), it makes sense to 
assert that MMS is an expression of politics in a time of multiple environmental 
threats, where pro-growth can be seen as a stabiliser and conserver of the existing 
GDP-regime, while post-growth is a world changer, trying to overthrow the existing 
economic policy reality and replace it with a new one based on different principles. 
This view is closely related to the performativity take on economics, where 
macroeconomic models can be seen as co-creators of economic realities and, 
therefore, as political actors. In Article 4 of this thesis, I try to show how 
macroeconomic models were part of configuring energy issues for policy purposes by 
producing energy policy imaginaries, thereby showing that macroeconomic models 
can be performative and participate in creating our common future (Urhammer 
forthcoming).  
 
Having thus emphasised the political strength of such models, it is also necessary to 
observe that models are sometimes strongly influenced by specific political interests. 
Exemplifying this, a previous employee at the Mexican ministry of finance told me 
how the overly optimistic economic growth forecast, which he participated in 
producing during the month prior to the financial crash in 2008, was not an actual 
prediction. Instead it was supposed to help stabilise the situation and give the 
impression that everything was normal, although everybody at the office could tell 
from the incoming numbers that there was something very troubling about to 
happen in the US [Sakai]. Additionally, the ministry employee explained that the 
publication of a more realistic economic growth projection with the inclusion of a 
potential crash would have led to an immediate and very negative reaction from the 
US government [Sakai]. Similarly, official Danish economic growth projections are 
also often overly optimistic and have to be gradually downgraded, which once again 
indicates that economic growth forecasts are part of a stabilisation regime, the 
purpose of which is to induce trust in governmental policies and future economic 
stability.  
 
Another telling example of the interplay between specific political interests and 
macroeconomic models is the story of how the Mexican finance ministry employee 
was ordered to tweak his model to produce a better growth forecast during election 
time, when the incumbent government needed a better economic growth forecast 
than the one he had initially presented to his superiors [Sakai]. The immediate, and 
also somewhat fair, reaction to such a story is probably that the economics behind the 
scenes is rigged, yet it is interesting to observe that it was not an option for the 
government to totally bypass the modelling office and simply produce its own 
forecast. The reason for this is probably that such forecasts may be subject to public 
criticism and scrutiny, in which case it is important that it is possible to verify that a 
specific forecast has been produced by an official authority using standard 
macroeconomic techniques. This underlines the subtle reciprocity between modelling 
and policy-making, where political interests and the epistemic apparatus of 
macroeconomics mutually constrain and support each other.  
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Discussion  
To end this chapter, I wish to ask the question of whether MMS is actually what we 
need in this time of multiple crises. In favour of an answer in the negative, Nelson has 
argued that good decisions do not necessarily need consistent machinery for 
weighing and comparing, and sometimes less information can lead to more 
satisfactory outcomes (Nelson 2013). Hence, “[u]se of intuition, rules of thumb, and 
unconscious processes may lead, in some cases, to better outcomes with less regret 
(Gigerenzer 2007 cited in Nelson 2013)”. If this argument is valid, the application of 
large elaborate MMS might not be the way to proceed. Instead, more direct activist 
attempts to re-politicise economic policy, as suggested by members of the degrowth 
movement (Kallis 2015), may be a better path to follow.  
 
However, the question is not necessarily either/or, and if we accept that some sort of 
modelling may, in fact, be useful in a time of urgently needed radical policy 
transformation, what sort of modelling should then be used? Having studied MMS 
for three years, it is rather frustrating that I am not able to give a better answer than 
to present the following three pleas: more policy focus, less theory/more accounting and 
metric pluralism.  
 
By proposing more policy focus, I urge the post-growth modelling community to 
engage more strongly in building policy models with the very clear objective of 
intervening in current policy debate and undermining the truth regime and the 
‘politics of necessity’ favoured by incumbent elites and supported by mainstream 
economics. This instead of building complicated unified models for debunking 
theoretical propositions of esoteric interests to a fairly narrow research community.  
 
Proposing less theory and more accounting implies a wish to encourage greater 
emphasis on accounts of tangible stuff and less emphasis on dogma and theoretical 
dynamics. This plea, however, is certainly primarily directed toward pro-growth 
MMS economists, who seem to be obsessed with mathematical crispness, theoretical 
consistency, and dubious behavioural assumptions, whereas ecological 
macroeconomic modellers seem far more interested in actually incorporating solid 
accounts of money, materials and other tangible factors into their models. Included in 
this plea is also a suggestion to discard the ambition to gaze far into the future using 
models based on sophisticated, theoretical dynamics. Instead I propose more static, 
short-term models based on tangible accounting methods, which recognise the 
human aspect and participation in the creation of model results. In other words, let us 
abandon the illusion of models as truth machines and embrace models as human-
method interfaces, which provide a basis for dialogue, negotiation and imagining.  
   
Finally, my plea for metric pluralism regards the abandonment of the ambition to 
measure and model everything using a monetary metric. The situation today 
resembles Tolkien’s universe, where one ring rules them all; instead I proposes that 
modellers should accept and encourage the use of multiple metrics for multiple 
purposes. As such, the plea for metric pluralism involves the total rejection of the 
hard-linking approach proposed by Böhringer & Löscel (2006), and instead 
encourages the construction of complementary models based on the metrics of 
several different disciplines. This can be seen as a plea for further soft-linking, where 
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models are disentangled instead of integrated, and there is no ruling macroeconomic 
model. It is also a plea for interdisciplinarity, where several disciplines bring their 
models and expertise to the table and negotiate proper responses to the challenges 
confronting us. In this regard, it is important to stress that economics should not be 
offered the seat at the head of the table.  
 
As pointed out by one of my colleagues, however, the plea for metric pluralism 
potentially involves the risk of increased complexity and confusion regarding the 
metrics applied, as exemplified by the OECD’s ‘endless’ list of green growth 
indicators (OECD 2011). However, I do believe that it is possible to find a limited 
dashboard of key indicators of most concern to our societies in the present situation.  
 
Chapter 5: conclusion  
As indicated in the title of this working paper, one of the purposes of the paper is to 
challenge the perception of macroeconomic modelling (for sustainability) as a pure 
epistemic practice that merely concerns the acquisition of accurate knowledge about 
the economy and economy-environment relations. By means of critical perspectives 
and ethnographic examples, I argue that there is more to the matter, and that 
macroeconomic models are complex political creatures, which are able to intervene in 
and set the scene for economic policy processes in multiple ways, and which are also 
highly sensitive to the particular intentions of modellers and the special interests of 
politicians. At this point, my argument is not fully elaborated, yet I still hope that 
this preliminary draft provides useful insights and food for thought for model 
builders and other academics working for a sustainable transition.    
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Abstract We live in times of global crises, where economic, social and ecological problems are increasingly entangled and therefore require novel answers. Economics is today holding a hegemonic position and dominates the way we understand and relate to the problems we face, and it continues to gain new territory. This is reflected in a value hegemony framing everything from biodiversity to carbon emissions in monetary terms. We consider this a democratic problem since the diversity of values is thus not fairly represented in our current mode of decision-making. We believe that the solutions to the grand problems of our time lie in a democracy where multiple values can be communicated. In order to provide inspiration for thinking about such a democracy, this paper provides an overview of a wide range of philosophical positions on values and value pluralism and analyses how values and value pluralism are treated in a selection of articles in ecological economics. The paper concludes that the treatment of values and incommensurability in ecological economics can be characterised as ambiguous. There is a need for further research on the theoretical aspects of these issues.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
“Aspects of the world are valuable.  
That	  constitutes	  reasons	  for	  action”	  (Raz	  2000:1). 
 Since the emergence of increasing, human caused, ecological disasters, such as loss of biodiversity, oceanic plastic pollution and mass deforestation, the issue of environmental values has become increasingly important. All over the world destruction and seizure of habitat is causing fierce conflicts, the settlement of which more often than not have devastating outcomes for the species and people who depend on and are constituent parts of these habitats. Economic valuation often plays an important role in such conflicts and economic valuation principles have become powerful political tools that influence decisions and actions regarding habitats all over the world. In this form of valuation, in order for any value to be taken into account it must be given a price and pass through machineries, such as cost-benefit analysis or payment for ecosystem services.  This raises a question of democracy. Is this a just way of representing opposing value interest? Is the interest of the indigenous to protect their habitat just as fairly represented 
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in these methods of valuation as is the interest of the multinational oil company? According to many ecological economists, this is certainly not the case, and in order to address the injustices and biases of monetary valuation they, among others, have proposed alternative approaches to valuation and settlement of environmental conflicts (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998 and Kallis et al. 2013).  Often these alternative methods of valuation are based on a non-reductionist view on values, which hold that it is not possible to reduce all values to one single value. This is in opposition to the monist view on values, which hold that all values can be reduced to one value and measured by a common	  metric	  (O’Neill	  et	  al.	  2008).	  The	  former	  view	  is	  often	  referred to as value pluralism (ibid.), and it seems fair to say that most ecological economists belong to the pluralists when it comes to values and valuation. However, reading the ecological economics literature on these issues reveals a tendency to focus mostly on the development of alternative valuation methods and less on the more philosophical aspects of values and valuation. In order to fill this gap, this paper summarises a series of philosophical positions in relation to values and value pluralism and investigates how these are reflected (or not reflected) in a selection of ecological economics articles. To guide our investigation, we propose the following research 
questions:	  “How	  are	  values	  and	  value	  pluralism	  articulated	  as	  philosophical	  topics”?	  “How	  
is	  value	  pluralism	  operationalized	  in	  a	  selection	  of	  the	  ecological	  economics	  literature”? In order to answer these questions we have performed two literature reviews; one for each of the two. The first is a review of a loosely defined selection of literature concerning environmental ethics, values and conflicts. This selection, counting 9 articles and two books, was collected using combinations of words such as values, value pluralism, 
ontology and intrinsic values in Google Scholar, Web of Science and bibliographies. An analysis of this literature is conducted in section 2. The second review is based on a systematic search in the journal Ecological Economics using Web of Science and Scopus and the following key terms: value pluralism, plural value(s), incommensurability, and 
incommensurable. This resulted in 26 articles that are analysed in section 3.   
 
2. Axiological positions 
 
When confronting the issue of value pluralism, two aspects have spurred our interest: the first 
is the ontological status of values and the second is the question of value incommensurability. 
The first could also be termed the being of values, while the second concerns the (im)possibility 
of measuring values using a common metric. In the following, we will discuss various 
methodological approaches to these two aspects.  
 
2.1 The ontological status of values It is beyond the scope of this paper to account for all the philosophical positions regarding the ontological status of values or to offer an exhaustive taxonomy of these often repellent positions. However, we still wish to give a rough account of some significant and opposing approaches to the ontological status of values.  The first approach, we wish to mention is often referred to as objectivist or value 
objectivism (Gracia 1976). This view conveys the understanding that values exists objectively and independent of human conceptions. This means that objects possess qualities, which are intrinsic and as such constitutive of the object (French 1965). Along 
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these lines Crowder talks about moral objectivity, which states that there are basic human goods that exist and maintain their fundamental qualities regardless of what people might think of them (Crowder 1998). This type of reasoning about values can also be termed 
realism or value realism (O’Neill	  et	  al.	  2008).	   In direct opposition to the objectivist view we find an approach which is commonly referred to as subjectivist or value subjectivism. In this view value is a characteristic of the subject (Gracia 1976). Hence value does not reside in the object but in the perceptions and thoughts of the individual subject, which means that the value of a given object is dependent on how a subject perceives it: to one subject a specific tree might be worthless, while to another the same tree is precious.     A constructive rejection of the two preceding positions can be found in a relational view on value, which holds that values exist as a relational quality between a subject and a desired object (Gracia 1976). In a sense this view is objectivist, since it assigns the value to the object, however, this value only exist due to a particular situation which brings the object in relation to a desiring subject (Gracia 1976). The relational view on values can be taken to an extreme by rejecting the usefulness of the subject-object dichotomy. This is 
the	   case	   in	   Latour’s	   empirical	   philosophy,	   which	   proposes	   the	   idea	   of	   being as other (Latour 2013). Being as other means that any entity exists by virtue of other things, thus subject and object emerge together and cannot be separated; they exist in reciprocity. This view can be applied to the issue of values, by saying that it does not make sense to separate the value and the valuer; they exist by virtue of each other and in relation to a multiplicity of other entities. This can be used to form a constructivist view on values, where values exist as multiple, hybrid entities composed of relations between human and non-human constituents.  Finally, there are more practice oriented views, which emphasise that social practices are necessary for the existence of value, since values emerge from social practices and 
cultural	   development	   (Raz	   2000).	   Along	   these	   lines	   O’Neill	   et	   al.	   (2008:1) claim that 
“There	   are	   no	   such	   things as values. There are rather the various ways in which individuals, processes and places matter, our various modes of relating to them, and the 
various	  considerations	  that	  enter	  into	  our	  deliberation	  of	  action”. Familiar to this is the view that institutions such as rules and norms that govern social practices become holders of values (Vatn 2005).  To finish this brief treatment of the ontological status of values, we wish to touch upon a long and on going discussion within environmental ethics regarding intrinsic and 
instrumental value. The main crux of this discussion regards the question of whether the mere existence of an entity can make it valuable. This leads to the following definition: 
“[…]	  a	  thing	  has	  intrinsic	  value only if it is judged that, considered in isolation, abstractly, by itself, and without regards to its consequences, its existence is better than its 
nonexistence”	   (Elliot	   2005:51).	   This	  means	   that	   a	   thing	  has	   intrinsic	   value,	   if	   its	  mere	  existence is more valuable than its nonexistence.  The polar opposite of intrinsic value is called instrumental or extrinsic value, which Elliot defines as the value of being instrumental in bringing intrinsic value about. Thus, a 
thing	  has	  instrumental	  value	  “[…]	  if	  it is an instrument that assists in bringing something 
into	   existence	   which	   is	   intrinsically	   valuable”	   (Elliot	   2005:45).	   This	   definition	   links	  instrumental value to the concept of intrinsic value. However, in our view, it is possible to talk about instrumental value without connecting it to intrinsic value. It is possible to say that a forest can be instrumental in providing valuable things, such as clean water, 
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peacefulness and beautiful sceneries without having to clarify whether these things have intrinsic value or not. In this sense, it makes sense to say that the forest has instrumental value without a clarification of whether this leads to intrinsic value.  Isomorphic to the preceding, it is possible to define intrinsic and instrumental value in terms of whether a thing can be considered an end in itself or merely a means for something else. If a thing is an end in itself it can be said to have intrinsic value. If it is 
merely	  a	  means	  for	  something	  else,	  it	  can	  only	  possess	  instrumental	  value	  (O’Neill	  et al. 2008). This definition relates to Thompson & Barton (1994) who suggest that the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value resides in a distinction between ecocentrism and anthropocentrism. In this view, the appreciation of intrinsic value is an expression of ecocentrism, while the view that things are valuable only as instruments for human satisfaction reflects anthropocentrism. An ecocentric view on a forest would then be to say that the forest has value simply because it exists, while an anthropocentric view would hold that it has value because it is instrumental in providing valuable services and experiences to human beings.  Some of the earlier mentioned positions in relation to the ontological status of values can be recognised in various discussions of intrinsic and instrumental value. It is thus equally possible to have a moral objectivist and a relational view on intrinsic value. The moral objectivist view is probably the most common view on intrinsic value, since it fits well with the idea that a thing can be valuable in and for itself regardless of how other things relate to it. It is, however, possible also to have a relational view on intrinsic value 
saying	  that	  “[…]	  a	  thing	  has	  intrinsic	  value	  if	  it	  is	  approved	  of	  by	  a	  valuer	  in	  virtue of its 
properties” (Elliot 1992:140). This statement conveys the idea that value can be an intrinsic quality of a thing, even though this value will only exist in relation to a valuer and certain properties.  Despite the intellectually appealing aspects of the philosophical discussions of intrinsic and instrumental value, we find them rather speculative and displaced from the concreteness of the environmental and social problems of our time. Yes, it is interesting to try and categorise values philosophically, and it certainly does not exclude considerations of values in more concrete social and political contexts. However, to spend efforts discussing, for instance, whether a thing would have value, if nothing else existed (Elliot 2005) simply seems meaningless. We therefore feel encouraged to call for a more pragmatic approach to values that try, less speculatively, to investigate the existence and characteristics of values in specific places and moments involving multiple and often opposing concerns.  
 
2.2 Incommensurability and value pluralism As mentioned earlier, we live in times of environmental conflicts and controversies. All over the world struggles regarding habitats, resources and pollution take place involving multiple stakeholders and concerns. Often such conflicts are sought settled by attempts to commensurate opposing values by the use of monetary measures that assign the settlement of conflicts to markets or to calculative technologies such as cost-benefit analysis. In spite of the cunning elegance of some of these settlements, they never really seem to satisfy all concerned stakeholders. In most cases environmental conflicts result in great losses, especially for marginalised groups such as indigenous people or threatened species, who are often forced out of their lands or habitats.  
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This inappropriateness of monetary measures in solving value conflicts could be claimed to have its roots in value incommensurability, which means that the multiplicity of human values cannot be comprehended under one measure. In this sense, it is not possible to reduce all values to one super-value that can ultimately settle value conflicts (Crowder 1998). This is, however, what environmental economists are trying to do and what many ecological economists argue against.  Core to this disagreement is the distinction between value monism and value 
pluralism	   (O’Neill	   et	   al.	   2008).	   Environmental	   economics	   is	   based on neoclassical economics, which confess to value monism: the idea that all values can ultimately be reduced to one value by the use of a single metric. Whether this value is pleasure, happiness or human dignity varies, however in neoclassical economics this value is called 
utility	  and	  the	  metric	  that	  quantifies	  it	  is	  money	  (O’Neill	  et	  all.	  2008).	  From	  value	  monism	  follows the possibility of commensuration between values and the optimal settlement of value conflicts, which is the settlement with the highest net utility measured in monetary 
units	  (O’Neill	  et	  al.	  2008). The opposite of value monism is called value pluralism, which means that it is not possible to reduce all values to one value. In this context, incommensurability means the nonexistence of a single metric which can measure the quantity of all values and thus determine the optimal outcome of value disputes. Value pluralism implies that there is no 
“one	  size	  fits	  all”	  recipe	  for	  settling	  value	  conflicts.	  There	  is	  no	  given	  ranking	  of	  values	  which can always be applied. This calls for multiple means of valuation, if environmental conflicts are to be justly settled (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998). The question of incommensurability transcends the previously described positions on the ontological status of values, in the sense that opposing views on the being of value, might still agree on the incommensurability of values. According to Crowder (1998) value pluralism has its roots in moral objectivity, which states that there are fundamental human values, such as liberty, justice and equality that exist and maintain there fundamental qualities regardless of what people might think and do. Since these values are fundamental, they are irreducible, which means they must be plural. In this view, there is a connection between the objective status of values and their plurality. However, we do not consider moral objectivism a necessary precondition for neither value incommensurability nor pluralism.  This view can be qualified by reference to French pragmatism as articulated by Boltansky, Thevenot and Latour and interpreted by Centemeri (2014) and Blok (2013). As Centemeri points out, there is an emphasis in French pragmatism on modes of 
valuation, which discovers and distinguishes sources of incommensurability not in the objective status of values, but in modes of practical engagement and coordination (Centemeri 2014). This does not rule out the question of objectivity, however, instead of objective values, Centemeri observes, French pragmatists stress the importance of modes of objectifying values based on codified knowledge and expert judgment. This indicates an implicit rejection of a substantive view on objects and values in favour of an emphasis on practices of objectification and valuation (Blok 2013, Centemeri 2014).      
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3. Value pluralism in ecological economics  
 This section explores how value pluralism and incommensurability are discussed in the Journal Ecological Economics, following three streams of thought: what do ecological economists mean when they speak about values, value pluralism and incommensurability? Why do both concepts matter in the community? And: What is being suggested as ways to conceptualise them in practice? We are well aware that the notions of plural values and incommensurability are implicit in a vast number of articles; however, in this study we only include the literature where the terms are made explicit. 
A	   concise	   definition	   of	   “value”	   can	   be	   found only in two of the 26 articles. Lo 
understands	  values	  in	  a	  subjectivist	  sense	  as	  “personal	  judgments	  or	  dispositions	  as	  to	  what is right or desirable, and assumed to be of fundamental subjective construct preceding formation of preference, which refers to a ranking of alternatives and is seen 
as	   the	   immediate	   precursor	   of	   personal	   choices”	   (Lo	   2013:84).	   Based	   on	   this	  understanding he illuminates that ecological economics is based on an alternative theory of value that draws on multiple philosophical strands,	   Sagoff’s	   (1988)	   citizens	   values	  
thesis	  and	  John	  Rawls’s	  (1971)	  theory	  of	  justice	  being	  the	  most	  prominent	  ones.	  Yet	  there	  has not been an evolution to establish a value theory that explicitly takes into account environmental values and larger society wellbeing and future generations (Lo 2013). In a similar spirit, Chan et al. combine different ethical theories to define values 
comprehensively	   as	   “the	   preferences,	   principles	   and	   virtues	   that	   we	   (up)hold	   as	  
individuals	   or	   groups”	   (Chan	   et	   al.	   2012:10).	   In	   this meaning values refer to both fundamental ideals (held values such as justice or happiness) and also to the relative importance we attach to things (assigned values, such as monetary values of commodities) (Chan et al. 2012). To capture the diverse nature of values the authors suggest classifying them along eight dichotomies and applying different empirical valuation methods to account for different kinds of values. Value pluralism is a colourful term for ecological economists that does not seem to demand specific explanation. It shines through that it is indeed a foundational normative pillar of the community; however, references made are mainly tacit and implicit, even in those articles that contain value pluralism as a keyword. The seminal article by Martinez-Alier et al. (1998) is generally THE reference point. Yet even there a clear characterization 
of	  value	  pluralism	  is	  largely	  absent.	  The	  authors	  describe	  the	  act	  of	  “valuing”	  as	  something	  that includes different perspectives and practices, hence there is a general agreement that 
framing	  any	  particular	  one	  dimension	  as	  “the	  true,	  real	  or	  total	  picture”	  is	  reductionist	  and thus has to be rejected, no matter whether physical or sociological reductionism is concerned (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998:282). Physical reductionism would be, for instance, defending an energy theory of value where all value is reduced to energetic terms; sociological reductionism could mean a position where all social phenomena are explained as emerging from one dimension, e.g. structure. Martinez-Alier et al (1998) defend that there are no universal values or ethical system that is correct. Söderbaum 
paraphrases	   value	   pluralism	   in	   the	   same	   spirit	   as	   the	   whole	   spectrum	   of	   “possible	  
ideological	  or	  ethical	  viewpoints”	  (Söderbaum	  1994:54). The other way around, accepting that there are different perspectives and different philosophical and ethical rationalities other than utilitarianism on how to deal with socio-environmental problems means accepting value pluralism (Spash 2013). This stance matches the nature of ecological economics as a discipline driven by issues of (in)equality, (in)justice, moral and 
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environmental values. On the other hand, valuing also includes different criteria and standards that might, as a general rule, end in valuation conflicts (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998). Going to church on a Sunday morning can be better than sleeping long according to one criterion but worse according to another. This framing establishes value pluralism as a multi-criteria problem: there is no optimal solution but only compromise solutions that require methods and tools that enable people to balancing out different conflicting criteria. Lo	  (2013) introduces a subtle distinction between value plurality and value pluralism. For him value plurality means that there are a number of different categories of values, whereas pluralism indicates a normative position that renders an appreciation of plurality possible. As emphasised by Lo and outlined above, value pluralism is primarily considered an ethical and normative position that aims to complement economic values by a range of social, ritual, symbolic, ecological and other values. However it goes beyond that to include a political commitment to oppose developments that narrow down the expression of values (e.g. the increasing commodification of nature). Advocacy of democratic institutions that enable the diversity of values to speak and be heard is put forward as the main strategy. Let us now turn to the notion of incommensurability. In order to get a deeper understanding of this second principal concept of our paper, we consider it easier to start with a discussion of commensurability first. In a nutshell, commensurability is the 
“enemy”	  reductionist	  mainstream	  economics	  approach	  to	  dealing	  with	  value. According to orthodox theory, economic value equals exchange value, i.e. the value at which goods change hands, usually measured in monetary terms. Monetary values assigned to goods 
and	  services	  make	  them	  comparable	  and	  tradable	  in	  markets,	  and	  “the	  market”,	  in	  turn,	  
is	   considered	   capable	   of	   producing	   “true	   value”.	   Concerning	   environmental	   problems	  there is recognition of market failure that can be solved by either creating actual markets to internalise externalities into the price mechanism or by creating surrogate markets (shadow prices). There are two shapes commensurability can take. Strong 
commensurability	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  “common	  measure	  of	  the	  different	  consequences	  of	  an	  
action	  based	  on	  a	  cardinal	  scale	  of	  measurement”	  (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998: 280), i.e. numbers taking the form of real numbers 52, 73, 9, etc. Weak commensurability, on the other hand, is a common measure based on an ordinal scale of measurement, i.e. ranks in the form of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. Another crucial distinction is the one between strong and weak comparability. If one term exists by which options can be ranked, one speaks of strong comparability, whereas if this one term does not exist, weak comparability is implied. Weak comparability is the strongest form of not-being-able to measure and compare within and between options. A situation characterised by an inescapable value conflict. Martinez-Alier et al. (1998) argue that ecological economics rests on weak comparability only. This is a very strong assumption and what is commonly understood by incommensurability. 
Incommensurability	   is	  defined	   as	   “the	   absence	  of	   a	   common	  unit	   of	  measurement	  
across	  plural	  values”	  (Martinez-Alier	  et	  al.	  1998:280)	  or	  “the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  reduce all relevant features of an object, service	  or	  system	  to	  a	  single	  dimension”	  (Van	  den	  Bergh et al. 2000:53). In other words, ecological economists believe that because values are heterogeneous in nature, they cannot be compared quantitatively with each other, 
“not	  even	  in	  principle”	  (Kapp	  cited in Martinez-Alier et al. 1998:280). This is especially relevant for environmental decisions as they raise ethical and moral issues that are not 
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comparable with choices people make about ordinary consumer goods. Some values such as justice, love, or respect for non-human beings are seen as sacrosanct and thus considered taboo to be traded-off with other values (Temper and Martinez-Alier 2013). Chan et al. (2012) present several reasons why values are considered incommensurable. One is that because some values	  are	  central	  to	  worldviews	  (“sacrosanct”),	  leaving	  them	  out would risk losing the basis for all meaning and value. Another is that some values need to be personally experienced to be fully appreciated, e.g. in the case of transformative values associated	  with	  a	  site	  (“You	  had	  to	  be	  there.”). Most of the articles analysed take value pluralism and incommensurability as central properties in environmental decision-making as given. They are most often treated interchangeably and used as straps around the core analysis of papers. Several authors use a very similar way to frame and embed their arguments. Typically, the storyline goes as follows: incommensurability of values and/or value pluralism are mentioned in the introduction of the article as fundamental pillar of ecological economics (mainly citing Martinez-Alier	  1998	  and	  other	  (but	  few)	  “usual	  suspects”	  such	  as	  O’Neill,	  Vatn	  and	  Spash).	  These references seem to be taken as justification for not being explicit about what is meant by the respective terms. Following, the mainstream compression of values is attacked as being insufficient, misleading, distracting and ineffective and an argument is constructed that effective sustainable development policies demand dealing with conflicting interests and priorities, usually by means of creating some form of deliberative institutions or other new (mainly participatory) decision support methods. An epistemological claim for various sources of knowledge often follows, and a link to post normal science is established. The article usually ends by making some reference again about the importance of value pluralism and/or incommensurability. This approach is taken, for instance, by Shmelev and Rodriguez-Labajos (2009) with a case of multidimensional sustainability assessment in Austria; Ananda and Herath (2009) with a case of forest management policies in India; Bebbington et al. (2007) with a case of sustainability assessment models; or Zendehdel et al. (2008) with a case of a group consensus method applied in Iran. Having established how our key terms are used (or not used) in the core ecological economics literature, we turn to the question why plural values and incommensurability matter for ecological economists. There is widespread agreement that the nature of the problems around (un)sustainability is fundamentally different from standard 
applications	  in	  economics.	  “Estimating	  costs	  and	  benefits	  […]	  is	  of	  little	  help	  if	  the	  problem	  faced by contemporary societies is one of values, ethics, ideology and even world views”	  (Söderbaum 1994:55). Ecological economists are generally not against economic values to natural resources but against the sole use of them. As ecosystem features are highly complex, dynamic and interrelated, their value cannot be condensed in a simple metric. Environmental risks and economic risks are not comparable at all because the nature of them is just too different. Damage to the environment is considered non-monetary in principle, often irreversible, and a collective problem. Against this background, almost all articles contain a fundamental critique of the 
mainstream	  orthodox	  approach,	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  acidity.	  Söderbaum’s	  article	  is	  primarily a critique of the mainstream cost-benefit framework to environmental problems (1994). Another example is provided by Temper and Martinez-Alier (2013) who attack net present value, using a case story from India. Overall, severe concern is raised that reducing values to a single one-dimensional standard in market and monetary 
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terms	  leads	  to	  “risk	  with	  human	  health	  and	  survival” (Kapp cited in Martinez-Alier et al. 1998:279). It is argued that it is highly misleading to take decisions based on only one type of value (Martinez-Alier and Temper (2013) providing a full account of the example of climate change; Spangenberg (2007) of biodiversity). By not respecting and accounting for irreversible and irreplaceable environmental damages and losses several goals of ecological economics are endangered simultaneously, e.g. social justice, or addressing the different faces of inequalities. Decision-making processes are understood as situations were plural values and interests are omnipresent. In other words, decision-making is, at its core, about dealing with conflict. Ultimately, the challenge is to openly articulate different shades of values and finding ways to constructively dealing with them. Taking into account plural values and incommensurability does not mean that all conflicts can be solved, but they allow a deeper understanding into their nature and how they can be balanced out by political compromise and increasing transparency of the choice process (Martinez-Alier et al. 
1998).	  “Environmental	  policy	  […],	   in	  order	  to	  be	  realistic,	  should	  […]	  deal	  […]	  with	  the	  higher dimensions of the system, those in which power relations, hidden interests, social 
participation,	   cultural	   constraints,	   and	   other	   “soft”	   values,	   become	   relevant	   and	  unavoidable variables that heavily, but not deterministically, affect the possible outcomes 
of	  the	  strategies	  to	  be	  adopted”	  (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998:282). It is argued that conflict might help sustainability. This view stands in stark opposition to the mainstream view 
that	  values	  can	  be	  “objectivised”	  and	  glossed	  over	  by	  presenting	  numbers	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  value-compressing exercise	   as	   “facts”.	   Again,	   the	   standard	   utility	  model	   is	   completely	  compensatory, i.e. decisions involve trade-offs that can be offset by a large enough advantage over the disadvantage. For ecological economists, on the other hand, there are issues where no trade-offs are involved (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998 and Kallis et al. 2013). Whether people value something or not, there are certain critical parts without which ecosystems and thus life support systems do not function in the long term. So, what are the implications of value pluralism and incommensurability in practice? If we assume that there is no and should not be one common unit of value to compare different options the key question arises: how can conflicts be resolved? What tools and strategies do we have to mediate between different values and situations of conflict?  An essential avenue of capturing different values comprehensively is by the application of a broad range of social-science tools and methods. Chan et al. (2012) make a case for such a multi-method and multi-metric approach.	   They	   argue	   that	   “market-
mediated	  values”,	  for	  instance,	  can	  generally	  be	  accessed	  by	  applying	  monetary	  valuation,	  
whereas	   “non-market-mediated	   values”	   largely	   cannot.	   For	   “biocentric	   values”	   (e.g.	  intrinsic value for non-human	  beings)	   and	   “other-oriented	  values”	   (e.g.	   future	  people)	  deliberative approaches are more suitable than economic valuation methods. Some forms of values demand a richer form of communication such as narration. On top of this differentiated tackling of values, a combination of methods seems sensible to account for the fact that usually more than one kind of value is involved (Chan et al. 2012).  Multi-criteria analysis is one of the methods mentioned by most of the authors as a promising approach to compare alternatives under incommensurability of values. It is a methodology to structure complex problems in matrix form, with alternatives on one axis and evaluation criteria on the other. The matrix can consist of qualitative, quantitative or both types of information and can be applied for macro, micro and project evaluation. This framework is expected to enhance a decision process by fostering transparency and 
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notions of quality and process. Originally not participatory, the approach was further developed to include working with different stakeholders to increase the quality of deliberation, an approach called social multi-criteria analysis (Garmendia and Gamboa 2012). Biophysical indicators or satellite accounts are another, though only briefly mentioned, option by Martinez-Alier et al. (1998), Söderbaum (1994) and Spangenberg (2006) to represent plural values. Non-monetary measures of the environment matter as they are a relatively direct way to assess both quantities and qualities of environmental media. As such, measuring material use in tons, energy use in Joules or water use in litres or the toxicity of chemical substances seem appropriate for effectively assessing environmental problems. The development and use of such measures also distinguishes ecological economics from environmental economics, where values are traditionally expressed in monetary terms. The precautionary principle is put forward by Aldred (2013) as another approach based on incommensurability claims. He argues that the precautionary principle can be justified on the basis of a combination of uncertainty and incommensurability. If uncertainty is high, a low incommensurability claim is sufficient to justify the application of the precautionary principle, and vice versa. Opposing views of some economists that the precautionary principle cannot be practically applied he tries to make a case in the context of climate change decision-making. Drawing on political philosophy he argues that incommensurability implies a discontinuous ordering of possible outcomes, which 
fits	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  problem	  as	  “climate	  risks	  and	  economic	  risks	  are	  not	  
comparable	  at	  all”	  (Aldred	  2013:	  137).	  However,	  he	  largely	  remains	  unclear	  about	  how	  to	  operationalise the concept, but rather provides, in his own words, “an	   explanatory	  framework for helping decision-makers structure their thinking in a way that focuses 
discussion	  and	  so	  might	  facilitate	  debate	  and	  agreement” (Aldred 2013: 139). At the end, he briefly mentions that safe minimum standards endorse incommensurability claims alike. Deliberative valuation methods are propagated as the	  most	   prominent	   “group	   of	  
methods”	   for	   dealing	   with	   plural	   values. Deliberation	   means	   “a	   particular	   sort	   of	  discussion that involves the careful and serious weighing of reasons for and against some proposition. It is the act of considering different points of view and coming to a reasoned decision that distinguishes deliberation from a generic group activity. Emphasis is given to the product that arises from discussion (e.g. a decision or set of recommendations), and 
the	   process	   through	   which	   that	   product	   comes	   about” (Antunes et al. 2009:933). In 
addition,	  deliberative	  approaches	  “presume	  the	  existence	  of	  irreducible	  conflicts	  in	  values	  
and	  beliefs”	  (Lo	  2013:85). Based on Habermas’	  account	  of	  communicative	  rationality,	  they	  are interactive processes of communication coordinated through discussion and socialisation of individuals with the goal to achieve generalizable interests or, in other words, a workable agreement. This is based on the assumption that people are capable and willing to listen to each other and open about sharing subjective values. The hope is 
that	   after	   deliberation	   people	   become	  more	   sympathetic	   to	   each	   other’s	   position	   (Lo	  2013). A plethora of disaggregated and ethically open methods are suggested, such as citizens' juries, multi-criteria mapping, trade-off analysis, participatory modelling methodology, deliberative visioning, participatory multi-criteria analysis, or alternative water forums (Antunes et al. 2009, Kallis et al. 2013, Kenyon 2007)	   While strongly 
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propagated in the ecological economics community, Kallis et al. (2013) highlight that these methods are still marginalised. Value articulating institutions are highlighted as a way of framing methodologies fit for wrestling with different values so that plural values can speak (Kallis et al. 2013). They are sets of rules that shape social processes of valuation by addressing questions such as: Who shall participate? In what role? What data is considered relevant? How is data processed? (Vatn 2005). The choice of specific value articulating institutions influences what values are included, what are excluded, and what type of conclusion can be reached (Vatn 2005). An example of a plural value articulating institutions is courts, as they enable different logics to be sustained, e.g. historical justice, or expressing values of recognition or responsibility (Kallis et al. 2013). Besides the application and combination of different methods and methodologies in a sensible way, two other strategies are highlighted in the literature as paving the way towards value pluralism in practice: a more conscious use of language and looking for alliances within and beyond academia. The use of specific language is propagated as one way to change discourses about values. The argument is that certain languages supress other languages and thus values. Concepts	   such	   as	   ecosystem	   “services”	   and	   “natural	  
capital”	   are	   not	   innocent	   but	   increasingly	   frame	   human-non human relationships as exchange value relationships and thus have to be approached with caution or rejected altogether (Kallis et al. 2013 and Spash 2013 respectively). Teaming up with other research fields is suggested as another strategy to strengthen a value pluralistic position. Kallis et al. (2013) argue that ecological economics could strengthen its opposition to the mainstream by gaining insights from Political Ecology on issues of power, institutions, institutional change, and explanations why mainstream economics became to dominate. The authors describe that while plural values is a hobby-
horse	  for	  ecological	  economists	  its	  implementation	  will	  remain	  difficult	  and	  “politically	  ineffective if they do not recognize the social processes and dynamics that make this 
normative	  proposal	  so	  hard	  to	  implement	  …	  Why	  does	  the	  World	  Bank	  or	  International	  Union for Conservation of Nature promote markets for ecosystem services and not deliberative forums? Without a social, political-economic theory such as the one offered by political economists, the critique of ecological economics will remain a methodological 
and	  normative	  one	  and	  will	  not	  go	  far”	  (Kallis	  et	  al.	  2013:100).	  In	  the	  same	  spirit,	  Spash (2013) emphasises that the broad nature of ecological economics based on value pluralism demands links across heterodox schools of thought, e.g. to critical institutionalists, evolutionary and feminist economists, and critical realists. Chan et al. (2012) join the canon by expressing that anthropologists, sociologists, ethicists, etc., attempt to account for a broader set of values too and that alliances to those fields are necessary to make decision-making frameworks more comprehensive in values. Some authors (e.g. Chan et al. 2012 or Hardy and Patterson 2012) formulate the need for extending alliances beyond academia to include other stakeholders as well, such as policy makers, practitioners, CSO representatives, or indigenous groups. These desired collaborations entail a plea for a post normal science approach towards research.      
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4. Discussion and conclusion 
 As PhD researchers learning about Ecological Economics for a number of years, we have been exposed to repeated claims that plural values and incommensurability are foundational pillars of the discipline. This motivated us to look more closely into this topic. Against this background it is very surprising to discover how little attention is paid towards both notions in the journal. Out of a total of approx. 8500 articles, only a handful of about 6 or 7 articles seriously tackle value pluralism and incommensurability. We are concerned that there is extremely little debate in the core journal about one of the roots of the field and wonder why this is so. Is theory not considered useful to inform normativity? Couldn't a deeper understanding of what values are, how they emerge and exist inform dealing with value conflicts? We believe that it could.  The lack of theoretical grounding gives way to a pragmatic approach of dealing with different values. The main focus within the ecological economics community clearly is on how to put plural values and incommensurability into practice. However, it seems to be 
some	  sort	  of	  “pick	  and	  choose”	  approach,	  i.e.	  author	  A	  proposes	  this	  method,	  author	  B	  that	  one, author C yet another one. There seems to be general agreement that the mainstream 
approach	  is	  generally	  “bad”	  and	  that	  deliberative/democratic/participatory	  methods	  are	  
generally	  “good”	  but	   in	  the	  sample	   literature	   from	  the	   journal	   there	  is	   little	  systematic	  investigation about what deliberative methods actually are, why they are better, in what contexts, and what their potential problems are2. The pragmatic approach taken rests on a huge assumption that more democratic processes will lead to less unsustainability and that social cooperation based on communication is a way to resolve conflicts. Democracy in general, and direct democracy in particular in the form of more public engagement, appeal as a way to achieve consensus about plural values, especially in the case of collectively held sustainability problems. It remains an open question whether this is really the case. The question what the evidence is for and against democracy as a tool to deliver sustainability remains unasked and largely unquestioned. Although we do see great advantages of participatory deliberative processes, we also argue that they are no guarantee for dealing with plural values per se. Participatory approaches are loaded with difficulties and raise questions such as, how to cope with influential social actors who shape opinions? How to make sure that facilitators have the relevant skills to manage participation processes effectively? How to avoid artificial consensus? We suggest that more research is needed to show how, when and why deliberative methods are successful in addressing plural values and to understand why they are still marginalised. Until now the methodologies suggested in the literature are rather technical and largely do not address issues of power: Who values? How? And why? We support voices that suggest learning from other fields such as political ecology (Kallis et al. 2013) or classical institutionalism (Spash 2013) to better understand the dynamics underlying valuation. In the section about axiological position, we described different positions in relation to the ontological status of values. In spite of a very limited explicit treatment of this subject in the reviewed ecological economics literature, it is still possible to discover expressions of some of these positions. The subjectivist approach to values can be found 
in	  Lo’s	  definition	  of	  values,	  which	  emphasises	  the	  personal	  and	  subjective	  origin	  of	  values	  
                                                 
2  Lo and Spash (2013) form the exception by showing that not all forms of deliberative methods 
defend value pluralism, e.g. deliberative monetary valuation (DMV). 
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(Lo 2013), while the objectivist approach can be found in the view that vital elements of ecosystems are objectively valuable, regardless of human valuation, due to their importance for the overall functionality of these systems (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998, Kallis et al. 2013). Even though it is possible to find both subjectivist and objectivist approaches to values, the most prominent approach seems to be an understanding of values, which emphasises practices of valuation and value articulating institutions (Vatn 2005). This conceptualisation of values is somewhat parallel to French pragmatism, as touched upon earlier, in the sense that it reflects an interest in how values are articulated through modes of valuation. In this view, the question of incommensurability becomes a question of struggles between opposing modes of valuation.  We find that such questions have not been exhaustively treated in ecological economics, and that there is a need for furthering the research on values and methods of valuation. Ecological economics has contributed to the conceptualisation of value articulating institutions such as multi criteria analysis and deliberative methods, but it seems to us that this work can be seen as basis for continued research in and further development of these institutions3. This connects to our view that the solution to the problems of our time is a democratic issue. If we want to change things, then we need to transform our democratic institutions and processes. In our view this calls for increased attention to values and value articulating institutions.    
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